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ABSTRACT 
 
The process of globalization and the emergence of a rules-based multilateral trading 
system pose significant challenges to local pharmaceutical industries in developing 
countries. With the advent of global patent protection for pharmaceuticals, 
developing countries are facing a significant dilemma. It is necessary for these 
countries to comply with international intellectual property standards while 
simultaneously protecting their local industries and, thus, ensuring an affordable 
supply of drugs. A better understanding of the nature of the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) and its components 
could help to raise awareness of the need for a comprehensive innovation policy. It is 
widely accepted that intellectual property rights (IPRs) are economic assets. 
Furthermore, they are necessary to develop world-class standards of innovation and 
creativity. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that innovation is not driven by the 
presence of strong IPRs alone; it has many other components going far beyond the 
IPRs regime. Nonetheless, designing policies for the promotion of R&D and the 
building up of innovation capacities in developing countries requires a well-
constructed patent regime. However, it also requires the implementation of broad-
based science, technology and innovation policy initiatives aimed at promoting and 
facilitating capacity building for the enhanced absorption of new technologies.  
 
To this end, this thesis investigates the concept of innovation and illustrates the 
crucial role that patent strategies play within processes of pharmaceutical innovation. 
Drawing on extensive country and company case studies, the thesis identifies the key 
issues relevant to the revival of local pharmaceutical industries. Based on an 
understanding of the post-TRIPS environment and case studies of national 
innovation strategies, this thesis specifically addresses the following question - to 
what extent can lessons from national experiences be transferred to current policy 
developments for innovation in the pharmaceutical industry in a developing country 
context?  
 
 4 
The research findings aim to contribute significantly to the body of knowledge in 
relation to new developmental policies. Overall, it is hoped that these findings can 
promote innovation and ensure the sustainability of the local pharmaceutical industry 
in the developing world. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
‘Science is the most reliable guide in life’ 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
 
 
I.I. Background 
 
The origins of pharmaceuticals can be traced back to ancient times. The practice of 
medicine was at a relatively advanced stage in ancient civilisations. Naturally 
occurring substances were often used to heal wounds and to relieve pain and treat 
infections. Medicines were compounded from a variety of substances including the 
remains of animals, plants, and minerals, as well as from other traditional sources 
e.g. honey.  
 
The urbanisation process, which occurred following the Middle Ages, contributed to 
the development of the specialised field of apothecary, a method of formulating and 
dispensing materia medica1 for healing purposes. The process of drug manufacturing 
was associated with apothecaries, who were specialised in the preparing and 
dispensing of drugs according to recognised standards. In the centuries that followed, 
these apothecaries became known as chemists and druggists, many of whom initiated 
the process of drug discovery in their back street shops.   
 
The industrial revolution, which began in the 18th century, changed the way of doing 
things dramatically. There was a clear shift from manual home productions to 
machine-based manufacturing, which took place in factories. The development of 
new industries and factories coupled with the usage of new machinery contributed to 
the rising level of economic growth in Europe and in North America.  
 
                                                       
1 “Materials of medicine" in Latin. 
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The industrial revolution began initially in Great Britain. It then spread throughout 
other European countries such as Germany, France, Switzerland and North America. 
At this time, a significant amount of technology transfer took place, moving from 
Great Britain to all the latecomer countries. This technological and economic catch 
up was based on borrowing, copying and modelling. Flexible legal systems and 
supportive government policies appreciably contributed to the industrialisation 
process. 
 
In late 19th century, German dye companies emerged as the vanguard of a new 
generation of pharmaceutical companies. German companies initially transferred 
knowledge and technology from Britain. These companies imitated English 
manufacturing methods. Nevertheless, the German companies invested heavily into 
research and development (R&D). Importantly, the companies established research 
collaboration agreements with the universities.  When compared to their British 
rivals, the German companies were more successful in using their capital efficiently 
and avoiding legal hassles regarding patents. The German companies expanded their 
R&D activities into the chemistry area. The firms developed techniques in relation to 
synthesising and the development of chemical compounds. These efforts later led to 
the nucleus of the modern pharmaceutical industry. By the early 20th century, the 
German dye industry had become a global powerhouse that effectively dominated 
the world chemical and pharmaceutical market.  
 
The rise of the German dye industry was a turning point in the history of the 
pharmaceutical industry. It prompted the investment of tremendous resources in 
pharmaceutical R&D in other countries. The discoveries of penicillin and insulin 
revolutionised the course of drug discovery. The emergence of new technological 
opportunities for drug development and increased R&D activities enabled American 
companies to grow into pharmaceutical world powers.  
 
Over the course of the 20th century, most European countries and Japan had 
completed their industrialisation process. These countries made remarkable 
achievements in the areas of drug discovery and development. The pharmaceutical 
companies in the US, Western Europe and Japan became the dominant inventors and 
suppliers of the world drug market. This Western shift from a position of being a 
 16 
borrower to being an innovator created a global market for intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) protection. Patent protection, in particular, became vital to the 
continuation of the innovative pharmaceutical company model. The high profit 
margins associated with pharmaceuticals lent consistency and continuity to the 
industry. The respective national governments soon realised the industry’s huge 
potential in creating an attractive growth market for investment, employment and 
exports.  Thus, the pharmaceutical industries in developed countries started to play 
an influential role in developing social, political and economic issues of national and 
international importance.  
 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the social and economic distinction 
between industrialised developed countries, and the non-industrialised developing 
countries became much clearer. The scientific and technological gap between these 
two categories of country became apparent, particularly in the area of life sciences. 
Some of the developing countries have invested a great deal of effort towards 
narrowing this widening gap by building up their local capacities. These developing 
countries have explored alternative approaches as a means to close the gap. They 
have pushed hard on the development side. At that time, it appeared that the best 
option was to follow the traditional development path taken by most of the 
developed countries. This traditional process includes a learning process. This 
process largely involves imitation. Over the course of the industrialisation process, 
all developed countries have ultimately relied heavily on imitation in order to build 
up their own technological capacities and to assimilate knowledge. At this time, the 
conventional wisdom suggested that imitation was a stepping-stone to innovation. In 
fact, industrialised country experiences suggest that imitation or free riding is indeed 
an essential and primary part of the catching-up process. Hence, as part of this 
process, the first thing for a country to do was to establish a legal environment 
conducive to the development goals of the country. Most of the developing country 
economies at this time were unable to deal with the increased population and health 
care costs. Due to an increasing number of health crises, access to affordable 
medicines emerged as an important policy issue. There was a constant public interest 
in serving national supply requirements.  
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To a certain extent, in an effort to facilitate imitation and borrowing and to cut 
increasing healthcare costs, most of the developing countries opted not to grant 
patents for pharmaceuticals products and/or processes.2 The absence of patent 
protection assisted the progress of the local pharmaceutical industries in the 
developing countries. Companies within these countries specialised in the area of 
generic medicines and built up their capacities. They also developed their skills and 
competences in the area of drug manufacturing. Certain countries like India and 
China became the exporters of generic drugs to Africa and other developing country 
continents.  
 
Soon enough, the Western pharmaceutical companies experienced a significant 
decline in their global market sales. This led to trade deficits for developed countries, 
and particularly the US economy was negatively affected. Eventually, what became 
known as the other drug war came to the forefront of US policy. Using its strong 
lobbying power, the pharmaceutical industry wanted the US government to take 
measures against developing countries and the generic companies therein. Thus, the 
US government initiated trade sanctions against certain developing countries in order 
to force them to take certain measures regarding patents and pharmaceutical product 
protection in the country.  By this stage, it could be said that the good policies of the 
past had already became the bad policies of the present day. Although the US was 
once itself an imitator country, in recent times the US industry vowed to take a zero 
tolerance policy towards borrowing and imitating. The outcome of the bilateral 
dialogues was not successful. Alternatively, it could be said that it was not sufficient 
enough to protect the global market for IPRs. Hence, the developed countries, led by 
the US, took the issue to the multinational setting in order to create an ambitious and 
comprehensive agreement on standards for the protection of IPRs of all kinds.  
 
The Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) was a package deal, whereby countries made certain concessions in 
exchange for trade benefits. It stands as the first multilateral treaty that sought to use 
                                                       
2 According to the study of WIPO in 1988, among 98 members of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, 49 members excluded pharmaceutical products from protection. See, 
DRAHOS P.: “Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-setting”,JWIP, 
V.5, 2002, pp.765-789 
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IPRs as commodities in the area of international trade law. TRIPS set the standards 
for the global market of IPRs and it established the minimum standards for 
protection.  
 
The placement of IPRs in trade agreements has led to strict restrictions on knowledge 
diffusion and transfer. The historical record of industrialised countries shows that 
traditionally knowledge was transferred freely across national borders, during the 
period when the developed countries were themselves developing countries. 
Nevertheless, after TRIPS, knowledge became a trade related commodity, subject to 
strict rules. In other words, TRIPS changed the nature of the game to a game where 
the winner takes all.  
 
It was particularly controversial that patents were given universal acknowledgement 
in relation to pharmaceutical products. The advocates of the Agreement have claimed 
that strong protection of pharmaceutical products is necessary to ensure greater 
technology transfers and foreign direct investment (FDI) in R&D in developing 
countries. Undoubtedly, such a confrontational approach ruled out the possibility of 
catching up through the traditional process of industrialisation through imitation and 
adaptation. This process is historically proven to be an effective strategy for 
developed countries.  
 
Another emerging problem was the foreseeable negative consequences of a 
strengthened patent regime on healthcare costs and access to medicines. This was 
one of the unique circumstances that characterised the TRIPS negotiations. The 
developed countries stayed totally indifferent in relation to addressing the negative 
outcomes of a strong patent regime on developing countries. Even though there were 
attempts to overcome such problems, the global solution has remained elusive. 
Arguably, the solution is still at the mercy of developed countries and multinational 
pharmaceutical companies.  
 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that developing countries have run out 
of options. At an individual country level, a degree of optimism still exists. Some 
developing countries have encouraged a sustainable local pharmaceutical industry. 
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This provides heartening evidence that the developing countries may yet be able 
change the nature of the game into winner does not necessarily take it all game.  
 
I.II. Terminology 
 
Developed and Developing Countries 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of developed 
and developing countries. These two terms are frequently used in the literature, but 
there is no consensus within the United Nations system on a definition of developed 
or developing in relation to countries. The conventional wisdom suggests that 
countries like the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and the European 
Union are considered to be developed countries. In this thesis, the term developed 
countries indicates a group of countries, where each country has completed the 
development process. The term includes certain countries possessing a strong 
pharmaceutical industry such as the US, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, 
France, Sweden etc.  
 
To say a country is a developing country is to refer to a country that has hitherto 
been unable to achieve a significant degree of industrialisation. Article 65 of TRIPS 
provides for transitional periods for countries as those in the process of 
transformation from a centrally planned into a market, free-enterprise economy and 
which is undertaking structural reform of its intellectual property system and facing 
special problems in the preparation and implementation of intellectual property laws 
and regulations. Nevertheless, there is no definition of what constitutes a developing 
country in Article 65(2) of TRIPS but, in addition to a developing country, any 
Member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that is in the process of 
transformation from a centrally-planned into a market economy etc. within the scope 
of Article 65(3) may also avail itself of the same extended transitional periods 
available to a developing country in accordance with Article 65(2). 3 
 
                                                       
3 See, Article 65 of TRIPS 
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In fact, the group of developing countries is far from being a homogenous group. 
With the exception of one subgroup i.e. the least developed countries4, the 
developing countries have a diverse range of characteristics.  The broad term of 
developing countries includes the least developed countries, the emerging economies 
as well as some newly industrialised countries. In this thesis, the term developing 
countries mostly refers to emerging economies. These are economies that already 
have a certain level of technological and scientific advantage and furthermore, these 
countries possess internationally well-recognised local pharmaceutical industries. 
 
Local Pharmaceutical Industry 
In this thesis, the term local pharmaceutical industry refers to domestic 
pharmaceutical companies in developing countries. These industries are able to meet 
a certain proportion of the local demand for drugs within each country and contribute 
to local economy to a certain extent. The pharmaceutical companies in these areas 
usually focus their activities on the production and distribution of generic drugs. 
They already have developed their capacities and built up their skill levels over the 
course of the imitating phase.  
 
Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies 
This term is used to identify and describe the pharmaceutical industry in developed 
countries. The business model of these companies is based on a strong research 
capacity and a high level of investment in research-based activities. These countries 
possess economic and political power over the governments of developed countries.  
 
I.III. Objective 
 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that the developing countries in question still have a 
number of options for surviving the post-TRIPS period. Furthermore, these countries 
have the potential to even boost their current levels of pharmaceutical innovation. 
                                                       
4 This category of countries are deemed highly disadvantaged in their development process (many of 
them for geographical reasons), and facing more than other countries the risk of failing to come out of 
poverty. See, UN recognition of the Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3618&lang=1, (24.09.2010)  
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The research on IPRs and TRIPS to date has tended to focus on legal issues rather 
than the practical issues i.e. the national innovation strategies and systems. 
 
The national innovation system greatly contributes to the growth of the economy. 
This contribution includes increasing the flow of technology and knowledge and 
raising levels of socio-economic development. It has become evident that unless 
IPRs are well supported by other complementary socio-economic essentials, the 
existence of an IPRs regime is very unlikely to support innovation and development 
within a country. Thus, the developing countries are well advised to create effective 
innovation strategies utilising the relevant TRIPS flexibilities, enhancing their local 
capabilities and prioritising technology transfer and information flow.  
 
To this end, this thesis sets out a number of recommendations on how this can be 
achieved. This is done in relation to the key development objectives of promoting the 
technological and scientific advancement of the country, enhancing local 
pharmaceutical innovation capacities, providing wide access to medicines and 
knowledge, safeguarding public health interests, and fostering innovation.   
 
I.IV. Hypotheses 
 
The relationship between patents, innovation and developing countries is a complex, 
multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary one. The impact of the IPRs regime on local 
innovation and economic development has been an issue of controversy in recent 
years. The role of IPRs to the innovation process has recently been challenged by 
economic studies. These studies demonstrate that patents do not act as a determinant 
of R&D investments in many industrial fields. Moreover, the post-TRIPS 
experiences of developing countries have made it evident that the global IPRs rules 
alone have delivered little more than broken promises to developing countries.  
 
Nevertheless, it may still be asserted that the high level of patent protection may well 
be beneficial for a country, providing that certain economic and social conditions are 
met. This discussion, however, goes far beyond the IPRs regime and the relevant 
legal literature. To demonstrate this, this thesis is based on the hypothesis that a 
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desirable level and scope of patent protection may vary over the course of 
development of a country. This hypothesis is tested by introducing two key 
questions: 
 
1.To what extent does a well-constructed patent system contribute to the national 
innovation system and pharmaceutical innovation in a country? 
2. How can TRIPS flexibilities be employed to induce local pharmaceutical 
innovation? 
 
The thesis further argues that an IPRs regime is necessary, but is not sufficient by 
itself, to induce local innovation and R&D investment. It may well be considered 
alongside that of other complementary essentials such as enhancing local capacity 
building in R&D, absorbing new knowledge and promoting innovation. To validate 
this premise, the country and company case studies, are presented as the real-life-
lessons.  These lessons look at the experiences of countries that have implemented 
development friendly policies. These policies have the aim of combining both IPRs 
and other complementary essentials. Furthermore, these policies had the ultimate aim 
of defending the country’s own local interests in terms of innovation and 
development. Finally, the thesis aims to determine the extent to which the lessons 
learned from the case studies are useful and to what degree they are transferable to 
the current policies regarding development and innovation in the pharmaceutical 
sector within developing countries. 
I.V. Research Methodology 
 
This thesis combines both theoretical and empirical data.  
 
I.V.I. Theoretical Data  
 
The theoretical data involves the relevant legal and economic literature as well as 
legislation and case law. It also includes reports from international organisations, 
non-governmental organisations, interest groups, and news items. The theoretical 
framework employs a structural business analysis of social, legal, economic, political 
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and technological factors (known as SLEPT analysis5). The SLEPT analysis provides 
a range of useful concepts to gain a better understanding of complex interplay 
between patents and innovation as well as the industry structures. Throughout the 
thesis, further references will be made to these factors in order to emphasise the 
importance of these factors in constructing the IPRs regime and implementing 
national innovation strategies. The SLEPT analysis of the local pharmaceutical 
industry in developing countries is given below. 
I.V.I.I. Structural Analysis Of The Local Pharmaceutical Industry In 
Developing Countries (SLEPT Model)  
 
The Social Factors 
The very existence of the local pharmaceutical (generic) industry is a socially 
significant factor in developing countries. Local industry directly contributes to the 
local health care system and to the social development of society.  
 
The access to medicines problems have emerged out of the conflicts over patents 
within developing countries. The local industry’s ability to make and sell 
cheap generic drugs increases the access to medicines in the country. It also 
improves the negotiation power of the country in obtaining price cuts from 
multinational pharmaceutical companies.  
 
Legal Environment  
The local pharmaceutical industries in developing countries owe their beginnings to 
the absence of patent protection for pharmaceutical products within these countries. 
Increasing health costs as well as unfair trade practices, coupled with the market 
disturbances of multinational pharmaceutical companies, led to the abolishment or 
non-introduction of patent protection for any type of pharmaceutical and chemical 
product and/or process in developing countries. Over the years, this trend spread and 
became common practice in many developing countries. Nevertheless, TRIPS 
changed the global IPRs landscape with respect to patent protection and 
enforcement.  More importantly, TRIPS granted patent protection to any invention, 
                                                       
5 See, DRANSFIELD R. & NEEDHAM D.: GCE AS Level Applied Business Double Award for 
OCR, Oxford, Heinemann, 2005 pp.140-142 
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whether it was a product or process, in all fields of the technology, without any 
discrimination. As a part of the TRIPS deal, developing countries were given 
transition periods in order to bring national legislation and practices into line with the 
TRIPS provisions. The transition periods expired in 2005 for most of the developing 
countries, including India and China. Since then, the new and strengthened patent 
regime is applicable.  
 
Economic Value 
The local pharmaceutical industries in developing countries contribute significantly 
to economic growth and development. The price element and the access element are 
probably the two most controversial features of the local health care systems. The 
availability of cheap and accessible generic medicines in the local market 
significantly contributes to control of the drug prices. The growth of the local 
pharmaceutical (generic) industry enhances competitive positioning in the market, 
stimulates healthcare quality improvement and diversifies the economy. 
 
A future market perspective entails the encouragement of productivity increases, the 
diversification of product lines and the expansion R&D activities in the search for 
new molecules/compounds. The long-term goals involve a long-standing shift from 
generic drugs to innovator drugs. The industry’s efforts to build its domestic 
technological and scientific capabilities, and to improve local production supply, 
contribute to the social and economic welfare of the country. 
 
Political Dimension 
The existence of strong and self-sufficient local pharmaceutical industries is 
politically and economically crucial for developing countries. The presence of large 
populations, limited economic resources, and the high costs associated with health 
care and social services, pose significant challenges to developing countries, in 
particular in the areas of access to medicine and knowledge. The international 
political clout possessed by developed countries and multinational companies affects 
the ability of developing countries to make the optimal economic and political 
choices and to deploy effective policies with regard to generic medicines and the 
local pharmaceutical industry.  
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Technological Capacity 
In most of the cases the technological and scientific base of the local industry is not 
sufficient to achieve longer-term economic stability. Technological progress within 
the industry entails large-scale improvement of the capacities to absorb and use new 
knowledge and technologies.  
 
Technological and scientific advancements in drug discovery and the changing 
market conditions are reshaping the business strategies of the local pharmaceutical 
(generic) companies. These long-term future strategies are aimed at inducing local 
technological innovation and facilitating the local industry’s participation in the 
patent system.  
 
I.V.II. Empirical Data  
 
Most of the empirical data was gathered through case studies relating to country and 
company experiences.  The case studies on Israel and Teva Pharmaceuticals 
(hereinafter referred as Teva) draw from fieldwork conducted in Israel. The data is 
collected through interviews with important public and private stakeholders in this 
country. The interview data provided background information on country specific 
issues covering economic, social, cultural, technological, legal and political aspects. 
It further provided insights to the interpretation of the data contained in the current 
literature.  
 
The interviews conducted with representatives from the Israeli Patent Office, the 
Office of the Chief Scientist, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour, the 
Ministry of Justice, as well as academic experts from the University of Tel Aviv, the 
University of Haifa, Bar Ilan University, and representatives of the national generic 
industry. It was also necessary to interview lawyers from law firms representing 
either the international pharmaceutical industry, or the national generic industry, in 
Israel.  
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All of the interviews for this study were conducted on a non-attributable basis due to 
the economic and commercial sensitivity of the issues discussed. The anonymity of 
the interviewees was crucial. This allowed the interviewees to share their knowledge 
and experiences. Thus, in order to protect the anonymity, the interviews were not 
taped. No direct quotations are used and any evidence that may identify the 
interviewees is left out. Notes from all interviews are on record and can be disclosed 
on a confidential basis without identifying the interviewee. Annex I provides a list of 
interviewees on a non-attributable basis. 
 
The nature of the interview questions varied, depending on the interviewee. The 
representatives from the Israeli Patent Office and Ministry were asked about the 
patent regime, and how the patent regime evolved over time. The representatives 
from the Office of the Chief Scientist and the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour 
were asked about the national innovation system, including questions concerning the 
components of the innovation system and the role of patents within the system. 
Questions to representatives from the local pharmaceutical industry were directed 
towards the structures of the local and international pharmaceutical market. This 
included questions on patent strategies, local political and economic factors, and 
innovation patterns within the industry. The other interviews were with law firms 
who represented either the international pharmaceutical industry or the national 
generic industry. These interviews focused on the patent regime and case law.  
 
I.VI. Outline Of Chapters 
 
Seven chapters and the introduction and conclusion parts comprise the corpus of this 
thesis. 
  
Chapter One outlines the issues surrounding the concept of innovation and patents. It 
presents the economic rationales of patent rights and discusses how these rationales 
apply in the context of innovation. By relying on economic studies, the chapter 
engages in an assessment of the importance of patents in different industries. As a 
conclusion, the chapter presents the pharmaceutical industry as an exceptional case, 
whereby patents are vital in order to enhance appropriability conditions.  
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Chapter two focuses on the pharmaceutical industry and innovation patterns therein. 
It further delves into the relationship between patents and pharmaceutical innovation 
and provides an economic and technological examination of the innovation process 
in pharmaceuticals. The chapter continues with a review of the historical 
development of the pharmaceutical industry. Finally, the chapter assesses the 
structure of local pharmaceutical in developing countries and generic companies and 
gives an account of the tension that arose between the developed and developing 
countries in pre-TRIPS era.  
 
Chapter three take this discussion further. It examines the political, economic, social, 
legal and technological consequences of TRIPS. In exploring the key content and 
flexibilities of TRIPS, the analysis is aimed at gaining a better understanding of 
TRIPS in order to minimise the potential side effects and to fill in the gaps between 
IPRs and innovation.  
 
Chapter four expands the analysis into issues surrounding the concept of IPRs and 
innovation. The objective of this chapter is to highlight and present the most 
significant sequences of innovation and to discuss how these indicators can be 
interpreted and used in policy design for innovation. It identifies the complementary 
policy essentials, other than IPRs, and discusses how these factors contribute to the 
national innovation system. 
 
Chapter five focuses on the experiences of four countries. The countries surveyed are 
the United States, Japan, South Korea and Israel. These countries went through the 
catch-up process at different times under different circumstances. Nevertheless, the 
innovation literature usually presents these country examples as innovation success 
stories. In this study, these countries were prioritised because of the presence of local 
policies that were implemented with the aim of encouraging the growth of the local 
pharmaceutical industry within each country. In this context, each case study 
provides an analysis of contemporary issues with regard to innovation. Each study 
assesses how these issues have been addressed in each country. Particular focus is 
given to the patent regimes, and specifically the impact of patent laws on the 
catching-up process. The case study method is adopted to embody a deep knowledge 
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of innovation and to generate a number of theoretical propositions for explaining the 
potential outcomes.  
 
Chapter six throws a spotlight on Teva and its successful business strategies. Teva 
presents a promising example of a local pharmaceutical company, which has 
travelled up to innovation ladder and has grown into a pharmaceutical giant. The 
case study of Teva reveals important mechanisms that might be put in place in order 
to drive long-term global growth in local pharmaceutical industries. Thus, the 
chapter analyses the facts and circumstances that are associated with a company’s 
business strategy in order to determine how particular strategic choices have been 
made. It ends with the details of the distinctive trajectories of the company that have 
helped to shape the present and future successes of the company.  
 
Chapter seven summarises the real-life lessons that are learned from the case studies. 
The chapter discusses the extent to which these lessons are applicable to developing 
countries. Thus, the chapter provides policy recommendations. While many scholars 
and international organisations approach IPRs simply from a legal angle, this thesis 
attempts to engage and open up debate about IPRs as essential component of 
innovation by integrating legal, political, technological and socio-economic 
considerations. This makes doctoral research significant in the theoretical approach it 
takes towards the current innovation debate.   
 
The concluding chapter briefly discusses the applicability of the research findings to 
developing countries. One of the most significant findings to emerge from this 
chapter is that there is a constant need for new models or recipes that are locally 
created. Although very important principles and implications emerged from the 
research findings, the application of the former in developing countries often 
depends upon the prevalent legal, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological 
conditions of each country.  
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II.INNOVATION 
 
 
II.I. Introduction 
 
Over the last few decades, innovation has become a widely used concept. It is 
frequently associated with globalisation and economic prosperity. The current rules-
based, multi-lateral trading system presents innovation as the global way forward. It 
is often stated that encouraging innovation is key to economic growth and 
sustainable development, especially for developing countries.  Furthermore, with the 
emergence of TRIPS, a great deal of attention has focused on the role of IPRs and 
their impact on innovation and technology transfer. Patent rights, or IPRs more 
broadly, have become central to many issues surrounding innovation. The debate in 
this area has created a constant need for developing countries to develop a better 
understanding of concept of innovation including the necessary trade off between 
innovation and patents. 
 
Taking this context into account, the present chapter outlines the issues surrounding 
the concept of innovation. The objective of the chapter is to highlight and present the 
economic rationales of patent rights and to discuss how these rationales apply to the 
context of innovation. The familiar argument is that patents create incentives to 
innovate; yet little is known about how those incentives work in practice. It is still an 
open question in the literature as to whether patents actually encourage and promote 
innovation. Although the empirical evidence is to some extent ambiguous, it does 
indicate a positive correlation in favour of the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Thus, this chapter, describes and critically appraises a number of studies reporting on 
i) innovation ii) innovation and patents, and iii) the economic effects of patents and 
how efficiently they work creating optimal incentives. Furthermore, the present 
chapter details the research methodology undertaken to identify and assess the 
relevant economic and legal literature.  
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II.II. The Concept Of Innovation 
 
It is widely recognised that innovation is central to the welfare of humankind 
because the social returns to innovation exceed the private returns. In other words, 
the benefits of innovation to society as a whole greatly exceed the benefits to the 
firms that develop the innovative processes and products.6 
 
The basic definition of innovation can be simply described, as making changes to 
what already exists. Innovation can, therefore, be considered as an interactive 
process in which later steps in the process are linked back to the earlier ones.7 It 
encompasses a new idea brought to the market or into the production strategy. 
Successful innovation makes a significant contribution to economic growth. In a 
narrow sense, innovation can be characterised as the act of starting for the first time 
and later introducing something new (e.g. initial technology that led to high tech- 
technology).  
 
To a large extent, the possession of technological knowledge regarding potential 
production arrangements in conjunction with knowledge of the technology in use 
comprises the given state of the arts. In this context, invention is described as 
producing technological changes in the knowledge available. However, innovation is 
defined as the application of existing knowledge to changes in the actual 
technological arrangements. Historically, the relationship between invention and 
innovation is usually examined in accordance with the three separate patterns of 
technological change.  Before the industrial revolution, it was often the same person 
who performed both the invention and the innovation. This person also devised new 
techniques and applied them. With the introduction of labour-saving machinery and 
the growth of the patent system, separate persons started to carry out invention and 
innovation, i.e. the inventor sold the rights to his invention to the innovator and the 
innovator manufactured and marketed it. The second half of the 20th century saw a 
substantial increase in R&D investments and a large amount of technological change 
                                                       
6 BAKER J. B. : “Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation”, AAI WP. 07-
04, 2007, p.2 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103623  (05.02.2011). See MANSFIELD 
E.: “Microeconomics of technological Innovation” in GUILE B. & BROOKS H.: Technology and 
Global Industry, Washington DC, National Academy Press, 1987, pp.307-326 
7 LUNDVALL B: Innovation, Growth and Social Cohesion, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002, p. 43 
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has originated from industrial R&D activities. Hence, today many economic theories 
assume that it is now a given that the individual firm invents and innovates as a 
normal part of business activity.8 
 
Economists have long argued that there is a sharp distinction between invention and 
innovation. According to Schumpeter, widely cited as the undisputed godfather of 
technological innovation, invention and innovation are not synonymous terms 
because ‘the making of the invention and the carrying out of the corresponding 
innovation are, economically and sociologically, two entirely different things’. He 
asserts that even though they often interact, they are never the same, and innovations 
are usually more important than inventions.9 The Schumpeterian theory solely 
focuses on the innovator, not on the inventor. While it considers innovation to be a 
distinctly economic process and a matter of business activity, it places invention 
outside the economic realm.  
 
 
 
Figure I.I. Invention and Innovation 
                                                       
8 SOLO C. S.: “ Innovation in the Capitalist Process: A Critique of the Schumpeterian Theory” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, V. 65, N.3, 1951, p. 417; DASGUPTA P. : “ The theory of 
Technological Competition” in STIGLITZ J. & MATHEWSON G.: New Developments in the 
Analysis of Market Structure, Cambridge, MIT Press,1986, pp.519-548; MERGES R.: "Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation: Commercial Success and Patent Standards", California Law Review, V. 
76, I.4, 1988, p.843 
9 SCHUMPETER J.: Business Cycles, V. I–II, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, pp.84-86 
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Along with the Schumpeterian theory, economists since Schumpeter typically 
distinguish between invention and innovation. Invention is usually taken as a starting 
point. It often refers to the act of finding new things whereas innovation is 
considered as a process of getting new things done.10 As such, the term invention 
refers to a technical idea that can lead to new products or that can be used to solve an 
industrial problem. Nonetheless, innovation describes the process of introducing a 
new technology – in the usual case, the arrival of an invention in a commercialised 
form on the market.11  For Maskus, invention refers to creation of new knowledge, 
and innovation, or commercialisation more broadly, includes development of 
marketable products from that knowledge.12 However, this does not imply that the 
firm that achieves success with an innovation is the first to perfect a particular 
invention.13  
 
Schumpeterian theory describes innovation as the truly dynamic element in the 
economy i.e. it is the source of credit, interest, and profit as well as of business 
fluctuations.14 The process of innovation includes several stages such as the 
gathering of new ideas, and the transforming of those ideas into new marketable 
commodities. It also includes spreading and, at times, sharing the use of those ideas 
and commodities.15 In a broader sense, innovation means establishing a new 
production function, covering the cases of new commodities as well as those of a 
new form of organisation e.g. a merger, expanding into new markets, etc.16  
 
Innovation may entail redesigning goods, altering the production process, the 
composition of material inputs. It may also include assessing the kinds and mixture 
of skills deployed, as well as the nature of upstream and downstream linkages. It may 
                                                       
10 KINGSTON W.: “ Why patents need reform, some suggestions for it” in ARUP C. & van 
CAENEGEM W.: Intellectual Property Policy Reform, Edward Elgar, Clentham, 2009, p.22 
11 MERGES, supra note 8, p.845 
12 MASKUS K., DOUGHERTY S. & MERTHA A.: “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development in China” in FINK C. & MASKUS K.: Intellectual Property and Development, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2005, p.299 
13 MERGES, supra note 8, p.860 
14 SOLO, supra note 8, p.427 
15 ROBERTS E.: Generating Technological Innovation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp.3-
7 
16 SCHUMPETER, supra note 9, pp. 84-86: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the 
Capitalist Process, V.1, New York, McGraw Hill, 1939, p.87 
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also offer new and more efficient machinery, reorganisation of work, new ways of 
transporting inputs and outputs, etc.  No matter how big or small they are, all 
improvements across the whole spectrum that leads to innovation and economic 
activity17; ‘when taken together...(innovation) may be (the) true unsung hero of 
economic growth’.18 
 
It is also true to say that innovation usually proceeds through the interaction of many 
actors including government, industry, universities and research institutions. 
Innovation simultaneously shapes market structure. Theoretical research indicates 
that there is a complex interaction of technical and social factors. These factors 
include market structures as well as the presence of scientific and technological 
knowledge.19  
 
II.II.I Innovation And Imitation 
 
It is often suggested that there is a trade-off between innovation and imitation. 
Recent evidence suggests that in order to stimulate economic development and/or 
maximising social welfare, there exists some optimal mixture of innovation and 
imitation. This mixture tends to vary, depending on country characteristics and 
preferences.20 The trade off between innovation and imitation is also highly 
dependent on the demand of consumers, the economic environment, the probability 
of success and the strategies of rival firms.21  
 
The process of imitation includes imitating, copying or counterfeiting. According to 
Schumpeter; imitation refers to the diffusion of innovation where innovation is 
                                                       
17 TRAJTENBERG M.: “ Innovation Policy for Development: An Overview”, STE Program WP, 
STE-WP-34-200, p.5 
18 MOKYR J:  “The Great Synergy: the European Enlightenment as a factor in Modern Economic 
growth.”, Society for Economic Dynamics, Meeting Papers, 179, 2005; TRAJTENBERG, supra note 
17, p.5 
19 SAHA T: Research, Development and Technological Innovation, Lexington, Lexington Books, 
1980, pp.116-118 
20 PARK W.: “Patent Rights and Economic Freedom: Friend or Foe?”, JPE, V.18, N1, 2002, p.89 
21 MOHTADI H. & RUEDIGER S.: “Imitation, Innovation and Threshold Effects: A Game Theoretic 
Approach”,http://www.uwm.edu/~ruediger/Imitation,%20Innovation%20and%20Threshold%20Effec
ts%20A%20Game%20Theoretic%20Approach%20Mohtadi%20Ruediger%202009.pdf, 2009, p.3 
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defined as the commercialisation of invention, which is a purely physical set of 
creation and discovery.22  
 
There are two main features underlying imitation; firstly, the imitator may make no 
payment to the innovator and secondly, the development costs incurred by the 
imitator are typically lower than those of the innovator.23  Prior economic analysis 
suggested that considering the cost of R&D, it is less expensive for a small firm to 
imitate another firm’s innovative activity. However, an economic study conducted on 
marginal costs of the imitator and innovator firms shows that the marginal cost of the 
imitator (non-innovating) company will usually be higher than those of the 
innovating firm. Since the innovating firm is always a step ahead of the imitator 
company, although innovating poses a fixed cost for the innovating firm, the 
marginal cost will be lower.24  
 
For example, Mansfield et al. found that about 60% of the patented successful 
innovations in their sample were imitated.25 Furthermore, the survey conducted 
among industry R&D personnel, Richard Levin et.al found that even major patented 
innovation could be imitated within three or fewer years.26  
 
It should be noted that the relative effectiveness of patents and the subsequent risk of 
imitation might differ across industries. For inventions that are difficult to reverse-
engineer such as airplane designs, patents inevitably became costly because 
disclosure raises the risk of imitation. Furthermore, even the safest patent expires at 
the end of the statutory term. Nevertheless, for inventions those are easy to reverse-
engineer, such as drugs where disclosure is imminent with or without patenting, 
patents provide great benefits by providing exclusivity at least for a limited period.27  
 
                                                       
22 See, KIM L.: Imitation to Innovation, Boston, Harvard Business Press, 1997, p.13 
23 KATZ M. & SHARIPO C.: “ R&D Rivalry with Licensing and Imitation”, AER, V.77, N.3, 1987, 
p.403 
24 MOHTADI & RUEDINGER: supra note 21, pp.9-10 
25MANSFIELD E, SCHWARTZ M. & WAGNER S: “Imitation Costs And Patents - An Empirical-
Study” Economic Journal, V.91, N.364, 1981, pp.907-918 
26LEVIN R., KLEVORICK A., NELSON R. & WINTER S.: “Appropriating the Returns from 
Industrial Research and Development”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1987, pp.783-820 
27 MOSER P.: “How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-Century 
World Fairs”, NBER, WP. 9909, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9909, (21.09.2010), p.14 
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In addition to high marginal costs, the empirical evidence shows that imitation 
reduces rewards. It also has a diminishing effect on incentives to innovate. A weak 
IPRs regime in developing countries tends to increase the probability of imitation; 
furthermore the introduction of IPRs lowers the profits retained from imitation and 
places considerable pressures on imitative firms in developing economies. Hence, the 
promotion of innovation and technology transfer in developing countries strongly 
depends on the restriction of illegal imitation activities.  
 
The economic study of Futagami et al., provides compelling evidence of the value of 
IPRs and their long-term effects on innovation. The study shows that governments in 
developing countries may promote innovation and technology transfer by 
strengthening IPRs protection. Typically, IPRs are enforced by restricting the 
imitation of products.28 Nevertheless, there are also some empirical economic 
findings that identify the economic conditioning factors regarding the relationship 
between imitation and innovation. Hence it is required that specific economic 
conditions should be present in each country in order for the country to benefit from 
strengthening the IPRs regimes.29  
 
II.II.II. Schumpeterian Theory of Innovation: Monopoly or Competition?  
 
With few exceptions, the Schumpeterian theory of innovation has been long 
neglected by legal scholars and has not received any sustained attention. For Merges, 
the reason could be that the economic analysis related legal literature usually focuses 
on microeconomic modelling. Nonetheless, the Schumpeterian perspective appears 
to be well suited for examining the relationship and interaction between legal rules, 
specifically patent laws, and innovation.30  
 
Schumpeterian innovation theory rest on three major principles:  
 
                                                       
28 FUTUGAMI K. & IWAISAKO T. & TANAKA H. : “ Innovation, Licensing and Imitation: The 
Effects of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Industrial Policy” Discussion Papers 07-05, 
OSIPP, 2007, available at http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0705.pdf, (24.09.2010), 
pp.2-28 
29 MOTHADI &RUEDIGER, supra note 21, p.11 
30 MERGES, supra note 8, p.845 
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1) A continuous process of creative destruction in which innovative technologies and 
organisational structures constantly threaten the status quo, something that tends to 
characterise the capitalist economies; 
2) Technological innovation provides the opportunity for temporary monopoly 
profits, and the Western economies owe much of their existence to this linkage and  
3) Large firms are more likely to keep the engine of technological innovation; 
therefore an industry structure encouraging innovation and competition among large 
firms instead of small ones appears to be the best structure for fostering 
technological innovation.31 
 
According to Schumpeter, there is nothing like perfect competition to create optimal 
incentives for innovation. The concept of perfect competition fits very well with 
mathematical modelling. However, it neglects the dynamics of creative destruction. 
He further notes, ‘perfect competition is and always has been temporarily suspended 
whenever anything new is being introduced – automatically or by measures devised 
for the purpose- even in otherwise perfectly competitive conditions’. He asserts that 
the economic theory tends to put so much emphasis on the analysis of price that it 
neglects the essential elements, which counts as the competition from the new 
commodity i.e. the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of 
organisation.32  
 
For Schumpeterian theory, monopolies33 generally favour innovation. However, 
competitive market structures and innovation processes tend to contradict each other.  
Schumpeter argued that competitive market structures are not compatible with 
innovation, as they do not provide the innovator with a market environment in which 
he can appropriate enough of the returns from innovation to justify his R&D 
investments.  
 
                                                       
31 SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, p.81-106; MERGES, supra note 8, p.843 ; MENELL P.: 
Intellectual Property, General Theories, Levine's WP Archive (618897000000000707), 2003, p.135 
32 SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, p.105 
33 Schumpeter describes monopolist as single sellers whose markets are not open to the intrusion of 
would-be producers of the same commodity and of actual producers of similar ones or, more 
technically, only those single sellers who face a given demand schedule that is severely independent 
of their own action as well as of any reactions to their action by other concerns. See, SCHUMPETER, 
supra note 12, p.99 
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Furthermore, it is widely known that Adam Smith, usually cited as the father of 
modern economists, vigorously opposed monopoly power. He saw it as detrimental 
to the operation of the invisible hand.  He was, however, one of the first economists 
to strongly emphasise the need for limited monopolies to promote innovation 
requiring substantial up-front investment and risk.34 
 
Many economists welcomed Schumpeter’s challenge to orthodox competition 
theory, and specifically to the theory, which regards perfect competition as the most 
conducive means of achieving efficiency in the market.35 Scherer and Ross, however, 
were critical of Schumpeterian theorists because these theorists were solely focusing 
on powerful monopolies, and tightly knit cartels, in relation to the model of dynamic 
efficiency. According to them, rapid technical progress entails a subtle blend of 
competition and monopoly, with more emphasis in general on competition than 
monopoly power. Furthermore, the role of monopolistic elements diminishes when 
rich technological opportunities exist.36  
 
It is, therefore, arguable that a short-term monopoly is very likely to encourage 
innovation. Even for Schumpeter a ‘monopoly position is no cushion to sleep on. As 
it can be gained, so it can be retained only by alertness and energy.’37 In doing so, a 
monopolist would be in better position compared to a new market entrant. The 
empirical evidence shows that a monopolist, by introducing a new product to the 
market, will also be able to divert profits from his old product. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that the gain of the monopolist with the new product would be much 
higher than the gain of the new entrant, as the monopolist would be coordinating the 
prices of both products and pricing the old product in a way that internalises the 
effect on the new one.38 
                                                       
34 MENNELL, supra note 31, p.131, SMITH A.: The Wealth of Nations, Clarendon, Oxford,1776 
pp.277-278 
35 “Although economists who study innovation generally accept Schumpeter’s first two principles, 
most empirical studies of the relationship between market structure and research and development 
expenditures reject the linkage between monopoly power and disproportionately large investments in 
innovation, SCHERER M. & ROSS D.: Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd 
ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1990, pp.614-660; MENELL, supra note 31, p.135 
36 SCHERER et al.,Ibid.; MENELL, supra note 31, p.135 
37 SCHUMPETER, supra note 16, p.102 
38 CHEN Y. & SCHWARTZ M.: “ Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition”, 
Georgetown University WP., 29 January 2010, available at 
http://econ.georgetown.edu/research/33243.html, (23.09.2010) 
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Thus, in order to stimulate innovation, after the invention has occurred, IPRs create 
ex post monopolies. Hence, Geroski highlights that it is the promise of monopoly –
not its actual existence- that stimulates innovation in this line of thinking.39  
 
On the other hand, economic theories based on imperfect competition support the 
view that much invention is spontaneous. Hence, invention is forthcoming without 
the provision of a short-term monopoly, or IPRs more broadly. Plant, for instance, 
argues that first-mover advantages, imperfections in markets and other factors 
provided inventors and publishers sufficient rewards to create and market their works 
in the absence of IPRs. Patent protection, therefore, would lead to an overinvestment 
in R&D that could result in discoveries that fall within the patent domain. This in 
turn would be seen as wastefully diverting resources from more appropriate 
endeavours.40  
 
Notwithstanding this opinion, an influential 20th century economist, Arrow, argues 
that it is the competition rather than the monopoly that promotes innovation.  For 
Arrow, in a competitive market environment, supported by exclusive IPRs, 
competitive firms are likely to devote more attention towards R&D efforts when 
compared to monopolists, who will not hold in all cases, i.e process innovations.41  
Hence, monopolist firms tend to innovate less than competitive firms because they 
have more to lose. Subsequently, this gives rise to a limitation on the incentive of the 
monopolist to innovative. This is widely cited as the ‘Arrow effect’, or the 
‘replacement effect’ to the extent the monopolist replaces himself rather than 
developing new business. On the other hand, a competitive firm is likely to be more 
innovative because it aims to take away much of the business previously conducted 
by rival firms.42 However, it must be emphasised that in a market environment where 
firms compete by offering differentiated products, a competitive firm may also face a 
                                                       
39 GEROSKI P.A., "Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Policy and Innovation: Is There a 
Problem?",  SCRIPTed ,V.2, 2005, available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-
4/geroski.asp, (22.09.2010) 
40 MENELL, supra note 31, p.132 
41 GILBERT J.: “Competition and Innovation” Journal of Industrial Organization Education V.1, I.1, 
2006, available at: http://works.bepress.com/richard_gilbert/15, (24.09.2010) p.14 
42 BAKER, supra note 6, p.7 
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replacement effect that reduces its incentive to develop a new product. This is the 
case even though the effect tends to be smaller than for a monopolist.43  
 
In this context, the empirical economic research produced four key principles 
highlighting the correlation between competition and innovation output. First and 
foremost, competition itself, specifically in relation to innovation, encourages 
innovation. That is to say, firms try harder to develop new products or processes. 
Consequently, these firms benefit from the resulting patent exclusivity. This dynamic 
gives rise to patent races between the firms.44 Schumpeter, however, argues that the 
fact that there is a possibility that a successful innovator will drive competitors out of 
business always constitutes an obstacle for competition.45  
 
The second key principle states that competition encourages R&D investments that 
are aimed at escaping competition. In other words, competition regarding an existing 
product market encourages firms to engage in R&D activities in order to lower costs, 
improve quality or develop better products.46 Therefore, a firm has less incentive to 
innovate, if the ex ante market is less competitive. 
 
The rate of innovation, in fact depends very much on the nature of the market. 
Innovative activity is likely to arise if the market is more competitive ex ante and the 
less competitive it is ex post.47 Under these market conditions, where more 
innovation is unlikely to allow a firm to escape competition, and the firm would 
instead be expected to face higher level of competition, the firm would have less 
incentive to pursue innovations in the first place.48  
 
Finally, the fourth principle is based on the idea of a pre-emption incentive. A pre-
emption incentive rests on an assumption that a firm will have an extra incentive to 
innovate new products or processes itself, thereby pre-empting potential rivals. This 
kind of incentive is found to be stronger than Arrow’s replacement effect, 
                                                       
43 GILBERT, supra note 41, p.13 
44 BAKER, supra note 6, p.7 
45 NELSON R.: “Reflections of David Teece’s “Profiting from Technological Innovation…”, 
Research Policy, V.35, 2006, p.1108 
46 BAKER, supra note 6, p.7 
47 GEROSKI, supra note 39,  
48 BAKER, supra note 6, p.8 
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particularly for monopolist firms, comparing to competitive firms. Due to the nature 
of the market, a monopolist firm has a greater incentive to invest heavily in order to 
pre-empt the entry of his rivals by being the first to patent a new technology. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that pre-emption is more likely to occur in markets 
where the dynamics of R&D competition provide a technological leader with an 
unassailable position in the race to patent a new technology.49  
 
Thus, there is still an unresolved question in the economic literature i.e. is it the 
presence of a monopoly or the presence of competition that does more to promote 
innovation? While the economists are still debating this issue, it is possible to say 
that economic research has at least refined our understanding of key interactions. For 
instance, it has identified the central role of IPRs to many issues surrounding the 
incentives to innovate debate. Therefore, before determining what exactly spurs 
innovation in either case, there is a constant need to define the interaction between 
IPRs protection and innovation. Because whether it is the presence of a monopoly or 
the presence of competition, all the firms must fight in order to be the market leader. 
In this respect it is vital that firms have a measure of market exclusivity. Thus, it is 
arguable that patents, or IPRs more broadly, appear as a crucial feature of innovation.  
 
II.III. Innovation And Intellectual Property Protection  
 
From an economist’s point of view, the objective of IPRs protection is to preserve 
incentives to innovate. Some utilitarian economists50 have suggested that IPRs 
provide the prospect of reward. This in turn promotes creative and technological 
advances by providing increased incentives to invest in invention and to further 
develop new ideas.51 These incentives maximise the difference between the value of 
the invention and the cost of its creation.52  
 
                                                       
49 “ In some circumstances, a small lead in the innovation race can be enough to render competition 
ineffective, and adding more competitors to the R&D race may have little or no effect on the pace of 
innovation by the firm that occupies the technological frontier”, GILBERT, supra note 41, pp.14-15 
50 Including Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill. 
51 ANDERSEN B.: “If ‘Intellectual Property Rights’ Is the Answer, What Is the Question? Revisiting 
the Patent Controversies” in ANDERSEN B.: Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, Governance 
and the Institutional Environment, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006, p.118 
52WEST J.: “Does Appropriability Enable or Retard Innovation” in CHESBROUGH H. et.al: Open 
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Thus, IPRs protection improves resource allocation by enabling people who create 
ideas, products, and processes to capture more of the economic value of their 
creative activity. The protection granted by intellectual property (IP) law is 
traditionally regarded as necessary to stimulate innovation. The link between IPRs 
and innovation, therefore, has been the subject of much empirical investigation. 
 
In this context, the ‘IPRs-induced incentives to invest’ rationale (a widely 
acknowledged assumption that establishes links between IPRs and innovation) was 
developed. It is based on two assertions. Firstly, without effective incentives the 
invention inducement would be weakened. Secondly, IPRs are the cheapest and most 
effective way for a society to produce incentives.53 Furthermore, it has also been 
argued that the legal protection of IPRs creates incentives to use resources more 
efficiently through investment in planning and development.54  
 
The most obvious defect of this rationale lies in the assumption that IPRs do not 
necessarily provide incentives to use and allocate resources more efficiently. It has 
been contended that a system with strong IPRs protection may result in more 
resources devoted to expensive inventive and innovative R&D efforts, aimed at 
avoiding a technological region, which is currently occupied by a patent holder. 
Thus, this kind of concentration could potentially lead to an increase of costs and 
inefficient technological trajectories.55 Likewise, Arrow suggested that in some cases 
the patent system tends to under-allocate available resources for innovation. His 
argument rests on the assumption that under monopolistic conditions the incentive to 
innovate will be lower than under a competitive market.56 
 
Patents have historically been viewed as the strongest possible form of IP protection. 
Furthermore, two important goals are identified as underlying the patent system. 
Firstly, patents are necessary to promote R&D. Secondly, patents are necessary to 
encourage the disclosure of inventions, so that others can use and build upon their 
                                                       
53 ANDERSEN, supra note 51, p.118 
54 POSNER’s (1992) “dynamic efficiency argument” reads that in a world without IPRs, inventors are 
not encouraged to conduct their inventive activities, as without an IPR they would not be able to 
recover the costs of R&D or expect any special reward, See, ANDERSEN, supra note 51, p.125 
55 WINTER states that inefficiencies might occur if patents are granted to inventors at an early stage 
of technological trajectory. See, ANDERSEN, supra note 51, p.126 
56 Ibid, p.127 
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research results.57 Therefore, it is widely held by economists that a lack of patents 
results in the under-investment in R&D. Without patents, innovation occurs only via 
trade secrecy. Accordingly, an extra incentive to invent, disclose and innovate is 
often needed. However, a patent right can help to fill this need.58  
 
II.III.I. The Economic Rationales For The Patent System 
 
The doctrine of patents is usually presented as part of a widely shared utilitarian 
baseline. This economic theory provides a viable theoretical legitimacy for the 
coherence of the patent system. In the course of the wider discussion undertaken 
here, the perceived economic rationales for the patent system need to be examined 
thoroughly. This is necessary in order to reach a better understanding of the role that 
the patent system plays within the innovation system. 
 
The ‘incentive to invent’ has been widely accepted as the classic function of the 
patent system since the 15th century. This theory focuses on the impact of the patent 
system on invention and R&D.59 As a virtue of the patent system, the theory holds 
that in the absence of patent protection, there would be a radical decrease of 
inventions. According to this theory, increased patent protection leads to increased 
R&D. Further to this, by granting temporary exclusivity rights to inventors, the 
government delegates the R&D decision and investment.60 
 
The roots of this theory can be found in Schumpeter’s notion of innovation. Recall 
Schumpeter and of course, his well-known theory that monopolies are necessary in 
order to create the economic incentive to invent. Schumpeter regards monopoly 
profits as the only possible way of rewarding innovators for undertaking costly and 
                                                       
57 GALLINI N.: “ Patent Policy and Costly Imitation”, RAND.J.Econ.,V.23, N.1, 1992, p.52 
58 GRANSTRAND O.: “ Intellectual Property Rights for Governance in and of Innovation Systems” 
in ANDERSEN, supra note 51, p.317 
59 Ibid, p.319 
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risky inventive activity. It follows that the incentive to invent is equated with 
monopoly profits achieved by an invention.61  
 
In the context of today’s modern, knowledge-based economy some commentators 
have claimed Schumpeterian theory is outdated. Hence, today’s competitive market 
necessitates routinized inventive activities, which actually offer many prizes for 
competitors. Baumol illustrates this with an R&D race between two competing firms. 
In a two-firm R&D race, the winner receives the highest payoff. This payoff comes 
usually through the successful patent. Nonetheless, the other firm whose R&D comes 
close to that of the winner is able to obtain compensation commensurate with the 
value of its performance.62  
 
As such, Kitch’s ‘prospect system’ fits neatly into a theory of ‘incentive to invent’. 
For Kitch, the patent system encourages further commercialisation and efficient use 
of as yet unrealised ideas.  Kitch applies classic property theory to patents and he 
argues that patents will provide incentives to inventors just as privatising land will 
encourage the owner to make efficient use of it. This theory particularly focuses on 
the role of a single patentee in co-ordinating the development, implementation and 
improvement of an invention, as in the case of the monopolies in Schumpeterian 
theory. Drawing on the Schumpeterian tradition, Kitch considers invention as being 
the first step in a long and expensive process of innovation instead of an activity, 
which comes close to producing a final product. However, contrary to 
Schumpeterian theory, he ascertains that the vast majority of IPRs rights do not 
confer a monopoly power. Kitch does stress the importance of strong rights because 
he sees these rights as necessary to preclude competition and effectively encourage 
innovation. For Kitch, patents constitute the economic incentive to invent and thus 
they should stand-alone. Further to this, patents should be broad and should also 
confer total control over current as well as future inventions.63  
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On the other hand, recent analysis by Bessen and Meurer suggests that the patent 
system provides only a minimal incentive in relation to public R&D. They argue that 
most public firms, which perform the lion’s share of R&D, do not receive positive 
incentives from the patent system.  According to their research, the total investment 
in R&D was $160 billion in 1999.  Of this sum, public firms invested $150 billion. 
Despite this, only  45% of the patents granted to US residents were obtained by the 
public firms.64 The findings of Bessen and Meurer lead them to conclude that ‘it 
seems unlikely that patents today are an effective policy instrument to encourage 
innovation overall’.65 
 
Economic theory has long recognised that the exclusivity provided by the patent 
system protects innovators and blocks imitators from the invention. This guarantees 
an innovator the net social return on R&D expenditure. In this context, the 
‘incentive-to-innovate’ theory attempts to establish a link between innovation and 
competition. It follows that patents induce firms to carry an invention to market. It 
refers to a post-invention environment and it gives existing patents an ongoing 
motivational role to spur on commercialisation.66 In a similar vein, Mazzoleni and 
Nelson have suggested that the anticipation of receiving a patent provides motivation 
for undertaking useful research. They refer to this as ‘invention motivation’ theory.67 
However, as a counter argument, the suggestion that there is a correlation between 
the availability of patents and the incentive to innovate is not simple or universal. 
The patent system interacts with industries at several points in the innovation process 
and thus, there is a complex relationship between patents and innovation. This 
industry specific relationship, present at each stage of the patent process, embodies 
certain stages and motives. These motives and actions include deciding to seek 
protection, obtaining a patent, setting the scope of the patent that results, deciding to 
enforce a patent and determining the litigation process.68 
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All of this supports Arrow’s proposition that patents, or IPRs more broadly, are 
necessary in order to create ex ante incentives, as opposed to ex post control rights. 
In the context of patents, adopting a narrower circumscription to particular 
implementations of an invention is therefore required in order to provide rights that 
offer less than monopoly control.69 
 
Historically, inventions and their exploitations were considered necessary to secure 
industrial progress. It has been argued that in the event of there being a lack of 
protection against imitation, inventors are more likely to keep their invention secret. 
In this scenario, the secret will sometimes die with the inventor and thus, society will 
lose the new art. Therefore, society must contact the inventor in order to provide for 
the disclosure of the invention. In this context, the theory of social contract70 rests 
upon the assumption that there is a contract between society and the inventor. This 
agreement grants the inventor a limited period of exclusivity in return for the 
disclosure of the invention so that it will be available to society.71  
 
The legislature establishes patents for both private and public goods. First of all, by 
providing exclusivity to the inventors, the law gives a private-good effect.  This leads 
to Schumpeter’s innovation phase, which is based on the presence of a monopoly. At 
the same time, the disclosure requirement of patents fits well with Schumpeter’s 
diffusion phase. To put it differently, patent information becomes a pure public good 
for a zero price, irrelevant of whether it is used for generating further knowledge or 
not. This is called the public good effect of a patent. This public good effect leads to 
innovation-based competition in the market. The most solid arguments for rewarding 
innovation are built precisely on an understanding of these simultaneous private-
good and public-good effects.72  
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 In fact, it can be argued that one of the important functions of the patent system is to 
contribute to the growth of the public domain by encouraging the disclosure of 
inventions. This disclosure should be sufficient to enable a skilled person in the art to 
reproduce a patented invention.  Thus, ‘the incentive- to-disclose’ theory rests on the 
impact of secrecy for the progress of science. It is concerned with the impact of 
disclosure on R&D as a way of facilitating stimulation, coordination, and diffusion.73 
In line with this, Mazzoleni et al. have developed the ‘invention dissemination’ 
theory. Wherein this theory, patents induce inventors to disclose their inventions, 
when otherwise they would rely on secrecy. Therefore, this theory aims to facilitate 
expanding both wide knowledge and the use of inventions.74  
 
Nonetheless, such economic arguments, which have the aim of justifying the 
existence of patents on disclosure theory, have been subject to a number of 
criticisms. For instance, it has been argued that it is not possible to keep inventions 
secret for very long. Furthermore, even if the knowledge has been kept secret; 
inventions derive from the needs of the society and the current state of the art.  
Hence, it is likely that others would come up with similar ideas and inventions. 
Finally, according to the critics of this kind of economic justification, the excessive 
litigation which occurs as a result of the patent system, and which is assumed to be 
an unavoidable by-product of the system75, creates a handicap for inventors. Thus, it 
is argued that inventors tend to apply for patents only in cases where secrecy is 
impossible.76 
 
Mazzoleni et al. propose two additional functions for patents. Firstly, patents induce 
commercialisation and secondly, patents enable exploration control. The 
commercialisation induce theory rests upon the assumption that patents on inventions 
induce the needed investments to develop and commercialise them. On the other 
hand, the exploration theory considers patents as a means to enable the orderly 
exploration of broad prospects.77  
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For Penrose, the patent system relies on the assumption that it is desirable to 
encourage invention for its own sake. Therefore, a monopoly privilege is the best 
way of doing this, because it does not necessarily require exploitation of the 
invention.78  
 
In this context, the economic rationales of the patent system appear to confirm the 
received conventional wisdom i.e. the existence of patents does promote innovation. 
Nevertheless, the differences in the way various industries value patents cast 
considerable doubt on the effective utilisation of patents in order to optimally 
encourage innovation. 
 
II.IV. Patents And Innovation: Empirical Studies 
 
Given the important role attributed to the patent regime, as a catalyst for innovation 
over the centuries, very little is actually known about the economic effects of it. 
Further to this, little is known regarding how efficient it is as a system for creating 
optimal incentives. Historically economists have devoted limited attention to the 
patent system. As a result, economic analyses of the patent system have been 
persistently neglected although the patent system has developed primarily to 
promote economic ends.79 It has long been claimed that economists have virtually 
relinquished the field, while patent lawyers were glad to see them go. Machlup 
describes the lack of economic analysis in relation to the patent system as a 
deplorable situation. Hence, it is not possible to argue the relative merits or demerits 
of various features of the patent system without undertaking further research to 
analyse the social costs and benefits involved.80  
 
Over the last century, economists gradually realised the importance of the issue and 
this promoted further research. As a matter of fact, several studies have been 
conducted involving different industries regarding the effectiveness of patents as a 
means of promoting innovation. R&D expenditure is usually used to measure input 
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into innovative activity whereas patent applications are considered to be a measure 
of the output.81 Over the past decades, a significant amount of economic research has 
been devoted to investigating the firms’ decisions to use patents in appropriating 
returns from inventions.  Pigou had long recognised the problem of appropriability 
i.e. establishing a balance between economic returns and legal protection to stimulate 
further invention. He noted the basic framework of modern welfare economics, and 
he further asserted the fact that patent laws bring private net product and marginal 
social net product together. He further noted that ‘by offering the prospect of reward 
for certain types of invention they do not, indeed, appreciably stimulate inventive 
activity, which is for the most part, spontaneous, by they do direct it into channels of 
great usefulness.’82 
 
In a similar vein, the data collected from both the innovation surveys and R&D 
studies showed that patents are judged to be relatively ineffective as an appropriation 
mechanism. The available evidence further suggests that strengthening patent 
protection is very likely to restrict spillovers and therefore, diminish subsequent 
R&D investments, rather than increasing R&D expenditures.  
 
The first research in this area was conducted by Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner in 
1981, using data from 48 product innovations. Their research estimates that almost 
90% of pharmaceutical innovations and 20% of chemical, electronics and machinery 
innovations would not have been introduced without patents.83 
 
The subsequent empirical study of Mansfield, in 1986, was an industry survey which 
discussed a ‘what if’ scenario. The scenario had two elements;  
i) to what extent would the rate of development and commercialisation of 
inventions decline in the absence of patent protection?  
ii)  to what extent do firms make use of the patent system, and what differences 
exist among firms and industries and over time in the propensity of 
patent? .  
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Mansfield worked on a random sample of 100 US companies, which have 
considerable amount of investment in R&D activities and asked the R&D managers 
to estimate what percentage of their firm’s innovations would not have been 
developed without patent protection. The results of the survey show that 60% of 
pharmaceutical and 38% of chemical inventions would not have been developed in 
the absence of patent protection. Nevertheless, the absence of patent protection 
would not have high impact at on the innovativeness in other industries. Regarding 
the lack of patent protection, there would have been only 17% less inventions in 
machinery, 12% less in fabricated metals, 11% less in electrical equipment and it 
would not have affected the rate of invention at all in the areas of office equipment, 
motor vehicles, rubber, and textiles.84  
 
 
 
Figure I.II: What percentage of the inventions would not have been developed 
without patent protection? 
 
The study also indicates that patents are infrequently regarded as necessary to the 
development or commercial introduction of an invention in certain industries like 
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primary metals, electrical equipment, textiles etc. However, patents are widely used 
in these industries. The firms still tend to consider some of the more obvious benefits 
of patent protection such as royalties, the potential use of patents as bargaining chips 
and the possibility that possessing a patent could delay competitors entering the 
market. Such a justification offers an explanation why the patent propensity i.e. the 
percentage of innovations that are patented, is about 60% in an industry such as the 
motor vehicle industry. In this industry, patents are frequently said to be relatively 
unimportant. Hence, the results further indicate that firms generally do not make 
attempts to rely on the law of trade secrets when patent protection is available.  
 
According to Mansfield et al., it is arguable that patent protection often does not 
affect the rate of market entry significantly. This might be the reason why patents 
were considered to be relatively unimportant within most of the industries. 
Assuming such knowledge, Mazzoleni and Nelson argue that the survey evidence 
might have been unreliable because much of the survey evidence focused almost 
exclusively on large, established firms operating within particular industries. 
However, the significance of patents for new entrants, or small firms, or universities 
and other organisations outside of any particular industry is often different from 
large, established firms. The evidence collected from the university start-ups, 
particularly in biotechnology, as well as recent changes to the U.S patent policy 
since the 1980s appear to support this assumption.85   
 
The debate here it is part of a wider discourse. It is difficult to say, definitively, why 
exactly patent propensity is still high in certain industries where patents are 
considered to be relatively ineffective in protecting returns to innovation. Cohen, 
Nelson and Walsh86 attempt to solve this dilemma. They posed the question of why 
firms are increasingly employing patents by examining the relevant appropriability 
mechanisms. The study used data from the Yale survey, collected in 1982 and the 
Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS) on Industrial R&D in the US manufacturing sector, 
which was administered in 1994. The authors conducted their own survey of R&D 
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managers in 1994, sampling almost 3000 research labs all around the US.  The 
survey results revealed that secrecy in 17 industries, and first mover advantages in 
13 industries, ranked as top appropriability mechanisms. As a matter of fact these 
patents have not been considered as the dominant mechanism for protecting product 
innovations in most of the industries. Patents only counted among the major 
appropriation mechanisms in a more sizeable minority of industries like 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals. It should be noted that the growing importance of 
secrecy as an alternative to patents indicates that firms are better able to profit from 
innovation by maintaining secrecy in the development stages. This can be explained 
by the short imitation lags even for patented inventions.  Once the product is on the 
market, the relevant patents usually complement secrecy by offering some extra 
lead-time as well as a competitive advantage to a firm before competitors can 
respond.87 
 
In fact, the results of Cohen et al.’s study indicate that levels of appropriability 
mainly depend upon the complementarities between product and process protection, 
in relation to all the mechanisms. These industries do not exclusively rely on patents; 
even pharmaceutical firms utilise complementary capabilities in addition to patents. 
The tendency to use patents alongside some other mechanisms has led them to the 
realisation that even though patents are considered relatively ineffective, they might 
simply add sufficient value at the margin, when used with other mechanisms.  
 
Assuming a certain amount of knowledge, the authors have attempted to identify the 
specific kinds of motivation behind the decision of a firm to apply for a patent. In 
this respect, the respondents of the survey have been asked to indicate which list of 
reasons motivated their most recent decisions to apply for a patent.  The long list of 
reasons included in the survey ranged from the prevention of copying, to patent 
blocking, or even to strengthen the firms’ position in negotiations with other firms 
(regarding cross licensing agreements, etc.). As presented in figure 3, the prevention 
of copying has been identified by 96% of respondents as the major motive behind 
patenting decisions. The motive of blocking rival patents on related innovations 
ranked second after the prevention of copying.  
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Figure I.III: Firms’ Motives to Patent Product Innovations88 
 
To probe for differences in the motives for patenting across industries, the authors 
also distinguished between technologies and industries, by exploiting a distinction 
drawn in previous literature that focused primarily on differences between complex 
versus discrete or simple technologies. The key difference between these two 
technologies is identified upon comparison of the number of separately patentable 
elements that a new, commercializable product or process comprises. In this context, 
as drugs or chemicals typically include a relatively discrete number of patentable 
elements these are categorised under discrete technologies. However, electronic 
products, for instance, are comprised of hundreds of patentable elements, and these 
are characterised as complex technologies. This distinction between the 
characteristics of industries becomes significant when firms’ motives to patent are 
examined. By way of illustration, the survey results reveal that among the sixteen 
industries, in which the use of patents for negotiations motivates 50% or more of the 
respondents, there is only a small handful of discrete products.  Accordingly, a 
comparison of two-industry groups, and the weighting of cases by volume of patent 
applications, reveals that, on average, patents are used for cross licensing by 54,8% 
of those in the complex product industries. However, the usage of patents for cross 
licensing is limited to 10,3% in discrete technologies. In the course of the wider 
discussion, the survey results present the fact that there are common uses of patents 
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that stand apart from the function of protecting the profits directly associated with 
either the licensing, or the commercialisation of the patented invention. The authors 
further observe that even where the patents are weak or untested, they can be used 
either defensively or offensively as a part of a litigation-intensive strategy. However, 
the high cost associated with such kind of strategies, and small firms’ prejudice 
against patents due to these high maintenance costs, raises serious concerns as to 
whether the social value of patenting is actually substantially reduced while the costs 
of innovation are unduly raised.89 
 
On the other hand, in their seminal work, Arora, Cecagnoli and Cohen approached 
the impact of the impact of patent protection on R&D at the firm level by employing 
data from the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey on Industrial R&D in the US. In their 
research, they initially tried to estimate the proportional increment of the value of 
innovations realised by patenting them. They did this by what they called calculating 
the patent premium. They then used the estimated parameters to simulate the effect 
of changes in the patent premium on both R&D and patenting itself. The results 
suggest that the expected premium, which is conditional on patenting, i.e. the patent 
premium for innovations that were patented, is considerable. On average, a firm can 
earn a 50% premium over the no patenting case. This goes up to 60% in the health 
related industries. This estimate leads them to suggest that an increase in the mean of 
patent premium distribution would significantly stimulate R&D, especially in 
industries where the patent premium is high, such as the drugs, biotech and medical 
industries. However, they conclude that, irrespective of whether inventions are 
worthy of patenting or not, patents are a valuable subset of innovation. Hence, it is 
clear that patents do provide incentives for R&D.90 Nonetheless, the reverse of this 
finding concentrates on the value that patents give to products in the real world. It 
investigates the role of patents in encouraging R&D by examining both the issue of 
how easy it is to get a patent and also the issue of how much protection that patent 
gives to the product.91  
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In a later piece of research, Lerner assesses the impact of major patent policy shifts 
on innovation across sixty countries over a 150-year period. His findings indicate a 
level of consistency with previous empirical research i.e. that patent policy shifts 
have a negative impact on innovation. This is particularly evident where the nation 
already has strong patent protection and when it’s per capita gross domestic product 
lags behind other nations.  The findings do, however, support the theory that patent 
protection-enhancing shifts have a number of positive implications for foreign 
applications. For instance, there was a substantial increase in number of applications 
on both the absolute and percentage basis in relation to patent applications by 
foreign applicants. However, the number of applications from residents fell by 
significant accounts.92   
 
Consistent with the above empirical evidence, Taylor and Silberston note that the 
protection afforded by the patent system is assumed to be weak and ineffective in 
protecting competitive advantage. The results also indicate that the innovator’s 
willingness to invest in R&D does not necessarily depend upon the degree of 
protection granted by the patent system.93 For industries like software or computers, 
it is, once again, observed that imitation promotes innovation. Hence, strong patents 
inhibit innovation due to the sequential and complementary structure of innovation 
in these industries.94  
 
The value of patents for a firm is usually associated with the sector of activity i.e. the 
firm’s business strategy, as well as the interactions with the business strategies of the 
firm’s competitors. 
 
Nonetheless, recent economic research demonstrates that the net private return from 
patents to publicly listed US firms is substantially negative. This is true to the extent 
that private benefits and private costs have been measured. Consistent with previous 
research, the pharmaceutical companies are the only outstanding exceptions in the 
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study.95  In fact, patents have long been recognised as valuable assets in sectors 
where innovations are easy to copy, such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals.96 Within 
these industries, patents are regarded as highly effective for encouraging investment 
in R&D.  The resulting patents in these sectors are more detailed in their claims and 
therefore, it is easier to replicate the finished product. Hence, the maximisation of 
patents for an industry is positively correlated with the increase in duplication costs 
and time associated with patents.  
 
The findings of Cohen et al., do, however, strongly emphasise that the key 
appropriability mechanisms in most industries are secrecy, lead time and 
complementary capabilities.  Thus, patents are still not the major mechanism for 
appropriating returns to innovation in most those industries.97 However, both the 
lead-time mechanism and the availability of a patent are found to be crucial for 
Japanese firms. However, the empirical research proved that lead-time and secrecy 
are considered as the key means of protecting inventions for most of the US 
companies.98  
 
For instance, in a study conducted on the aircraft industry, where new product line is 
complicated, and products have long lasting effects, it was found that both lead-time 
and the strength of the learning curve were determined to be more important than 
patents in capturing benefits of the innovation mechanism. There is no doubt that it 
is very expensive, complicated, and time consuming to duplicate an aeroplane, 
particularly when compared to the relatively simple methods that exist to analyse a 
pill and reproduce it.99 It follows that in cases where imitation is as costly as 
inventing, or cases where firms have the economic and technical means for 
protecting their inventions; there is no need for further legal protection. 
 
Assuming such knowledge, the next question that arises is how much IPRs 
protection is optimal given that firms can also appropriate their investments in 
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innovation through secrecy, lead time advantages etc. It is often suggested that IPRs 
strategies should be placed firmly within the context of an overall appropriation 
strategy. This strategy would also necessarily comprise other factors that are 
essential to a company’s ability to profit from innovation.100  
 
II.V. Concluding Remarks 
 
In light of the above, it can be said that there is overwhelming evidence that the 
concept of innovation differs across industries, and that these different industries 
treat patents differently. Nevertheless, it is a common misconception, particularly for 
legal scholars, to make generalised assumptions on the role of patents in relation to 
the innovation process. The impact of patent protection, or IPRs more broadly, on 
innovation, is likely to depend upon a number of factors. Patent protection is not 
necessarily regarded as the main appropriability mechanism for most of the 
industries. In fact, it is true that an assessment of the cumulative and sequential 
nature of these industries suggests that patents tend to hamper innovation activities. 
The empirical research does, however, demonstrate that patent protection is of the 
utmost importance for the pharmaceutical industry. Patents, or IPRs more broadly, 
are considered as the most conducive means of appropriating returns from R&D 
investments in this area.  
 
Unlike other technologies, there are clear patent boundaries that are regarded as a 
significant determinant of relative returns in relation to R&D, in pharmaceuticals. 
The presence of a high level of patent protection dramatically increases the time and 
the cost of imitation, which are nonetheless, lower than the average. Hence, patent 
protection is widely acknowledged as the primary incentive for innovation in 
pharmaceuticals.  
 
What emerges clearly from investigation of empirical data is an effort to recognise 
the differences in innovation among the industries. It is also important to stress the 
need for a guide to the practices of pharmaceutical innovation. This is all the more 
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necessary when one takes account of the different needs and experiences of the 
pharmaceutical industry regarding patents.  
 
Therefore, the next chapter gives an account of pharmaceutical innovation and it 
further investigates the reasons why patents are considered to be critically important 
in order for pharmaceutical innovation to occur.  
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III. INNOVATION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
III.I. Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter described the issues surrounding the concept of innovation. By 
presenting the various economic rationales that underpin patent rights, the chapter 
presented an analysis of the application of these rationales in the context of 
innovation. In an effort to recognise the diversity of innovation processes present 
within the industries, the chapter suggested that innovation occurs differently within 
each industry. Consequently, each industry treats patents differently. It was 
established that amongst all the industries examined, the pharmaceutical industry 
presented an exceptional case, whereby patents are vital in order to enhance 
appropriability conditions.  
 
This chapter aims to take this discussion concerning innovation and the 
pharmaceutical industry further. It is necessary to analyse the issues concerning the 
interaction between patents and pharmaceutical innovation. Hence, this chapter 
explains in detail how the trade-off between patents and innovation is achieved. The 
chapter further charts the historical evolution of the pharmaceutical industry over 
three main epochs. Building on the foundations that are historically established, this 
chapter contributes to general understanding of the innovation process in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Within the context of this thesis, particular emphasis is 
placed on the aspects of pharmaceutical industry business models as well as the 
tension between research-based pharmaceutical companies and generic drug 
companies, which eventually led to the recalibration of world IP structures with 
TRIPS. 
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III.II. At A Glance: Pharmaceutical Innovation 
 
Innovation in development of drugs is critical to the survival of a big pharmaceutical 
business model. It follows that innovation in drug development is a fundamental 
requirement for a company to establish and maintain a competitive advantage in an 
increasingly complex world.  Pharmaceutical innovation has numerous features and 
it is an ongoing process. The scope of innovation generally ranges from developing, 
manufacturing and marketing new drugs, about which relatively little is known at the 
time of their discovery, to enhancing existing drugs that have been on the market for 
some time by making minor changes to them.  Between these activities, 
manufacturers also try to find new ways to increase the safety, effectiveness, and 
convenience of their products.  
 
Given the relationship between R&D, industrial innovation and growth, the analysis 
of the pharmaceutical industry undertaken here demonstrates an extremely important 
part of development economics. Co-operation across government, universities and 
industry often combines to provide a high level of expertise, which accelerates the 
process of bringing new products to the market. The industry maintains a number of 
patterns, which are mainly linked to two main factors. The first factor can be 
identified as the nature of the drug discovery process; these are characterised by a 
low degree of cumulativeness and by quasi-random search procedures. The 
fragmented nature of the relevant markets is the second factor that shapes 
pharmaceutical innovation.101  
 
Furthermore, on examination of the pharmaceutical industry it is clear that the 
presence of a high ratio of R&D spending in relation to sales emerges as a distinct 
characteristic of the industry.102  Hence, the cost of R&D has become an important 
issue in relation to the policy considerations. i.e regulatory requirement, economic 
performance, that are central to regulation of the pharmaceutical industry.103 The 
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debate in this area usually revolves around the relatively high R&D expenditure level 
in the pharmaceutical industry, when compared to other industries. Ensuring the 
successful development and launch of new drugs is considered to be an enormous 
challenge for the pharmaceutical industry.  High costs coupled with the lengthy 
process involved constitute obstacles for innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. 
The average time required to bring a medicine to market is estimated to be about 8-
10 years in the US.  The proportion of substances that are successful and result in 
marketable products is 1 out of 10,000.  In addition, only three out of every ten 
successful drugs bring in enough revenues to meet or exceed average R&D costs.104 
 
Further to this, an economic analysis of the industry reveals that apart from the high 
cost of R&D activities, it is also necessary for companies to control other important 
complementary assets. In addition, possessing the competencies developed in the 
management of large-scale clinical trials, obtaining regulatory approval and 
managing the costs of marketing and distribution appear to be the key requirements 
for the innovation process to succeed. Thus, it can be said that the costs of the 
development of a drug also depend on these factors. An economic study in 2003 
revealed that the average pre-tax cost of bringing a new drug to the market was $802 
million per drug. The data was collected from a survey of ten research-based 
pharmaceutical companies for sixty-eight randomly selected drugs.105 However, 
there are a number of criticisms of this figure, mainly because the relevant data was 
not made available to other researchers. Hence, there was a significant lack of 
transparency regarding the collection of the data for this study. Furthermore, the data 
regarding the industry’s cost structures is highly ambiguous. Thus, it is still unclear 
what forms of expenditure are included in these figures.106  
 
In the context of this wider debate, it should be noted that the majority of the data in 
this account is primarily collected and collated by the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).  There has been much controversy regarding 
the reliability of the PhRMA’s statistics. Doubts have been cast regarding the 
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accuracy of much of the data that the PhRMA has made available, yet it is still a 
widely accepted fact that the R&D budget of the pharmaceutical industry is 
substantially higher than other industries.  
 
The relevant statistical data indicates that pharmaceutical R&D/sales ratios have 
consistently been at a level nearly seven times higher than the ratios of other-
manufacturing industries. In this context, Scherer has compared the PhRMA data 
with the National Science Foundation (NSF) data, which is often presented as an 
indicator of research intensity in pharmaceuticals. Over the period between 1999 and 
2003, the average R&D/sales ratio has been found to be 9.2% in the NSF industry 
category pharmaceuticals and medicines, whereas according to PhRMA series it was 
18.3%. Scherer notes that NSF figures are biased downwards because these statistics 
rely on data collected by the whole company method. This method of collection 
includes data from less research-intensive areas such as toiletries, cosmetics, first aid 
supplies etc. For this reason, Scherer regards the PhRMA data as more accurate 
source for pharmaceutical innovation.107  
 
Still, it is questionable how accurately these figures reflect the reality of R&D in the 
pharmaceutical industry. There is a growing consensus that the pharmaceutical 
companies reinvestment into R&D is disproportionately small, when compared to 
non-R&D expenditure.108 For instance, a recent study on drug price negotiation 
mechanisms was conducted by Families USA, a US based consumer health group. 
This study found that drug companies109 typically spend more than twice as much on 
marketing, advertising and administration as they do on R&D.110 More recently, 
another study, which was based on systematic data collected directly from the 
industry and the medical profession, confirmed the findings of the Families USA 
study. The more recent study suggested that pharmaceutical companies typically 
spend almost twice as much on promotion as they do on R&D. The findings showed 
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that during the course of 2004, [24.4% of the total domestic pharmaceutical sales in 
the US, which accounts to around $235 billion.] Of this sum, 24.4 percent was spent 
on promotion, whereas only 13.4% was invested in research and development. This 
fact has led authors to make the critical comment that contrary to the industry’s 
claim, spending on promotion, such as marketing and advertising, predominates over 
R&D spending in the pharmaceutical industry.111 Supporting these views, the US 
Government Accountability Office revealed that between the years 1997 and 2005, 
the total spending on direct-to-consumer advertising grew at twice the rate of R&D 
spending.112  
 
Hence, the current evidence provides compelling evidence for the argument that the 
research-based pharmaceutical industry has a systematic tendency to overstate the 
cost of drug development.113  The potential magnitude of the overstatement remains 
unclear. The argument made here is highly important for one reason in particular. In 
patent scholarship, it is often said that the potential costs of R&D justifies the market 
exclusivity provided by the provision of a patent. In fact, the main raison   
d'etre behind the patent system is not only to provide protection for the time, money 
and intellectual ability that has been invested, but also to encourage future R&D 
investment and the subsequent innovation that results from this investment. In this 
context, the high R&D costs require a number of trade-offs between patents and 
pharmaceutical innovation.  
  
III.III. Exploring The Versatile Trade-Off Between Patents And 
Pharmaceutical Innovation 
 
There is a growing consensus that patents advance pharmaceutical innovation in a 
substantial way. For example, a great deal of empirical research appears to support 
this view. As noted in the previous chapter, innovation occurs differently within each 
industry, and each industry treats patents differently. Recent studies in the US, 
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Europe and Japan, which assessed the means by which firms are able to make a 
return on their R&D investment, showed that patents are considered to be one of the 
major appropriability mechanisms in the pharmaceutical area.114 Along similar lines, 
empirical analysis shows that pharmaceutical companies are the major users of the 
patent system.  Furthermore, the net private returns from pharmaceutical patents tend 
to be significantly higher than that of other types of patents.115 Even Lawrence 
Lessig, a prominent advocate of user and open-innovation, acknowledges that the 
pharmaceutical industry constitutes an exception to other industries, where the 
benefits derived from patents are often quite limited.116 In a similar vein, Bessen and 
Meuer’s empirical analysis on the benefits and costs of patents for public firms 
indicates that patents universally discourage innovation outside of pharmaceutical 
and chemical sectors.117  
 
Indeed, patent exclusivity is accepted as a major incentive for the encouragement of 
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Hence, the patent system is stated to 
justify the costs and time associated with pharmaceuticals. In other words, the 
promise of monopoly protection for a limited time is a factor that dominates 
pharmaceutical R&D decision-making. Furthermore, economic analysis of the 
imitation costs in a number of industries has shown that patents significantly raise 
the costs incurred by non-patent holders seeking to use the idea or invent around the 
patent.118 The range was estimated to be 40% in the pharmaceutical sector, 30% for 
major new chemical products and 25% for typical chemical goods, while the 
proportion was only limited to 7%-15% in electronics.119  
 
In sharp contrast to other fields of technology, it is arguable that patents have 
historically been quite effective in the pharmaceutical industry. For instance it is 
often argued that the distinction between the acts of invention and innovation enables 
maximum optimisation of patents for pharmaceuticals. Innovation in the 
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pharmaceutical industry increasingly relies on costly and expensive R&D activities. 
The development of drugs requires not only significant expenditure on research but 
also the transformation and commercialisation of those inventions into marketable 
commodities.  Thus, the active agents in the innovation process are in fact, the large 
firms. Indeed, R&D, which is further aided by legal, administrative and marketing 
activities, has become a large-scale activity, and a routine part of business 
operations, in multinational pharmaceutical companies. In line with the 
Schumpeterian theory that large firms are more likely to keep the engine of 
technological innovation going, research- based pharmaceutical companies have 
become the dominant players in a variety of innovative areas in the sector.  For 
Schumpeter, monopoly power favours innovation, because it is only through a 
monopoly that the innovator can appropriate enough of the returns of the innovation 
to justify the investment in R&D.120 Schumpeter emphasised the routine activity of 
innovation, which necessarily gives rise to a temporary state of monopoly in favour 
of the innovator. However, ‘monopoly offers no cushion to sleep on for 
companies.’121  Therefore, it is necessary that pharmaceutical companies be in a 
position to assure a continuum of innovation from the laboratory to the marketplace.  
 
Secondly, the notion of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is increasingly 
associated with secrecy. In fact, much of the R&D in drug discovery and 
development is aimed at securing the relevant knowledge. The traditional proprietary 
approach in the pharmaceutical industry requires that the relevant knowledge, e.g. 
pertaining to the therapeutically interesting molecules or pertaining to the safety and 
efficiency of the drug candidate, to be kept secret. Patent protection provides for an 
accumulation of this knowledge.  
 
Moreover, the ease of imitation is an issue of great concern in relation to 
pharmaceuticals. Once the knowledge is accumulated, a would-be generic imitator of 
a small-molecule drug is able to enter the market with an exact knock-off copy. 
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Hence, the advanced process engineering level of generic companies has potential to 
erode the quasi-rents anticipated by a pharmaceutical innovator.122  
 
Given the current status quo of the industry, a short-term, limited monopoly is often 
claimed to be necessary to encourage innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
According to Lemley and Burk, ‘the prospect vision of patents maps closely onto 
invention in pharmaceutical industry’. In a scenario without patents, as the difference 
between the ratio of inventor cost and the ratio of imitator cost is quite large, it is 
usually claimed that innovation is likely to drop substantially.123 It should be bare in 
mind that pharmaceutical innovation is not only about invention; drug discovery is 
the beginning of the process, not the end. In accordance with Schumpeterian theory, 
it is arguable that innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is a distinctly economic 
process and a matter of business activity. For instance, it is clear that much of the 
work occurs after the drug candidate is identified. This work includes undertaking 
activities such as bulk manufacturing, market approval, advertising, marketing, sales 
promotion etc. Hence, it is critical that patentees have control regarding downstream 
uses of inventions. In line with this, Burk et al., suggest that patents should stand-
alone, should be broad, and confer almost total control over subsequent uses of the 
product.  
 
Consequently, the pharmaceutical industry places a great deal of importance on the 
patent system. It is suggested that there are two likely reasons for this. First of all, the 
patents obtained by pharmaceutical companies are unusually strong, when compared 
to the patents obtained by other industries. The subject matter of pharmaceutical 
inventions is usually a number of actual molecules, which have useful medicinal 
properties and its analogs. It is usually possible to refer to lists of recognised 
functional equivalents for each component of the molecule at issue rather than 
simply claiming each analog.  By way of illustration, for a molecule which has 10 
important component parts, a patent application may claim x plus 10 recognised 
functional equivalents of x for each part. Therefore, it is clear that a pharmaceutical 
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patent application can be made subject to millions of specific molecule claims 
without actually having to synthesise more than a few.124  
 
One of the dilemmas that pharmaceutical patents typically create is that inventing 
around them is inevitably quite difficult. It is very unlikely that potential imitators 
will be able to work around the patent. Furthermore, the possibility of discovering 
another compound, which possesses the same therapeutic properties, and does not 
infringe the original patent, is quite low.125  
 
Hence, it is argued that the broad scope of patents in the pharmaceutical industry 
provides relatively more incentives for innovation and research into the development 
of new drugs.126 It has been observed that the enactment of policies aimed at 
broadening the scope of patent protection tend to have significant positive effects on 
investment in R&D with regard to drug innovation.127 However, broader patents may 
also constitute an obstacle to the development of spin-off innovations that are 
tangential to the original innovation. According to Merges and Nelson, patents play 
an essential role in appropriating returns from invention in the pharmaceutical 
industry, in cases where the invention is reasonably well defined and bounded.  In 
contrast, in relation to broad patents, the boundaries of which are difficult to define, 
patents are arguably less useful.  As Merges and Nelson point out, the provision of 
broad patents diminishes incentives for other competitors to stay in the innovation 
game.128 Hence, it is arguable that the relationship between a tightly defined patent 
regime and a steady rate of innovation is not a linear one. Furthermore, it is 
suggested that neither increasing nor decreasing the level of patent protection has 
more than a minimal effect on encouraging innovation.129  
 
In a seminal work, Cohen et al. categorise the pharmaceutical industry under the 
category of discrete product industries. Furthermore, the survey results revealed that 
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patent blocking is one of the most persuasive factors in encouraging patent usage in 
discrete product industries. In addition, the majority of the industry is likely to use 
patents for blocking in order to create a patent fence for weaker patents. For instance, 
pharmaceutical companies often aim to build a patent fence around some patented 
core invention in order to impede the development of competing alternatives. 
Additionally, when compared to complex product industries, pharmaceutical 
companies are less likely to use patents in negotiations. The findings, also raise an 
important question concerning whether patents have been used by the pharmaceutical 
industry in ways that ultimately undermine the purpose of patent law.130 
 
There has been much controversy in recent years about optimal patent duration. 
Economists have long discussed how long optimal patent life should be. However, 
the only conclusion that they can agree on is that it is highly dependent upon the 
invention or class of inventions. Moreover, any effort to determine it a priori would 
be costly, in some cases, and in most cases, simply impossible.131 On the other hand, 
the pharmaceutical industry continues to argue that effective patent life is often lost 
due to the requirements of lengthy and costly clinical trials. Moreover, the regulatory 
approval process potentially affects patent life. As a result of these factors, the 
possibility of compensating R&D investment costs reduces. Therefore, it is 
advocated that patents should be granted with an option to extend the term of 
protection. In their seminal work, Malerba and Orsoni, explored the consequences of 
different patent durations. Malerba et al. took the standard patent term as 20 periods. 
When the protection is extended to 50 periods from 20 periods, the findings indicated 
a substantial decrease in the number of surviving firms and consequently, less 
exploration. However, the market share of innovative firms and the level of 
concentration in each therapeutic category increased. Nonetheless, the overall 
concentration remained relatively constant. In fact, the findings of the study 
demonstrated that the number of therapeutic areas discovered decreased and the total 
quality remained practically unchanged. In some cases, the total quality level even 
decreased. This led them to the opinion that the provision of longer patent terms will 
lead to be less exploration and less diversification for each firm. Undoubtedly, the 
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analysis challenges the assumption that long-term monopolistic market conditions 
favour levels of pharmaceutical innovation. In other words, the provision of a long-
term patent term gives rise to less exploration and it is likely to reduce 
diversification. The principal reason for this is that the molecules discovered, but not 
developed by innovators, remain unexploited by the imitators for a long period of 
time.132 The study demonstrated that there is an unambiguous relationship between 
the strength of patent protection and the rate of innovation. This confirms that 
innovators in a monopolistic position generally tend to concentrate on a small 
amount of therapeutic categories, where the prospective incomes tend to be higher. 
In this hypothetical scenario, many pharmaceutical companies are likely to 
concentrate their efforts on the development of lifestyle drugs, which are usually 
aimed at high-income markets.  Consequently, they will place less importance on the 
development of drugs to treat diseases of poverty, such as HIV/AIDS. This could 
eventually lead to fewer drugs being available for poorer populations, particularly in 
developing countries. 
 
In addition, the findings show that firms would still continue to invest in R&D even 
with no patent protection at all. The reason for this is that the first mover advantages 
i.e. profits earned through the introduction of a new product, are found to be 
sufficient enough to maintain company profitability, and thus, R&D investment. In 
this scenario, a lack of patent protection could lead to more exploratory activity, 
because the average number of therapeutic areas increases. The extension of the 
patent term133 is highly likely to create diminishing returns in innovation 
effectiveness.  The results indicate that patent term extensions have no effect at all 
above certain minimum levels of protection.134  
 
Notwithstanding this argument in recent times the pharmaceutical companies have 
developed a multifaceted approach to gaining a competitive advantage. Companies 
typically draw on strategic patenting concepts, as well as the enforcement 
mechanisms in order aim to restrict competition for several years beyond the term of 
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patent protection. These tactics range from the development of line extensions to 
evergreening through patent strategies, next generation franchises, and life-cycle 
management. Evergreening, also known as stockpiling, has recently become a major, 
high-stakes issue for pharmaceutical patents. In this way the pharmaceutical 
companies skilfully use patent law doctrines to secure evergreening in order to delay 
competitors access to the patent or to extend the term of patent protection. Although 
it is not a formal concept that is derived from patent law, evergreening illustrates the 
myriad of ways by which patent holders try to exploit the law, as well as the 
regulatory processes, in order to prolong their patent exclusivities.135 Evergreening 
simply refers to a system where a patent holder obtains multiple patents that cover 
different aspects of the same product, over a period of many years. This strategy 
effectively extends the patent term of the product. The evergreen patents usually 
cover a wide-range of aspects of the drug i.e. active ingredient, formulations, 
methods of medical treatment, methods of manufacturing as well as chemical 
intermediates.136 In practice, pharmaceutical companies typically apply for patents 
on new delivery methods for the drugs, or on reduced dosage regimens, or even on 
new versions of the active compound. For instance, a company might try to patent a 
combination compound that has advantages e.g. fewer side effects, over its parent 
compound.137  
 
In essence, line extensions aim to switch the patent from a branded drug to its next 
generation, before the onslaught of generics. This tactic has become a crucial 
regulatory tactic for pharmaceutical companies.  In applying this tactic, companies 
are able to secure a fresh monopolistic position through a set new of patent 
applications. Potentially this tactic could provide millions to extra income to their 
fiscal revenues.138  
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To cite a few examples, many drugs sold today are mixed drugs. Mixed drugs consist 
of both active and inactive parts. Generally speaking, when a company applies for a 
patent, the inactive part of the drug is disclosed as a result of the patent application. 
Usually, drug companies introduce a purer version of the drug, which consists of the 
inactive part, prior to generic competition launching. Companies do this to extend 
their monopolistic presence in the market. Another example of this kind of practice is 
the development of new versions of existing drugs. This is done by launching a new 
version of the drug, which includes an active metabolite. Following the 
administration of the older drug, the body, usually the liver, forms an active 
metabolite. This active metabolite exists within the new dosage and hence, it is 
usually launched as a new version of the existing drug. A well-known example of 
this kind of active metabolite is Desloratadine. This drug has been marketed under 
the trademark of Clarinex by Schering- Plough since 2001, and has been typically 
used for the treatment of allergies. It is the active metabolite of loratadine, an 
antihistamine drug (marketed under thetrademark of Lorastine by Schering-Plough in 
1988). The relevant patents on Loratadine expired in 2002. However, the patent on 
the new product is not due to expire until July 2019. Finally, the introduction of a 
known active ingredient, with an established efficiency and safety profile, or with a 
different pharmaceutical presentation, is another widely used strategy for the 
extension of market exclusivity. Paroxetine, for instance, is a widely used 
antidepressant developed by British pharmaceutical giant SmithKline Beecham. The 
company is known today as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). The drug was originally 
marketed under the trade name of Paxil in 1992. Within a very short period of time, 
Paroxetine became a bestseller drug for the company and following the September 
11 attacks; the company increased its advertising campaign, especially in the US. 
Nevertheless, the patents on the drug were due to expire in 2003. However, in 2002, 
prior to market entry of generic versions, GSK introduced a new drug, Paxil CR, to 
the market. Essentially, Paxil CR contains the same active ingredient as the old Paxil, 
but it has a controlled release formulation. More importantly, it is patent protected 
until 2017.139  
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In an effort to maximise market exclusivity, the pharmaceutical companies also 
explore marketing strategies such as ‘launching a patent prescription drug in an over-
the-counter form prior to expiration of marketing exclusivity to build up an over-the-
counter market position against future competition’ or ‘marketing campaigns to get 
consumers to switch to newer formulation…of drug products from earlier 
formulations, for which patent protection has not yet, but is soon to, run out, thus 
undercutting market demand for generic versions of the older formulations.140’  
 
As a matter of fact, there is a growing body of empirical research, especially 
regarding biotech patents that involve DNA sequences, that raises a concern about 
whether IPRs are becoming fragmented. This problem is potentially damaging 
because it could lead to the situation here assembling the rights necessary to 
commercialise a new therapy or drug is prohibitively costly. Furthermore, it could 
contribute to a situation where some promising lines of research are abandoned 
prematurely.141  This also raises an important question that goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis i.e. whether the granting of broad claims on patents, and biotech patents in 
particular, actually slows down the process of diffusion and circulation of 
knowledge.142  
 
The strong incentives given by patents are intended to encourage new innovation. 
However, these incentives may also discourage further development of those initial 
new innovations143. Correspondingly, it is possible that patent holders with broad 
claims may try to use those claims to hinder competitors. Patent holders might 
exercise their rights through licensing restrictions or through taking legal action 
against technologies on similar products. A well-known example of this can be seen 
with the case of Chiron’s patent on the hepatitis C virus.144 The aggressive 
enforcement of the Chiron patent on a cloned virus has held up extensive research on 
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hepatitis C. Furthermore, it is considered to be a problem by a number of researchers 
who are currently working on an antiviral or a vaccine for hepatitis C.145  Moreover, 
the patent-driven pharmaceutical industry utilises patents for a wide-range of other 
strategic purposes.  As it turns out, pharmaceutical companies also employ 
techniques such as creating a broad zone of exclusion around a patent, or preventing 
other companies from exploiting their own patents, as a part of patent-cross licensing 
practice.146  
 
Patent law also limits the scope of individual patents. This enables competition 
between different drugs in the same class as well as drugs in different classes that are 
targeted at the same underlying condition. In this way, patents are thought to help to 
create a vibrant market for innovation.147 There is a further point worth considering. 
As of today, successful utilisation of secondary pharmaceutical use claims 
maximises patent lifecycles. This is acknowledged as another factor that strengthens 
pharmaceutical patents. Furthermore, the integration of patent term extensions, and 
the presence of data protection laws, increases the strength of pharmaceutical 
patents.  
 
The industry, theoretically, subordinates its patent-related interests to those of 
patients. To this extent, they argue that the lack of a limited period of exclusivity, as 
conferred by patent protection, will eventually lead to a shortage of cures for most of 
the diseases, and as a result, many patients could be unable to receive suitable 
medicines.148  In reality, the evidence indicates that pharmaceutical companies 
favour the R&D of products and technologies that have high global demand. These 
products and technologies assure high profitability, and are accompanied by the 
promise of a limited monopoly, as provided through patent protection or IPRs more 
broadly. Only a small amount of global R&D is focused on the needs of developing 
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economies with low incomes and weak IPRs. This fact illustrates why the current 
system of pharmaceutical innovation largely ignores disease-afflicted poor 
populations in developing countries. In other words, innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector usually relies on blockbuster R&D strategies that focus on the 
development of products in therapeutic areas with large potential markets. In these 
areas, failure is more likely to be caused by economic factors such as increased 
competition in the market. Moreover, having long recognised the market need for 
developing drugs for wealthy and healthy people, the pharmaceutical industry has 
begun to concentrate R&D efforts on a range of drugs that seek to improve the 
quality of people’s lives. Confirming this fact, Henyr Gadsde, a head of Merck, 
stated in 1950s that ‘there are more well people than sick people. We should make 
products for people who are well.149’ 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that changes to the patent system directly affect the industry. 
A well-known example of this is the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in the US. This 
Act is intended to establish patent ownership as an incentive for private sector 
development and the commercialisation of federally funded R&D. Arguably; it 
positively affected innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Many of the 
discoveries made by universities in the biomedical and pharmaceutical field have 
lead to the creation of new drugs and therapies.150 Although, it is regarded as having 
had a significant impact on US pharmaceutical research, there is however increasing 
concern about the Bayh-Dole Act and its effect on the pharmaceutical industry. 
These concerns and issues will be critically examined under the chapter dealing with 
the US innovation system.  
 
Furthermore, the continuous and multidimensional characteristics of innovation in 
the pharmaceutical industry produce difficulties for the development of new products 
or processes. In addition, the presence of uncertain regulatory environments, public 
mistrust and a highly volatile political climate also create difficulties for 
                                                       
149 DUTTFIELD, supra note 133, p.97 
150LEVENSON D.: “Consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act”, 2005, available at 
http://ocw.usi.edu.mn/NR/rdonlyres/Electrical-Engineering-and-Computer-Science/6-901Fall-
2005/D02FDA40-5159-4097-86E4-E66D6E5FAF31/0/bayh_dole.pdf (24.09.2010) 
 74 
pharmaceutical companies.151  It is often said that a strong IPR system is one of the 
key components of innovation. However, more is needed to build an environment 
based on sustained innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.  Pharmaceutical 
innovation requires effective innovation policies. These policies should give priority 
to R&D, and also include regulatory systems that include efficient tax systems, 
investment regulations, production incentives, trade policies, and competition rules. 
 
III.IV. History Matters: A Spotlight On The History Of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation 
 
An attempt to stimulate comprehensive debate about the relationship between 
pharmaceutical innovation and patents requires an evaluation of the existing 
structural features of the industry. The history of the pharmaceutical industry shows 
that there is an evolutionary process of adaptation to major technological and 
institutional shocks.  In their seminal work, Malerba et al. examine the history of the 
industry in three major epochs. The first period is between the mid-nineteenth to the 
mid-twentieth century. During this period only a minimal amount of new drug 
development occurred. Hence, the research conducted over this period was based on 
relatively primitive methods. The second epoch begins with the large-scale 
development of penicillin during World War II. The formalised in-house R&D 
programmes and relatively high rates of new drug launches characterise this period. 
The third epoch begins in the 1970s and it continues up to the present day. This study 
included a research methodology that drew on the advancements made in genetic 
engineering and biotechnology.  
 
To a certain extent, the empirical analysis of the history of pharmaceutical 
innovation in this thesis follows the same patterns as Malerba et al.  It essentially 
fails into three major epochs. These epochs are distinctive on the basis of key 
developments in the drug development process. Each epoch is aided by anecdotal 
success stories, which highlight some of the practices that need to be considered 
during the drug development process. The first corresponds to a period between the 
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late nineteenth century and the World War I (WWI). This epoch is characterised by 
the German dyestuff industry’s efforts to synthesise natural products and proactive 
patent strategies. The discovery, development and marketing of Aspirin also 
illustrates the practice patterns at that period. The second epoch for the 
pharmaceutical industry starts with the penicillin revolution. The discovery of 
penicillin, or antibiotics more broadly, effectively pioneered the earliest drug 
screening techniques. Hence, this significantly contributed to the rise of the 
American pharmaceutical industry. The third epoch of pharmaceutical innovation, 
which continues up to present day, is characterised by the emergence of a wide range 
of antibiotics and screening efforts. Furthermore, this wave of pharmaceutical 
innovation includes the huge leap from random screening techniques to tailor-made 
drugs. Hence, the seeds of biotechnological or genomics revolution have been sown. 
It is possible that the fourth epoch, and perhaps a new golden age for the 
pharmaceutical industry, is just about to begin.  
 
II.IV.I. First Epoch: The Wonder Drug Aspirin And The German Dyestuff 
Industry 
 
The roots of today’s pharmaceutical industry go back to the late 19th century. Over 
the course of the 19th century, the dyestuff industry grew tremendously in Germany 
and German companies became world leaders in the synthetic dyestuff market. The 
successful attempts of the dyestuff industry in synthesising and testing dyestuff 
formulations prompted scientists in Bayer A.G to test dyestuff formulations for 
medical effects in humans. Not long after, one of the drug candidates proved to be 
effective against fever and headaches. The candidate was base on synthesised 
salicylic acid—the active ingredient of willow bark.  
 
As a matter of fact, the usage of willow bark for medicinal purposes has a long 
history that goes back to ancient Egypt. Willow bark had been widely used in ancient 
Egypt to reduce pain and fever. Furthermore, this practice continued throughout the 
centuries in Asia, China and Europe. During the last half of the 19th century, with the 
scientific revolution, an effort was made to synthesise plants parts into concentrated 
doses. French chemist Charles Frederic Gerhardt was the first to synthesise 
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acetylsalicylic acid. Even though he produced good results, the process took a 
substantial amount of time and produced severe side effects. Hence, he was unable to 
realise the potential of the formulation and thus, he decided to give up on the 
potential invention. Nevertheless, as an academic chemist he wrote an article about 
the synthesisation process of willow bark.  
 
When two scientists in Bayer, Hoffman and Eicehengrun, learned about Gerdhardt’s 
research, they immediately started work on the synthesisation process.  Their hard 
work and dedication paid off in a very short time; the formulation was found to 
perform effectively without severe side effects. The process used was similar to the 
one Gerdhardt had discovered, but it now worked more efficiently. The drug 
candidate was called Aspirin, a name that originated from Spiraea, the Latin 
abbreviation of plant genus. Subsequently, a new epoch started with the development 
of aspirin, which is widely accepted, as the most remarkable drug the world has ever 
known.152  
 
In undertaking an examination of the aspirin case, it is possible to observe underlying 
patterns of innovation behaviour in the pharmaceutical industry that exist up to the 
present day. From the perspective of Schumpeterian theory, the discovery and 
commercialisation of asprin presents anecdotal evidence that illustrates the 
distinction between invention and innovation. The Schumpeterian theory rests upon 
this distinction between invention and innovation. For Schumpeter, it was the 
inventor who produces ideas and the innovator who gets things done. He argued:  
 
‘It is in most cases only one man or a few men who see the new possibility and are 
able to cope with the resistances and difficulties which action always meets with 
outside of the ruts of established practice.153  
 
In the context of Schumpeterian theory, invention is a technical idea that can either 
lead to new products, or that can be used to solve a current industrial problem. 
Innovation, on the other hand, refers to the process of introducing a new technology 
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to the market. Hence, the case of Gerhardt is a good example of the Schumpeterian 
inventor. Gerhardt, in fact, was the first inventor of the wonder formula. He had the 
intellect to develop the formula, but not the will to deal with the side effects that 
resulted from his formula. He was unable to realise the far-reaching potential of the 
formula; therefore, he did not commercialise it. Aspirin became the brand name of 
drug of Bayer. Thus, Bayer has been associated with the success of the drug as it can 
be described as the innovator under Schumpeterian theory. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the successful innovation of Aspirin was a ‘feat of will, not of 
intellect154’. The scientists in Bayer, especially Hoffman and Eichengrun, deserve to 
be given credit as the real innovators. They took the invention of Gerhardt and they 
worked on it passionately. Furthermore, even when the head of the pharmacology 
department of Bayer rejected the new substance, Eichengrun did not give up on 
Aspirin. He first tried the drug on himself and he later arranged clinical trials in 
Berlin to demonstrate its efficiency.155 He presents a very good example of 
Schumpeter’s innovator. In Schumpeterian theory, he can be described as the one 
who saw the new possibilities that could result from the invention, and he was able to 
cope with the resistance and difficulties that he was faced with. This resistance is 
always felt when a pharmacist acts outside of the course of established practice of 
pharmacology. For Eichengrun, the efforts paid off; that little white pill known as 
Aspirin became the most remarkable drug the world has ever seen. 
 
III.IV.I.I. Aspirin - A Profitable Product For The Legal Profession  
 
The example of Aspirin provides a good case for further analysis of how patents 
work in the pharmaceutical industry. Following the clinical trials, Bayer immediately 
made a patent application for the process of synthesising salicylic acid. At that time, 
the German Patent Law provided patentability for methods of manufacturing 
chemical products, but not the products themselves. Chemical products were 
specifically excluded from patentability. In fact, German Patent Law was constructed 
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in an effort to serve the interest of the German dyestuff industry and the chemical 
industry. The dyestuff industry was highly active during the drafting process of this 
law. Furthermore, the German Chemical Association favoured patent protection for 
processes, but not products. In the petition submitted to the Reichstag, the German 
Parliament, it was stated ‘a chemical product can be obtained by various methods 
and from different materials; the grant of a patent for the product itself would prevent 
better processes discovered subsequently from being brought into effect in the 
interest of the public and of the inventors.156’ Thus, the Reichstag took these 
industrial concerns into account and it enacted the patent law in line with the 
industry’s demands and rationalisation.  
 
Hence, the process patent was the only viable option available for Bayer to protect its 
IPRs and thus, to ensure market exclusivity. Bayer attempted to file an application 
for a process patent. Nevertheless, a few weeks after the application, the German 
patent office rejected the application on the basis of lack of novelty. According the 
patent examiner, the process of synthesising acetylsalicylic acid was already in the 
state of the art. It was French chemist Charles Frederic Gerhardt who first 
synthesised acetylsalicylic acid.  Furthermore, German chemists Kraut et al.157 had 
already published a scientific paper describing the manufacture of acetyl-salicylic 
acid by heating salicylic  acid with acetyl chloride and then re-crystallising  the 
product from boiling water.  Therefore, the patent office rejected Bayer’s application 
on the basis that the discovery at issue was not the direct result of a new process.158  
 
It should be noted that the patent examination in Germany was described as intensive 
and rigorous, when compared to any other country at that time. Germany adopted a 
rigorous examination process whereby patent examiners were required to conduct an 
extensive investigation into the prior art. The essential part of the examination was 
intended to determine the novelty of the relevant products or processes. It was also 
aimed at demarcating the scope of the claim. In addition, it was also possible for 
third parties to file opposition to the granting of the patent during the application 
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process. As a result of this rigorous process, the German patent proved to be legally 
strong, once it was granted.159 In this way, the decisions of the German patent office 
provided guidance to other patent offices in Europe. In this context, it was not a big 
shock for Bayer when the patent application also failed to meet the novelty 
requirements of other patent regimes in Europe. At that time, most of the European 
countries provided patentability to chemical processes of manufacturing, but not 
products.  Hence, the patent offices in countries like France and Switzerland took the 
same view as the German patent office and rejected the patent application for the 
chemical process of manufacturing Aspirin, on the basis of a lack of novelty. 
Nevertheless, Bayer did manage to secure a patent in two countries; Britain and the 
United States. Interestingly, these two countries were the largest target markets for 
the drug.  
 
At that time, the patent examination process in Britain was not considered to be 
rigorous and intensive, when compared to patent examination in mainland Europe.160 
Thus, it had been fairly easy for Bayer to get a patent for Aspirin in Britain. 
Furthermore, the British patent, was of utmost importance for Bayer’s worldwide 
marketing strategy. The British patent provided protection in Britain, and crucially, it 
also provided protection within the British Empire, covering a wide range of 
territories from India to Canada. Furthermore, it was widely regarded as certificate of 
authenticity that demonstrated the value of goods. Hence, Bayer was able to rely on 
the protection of its patent rights as a way of controlling the profitable British 
market. When another German dyestuff company, Chemishe Fabrik von Heyden, 
started to import acetylsalicylic acid into the UK, Bayer filed an infringement case 
against its German rival. In practice, Chemishe Fabrik had been producing the 
unbranded version of acetylsalicylic acid in Germany and then exporting it to other 
European countries for a number of years. As stated above, the process was already 
in the state of art and thus, it was not protected by patents in Germany, nor in other 
European countries. The protection existed only in Britain and its territories.161  
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Consequently, Bayer sued Chemishe Fabrik, for infringement of the British patent of 
acetylsalicylic acid, which was sold under the name of Aspirin, in 1905. The 
respondent company denied the infringement and alleged that the patent was invalid. 
Chemishe Fabrik argued that there was nothing novel about the invention, due to the 
fact that the process of obtaining acetylsalicylic acid, by producing a chemical 
reaction between acetylsalicylic acid and acetyl chloride, existed within the state of 
art. On the other hand, the plaintiff company claimed that it had properly obtained a 
patent for acetylsalicylic acid as a new body or compound. Justice Joyce rejected the 
central claim of the plaintiff and held: 
 
‘It would be a strange and marvellous thing, and to my mind much to be 
regretted, if after all that had been done and published with regard to 
acetylsalicylic acid before the date of this patent, an ingenious person, by 
merely putting forward a different, if you like a better mode of purification 
form that stated, and truly stated by Kraut to be feasible, could successfully 
claim as his invention and obtain a valid patent for the production of 
acetylsalicylic acid as a new body or compound. In my opinion, it was not a 
new body or compound and I hold the patent in question in this case to be 
invalid.162’ 
 
The judge further noted that the patent specification contained no element of 
invention or discovery beyond what was common knowledge. Hence, the judge 
found that there was a lack of novelty and a lack of inventive step. Consequently, the 
court invalidated the patent.163  
 
Nevertheless, Bayer’s experience with the German patent system up to this date had 
been different. The company had developed the skills to enable the exploitation of 
loopholes in the patent regime. For this reason, the company was often able to claim 
patent exclusivity for products it had not invented by merely providing evidence to 
show that there was a slightly different way of producing it. Due to this phenomenon, 
with regard to their own inventions, German chemical companies were cautious 
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about revealing their methodologies. In particular, the companies attempted to 
obscure the methodology behind an invention in order to hide the secrets of their 
trade. In doing so, the companies hoped to make it more difficult for competitors to 
copy their inventions. By way of illustration, Justice Joyce J. described Bayer’s 
patent application as a remarkable document. In fact, none of the experienced 
counsel in the case had ever seen such an ambiguous patent application before. The 
judge further noted that the document was erroneous, or at the very least, misleading, 
and that it was  ‘…by accident, error or design so framed as to obscure the subject as 
much as possible.164’ 
 
In the early years of the pharmaceutical industry, the German chemical industry was 
heavily oriented towards the export market. Companies sought to achieve a 
monopoly position within the world market. Hence, companies established many 
branches abroad and attempted to exploit international patent law. The companies 
were able to utilise the patent systems in countries that did not have stringent patent 
application review system. In this way, the companies systematically patented 
everything that had been produced as part of their R&D activities. The companies 
filed patent applications in all possible areas of organic chemistry. This clearly had 
the potential to inhibit future research efforts.165  This aggressive attempt to patent a 
huge amount of research was undertaken by the German companies, particularly in 
Britain, and it raised significant concerns regarding the efficiency of the patent 
regime. The granting of a large number of German patents had the effect of blocking 
many potentially lucrative R&D possibilities in the country. At this time, the German 
Chemical companies were lobbying hard for an innovation-friendly patent system in 
Germany, while also using patent law strategically in Britain in order to stifle local 
innovation.166  
 
Arguably, this situation is similar to what happened in the early years of the US 
software industry. When software-related patents were introduced for the first time in 
the US, many firms patented as many inventions as possible, so to create patent 
portfolios. In a similar way, German companies patented everything that came out of 
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their R&D labs, and thus, they created huge patent portfolios. These portfolios 
provided them with effective bargaining chips for possible future court battles. In 
line with this, in the US industry, the granting of software patents created barriers to 
market entry for new entrants due to the fact that new entrants were forced to license 
some of the patent protected inventions. 
 
As a result of the actions of the German companies, it became evident that the British 
patent system was in need of serious reforms in order to rehabilitate the local 
chemical industry in Britain. Hence, at this time there were a number of attempts to 
modify the law in the interests of the local industry. For instance, in 1902, the patent 
law was amended in order to enable revocation in the case of non-working 
inventions. However, the amendment was flawed and it failed to resolve the issue in 
practice. In other words, the amendment did not offer any immediate benefits to 
British firms in relation to encouraging competition in the British market. In 
addition, the German companies continued to flood the country with non-working 
blocking patents. German companies also enjoyed the economies of scale that 
existed within the British market, where the average cost per unit decreased with the 
level of increased production just as the fixed costs were shared over an increased 
number of goods.167 Hence, the German companies were able to reduce their prices 
in order to undercut the domestic competitors, while still making a tidy profit. Thus, 
British companies were concerned that German companies were dominating the 
domestic market. Furthermore, it appeared that at this time English patent law 
created greater incentives for the German companies than for the local ones. This in 
turn raised concerns regarding the purpose of the patent regime in Britain. The 
industry argued;   
 
‘English brains created the colour industry, English brains developed it, and 
English legislative folly has been the principle source of its decline.168’ 
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In reality, as observed by Justice Joyce in the Aspirin case169, the German patent 
applications were drafted using obscure language in order to avoid dissemination of 
the inventive processes. It is arguable that, at this time, German companies were in 
the pursuit of a world-monopoly in the organic chemical field. Furthermore, the 
patent system in Britain served that aim very well.  
 
Moreover, the Aspirin case shed new light on the understanding of the relationship 
between patents and local innovation. It is suggested that the Bayer case led to the 
indirect reform of the British patent laws.170 As such, and influenced to a certain 
extent by Mr. Justice Joyce’s observations in the Aspirin case, David Lloyd George, 
the then Minister of Trade, stated: 
 
‘Big foreign syndicates have one very effective way of destroying British 
industry. They first of all apply for patents on a very considerable scale. They 
suggest every possible combination, for instance, in chemicals, which human 
ingenuity can possibly think of. There combinations the syndicates have not 
tried themselves. There are not in operation, say, in Germany or elsewhere, 
but the syndicates put them in their patents obscure and vague terms so as to 
cover any possible invention that may be discovered afterwards in this 
country.171’ 
 
In 1907, a new Act entitled ‘The Act To Consolidate the Enactments Relating to 
Patents for Inventions and the Registration of Designs and Certain Enactments 
Relating to Trademarks’ was introduced. The terms of this Act included strengthened 
revocation provisions. These provisions were enacted in order to put strong pressure 
on the German synthetic dyestuff manufacturers to work their patents in Britain. The 
Act effectively encouraged the main German dyestuff companies to set up factories 
in Britain to manufacture their patented dyes. Despite the British government’s 
strategic approach to the development and regulation of its domestic chemical 
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industry172, it is arguable that the German industry’s control of patents and know-
how made it almost impossible for Britain to build and operate the chemical plants 
that were required for the war effort during the WWI.173  
 
On the other hand, until the WWI, the German chemical industry controlled the 
entire scientific world to a large extent. Arguably, it was the German patent system 
that provided both a shield and a spear to the industry.174 According to Murmann, 
‘the interface between the German chemical industry and the government was well-
developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, allowing such important 
collective policy initiatives as the passage of a patent law to be especially tailored to 
the needs of the chemical industry.175’  In this context, Borkin &Welsh  observed that 
‘the methodical but almost frenetic determination which inspired German research 
did not observe any scruples in borrowing inventions from other countries.176’ 
 
An analysis of William Henry Perkins’s, later Sir William, is best known as the 
inventor of first aniline dye, experience with the German patent system provides an 
understanding of how the patent system worked in Germany. 
 
‘He went so far as to say that, for years before he left the business, he and 
other English chemists had entirely abandoned attempts to patent their 
discoveries in Berlin. He had found, by sad experience, that whenever he sent 
over an application for a patent on a new dyestuff, or new chemical 
compound of importance, the German Patent Office would at once call in, for 
consultation, the leading German chemists who were interested in that line of 
work. He would get request after request for more and more detailed 
information about every part of the process; and then, when they had got from 
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him every bit of information that they could, they would grant the patent to 
some one of his German competitors...177’ 
 
Clearly, the German patent regime favoured the local industry by creating incentives 
to exploit every possible chemical route to the development of a particular dye 
product. In contrast to the situation in Britain and the US, the lack of patentability for 
chemical products prompted the creation of true research laboratories whose only 
function was to search for new dyes. Thus, the German patent regime was of crucial 
importance to the German industry in relation to the building up of domestic skills 
and research capacities. Given the ideal-patent environment up to this date, the 
German dye industry had the ability to dominate the world market. For Murmann, 
the industry would not have been able to develop a virtual world monopoly that was 
capable of being maintained over a long period of time, had this ideal patent 
environment not existed.178 In other words, it is suggested that German patents, in the 
hands of the German industry, proved to be a branch of German arms following the 
enactment of the Patent Act in 1877.179  
 
Following the WWI, the German companies faced strong pressure from the US 
Government. The wartime shortage of medicines coupled with the dependency on 
the German industries, presented a compelling rationale for the US goal of 
maintaining a self-sufficient local pharmaceutical industry. The US government 
realised the importance of developing wide ranging industrial capabilities in drug 
manufacturing in order to counterbalance the influence of German companies that 
dominated the market. With the enactment of the Trading with the Enemy Act180, 
which authorised the use of economic sanctions against foreign nationals and 
companies, all the German chemical patents were sold to the Chemical Foundation, 
which represented the US chemicals sector. Although most of the German patents 
were written in obscure language, as stated above, so as not to disclose the 
inventions, the US industry still benefited from this trade-off to a certain extent. 
More importantly, the US government finally adopted a more mercantilist approach 
to its industry, an approach that was similar to that of the German government, in 
                                                       
177 Id. 
178 MURMANN, supra note 159, p.91 
179 BORKIN & WELSH, supra note 171 
180 Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917. Act October 6, 1917, Ch 106, 40 Stat. 411.  
 86 
prioritising and implementing policies that were specifically aimed at promoting the 
development of the local industry.181  
 
Back in the European continent, the worldwide success of Aspirin, the first synthetic 
compound, prompted further research into the possibilities of using dyestuff variants 
as medicines. In a period of less than a half-century, the German dye industry 
discovered a new class of so-called sulpha drugs, which proved to be effective 
against bacterial infections such as spinal meningitis, various forms of pneumonia 
etc., and which provided a first line of defence against bacterial infections. The 
encouraging results allowed the dyestuff industry to concentrate on developing key 
skills in organic chemistry. Nevertheless, taking the leap from traditional dyestuff 
research to organic chemistry was not easy, and thus, it posed significant challenges 
for the industry. It required a long-term vision aimed at dominating the market 
through encouraging innovation. In fact, a few large firms soon dominated the 
market because the industry was highly capital intensive i.e. it involved a level of 
costs that was beyond the means of most small firms. By the beginning of the 20th 
century, there were only six leading companies in the market in both Germany and 
the world: BASF, Bayer, Hoechst, Agfa, Cassella and Kalle AG.182 Furthermore, the 
German dye industry had established strong links with major German research 
institutes that undertook research into areas of organic chemistry and related medical 
fields. The strength of the German university system in the field of organic 
chemistry, according to Murmann, also assisted the German Industry in developing a 
better understanding of the formation of dye molecules. It was particularly important 
for the industry to understand how these molecules bonded with fabrics. It was also 
necessary to provide essential training for chemists who populated the firms’ R&D 
labs.183 The university system helped to enable the industry in these areas. These 
efforts provided the industry with an increased ability to synthesise molecules and 
analyse chemicals, and consequently, this helped to develop the current 
understanding of microorganisms, which lays the foundation of much modern 
pharmaceutical research.  
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III.IV.II. Epoch Two: Penicillin- A Breakthrough In The History Of 
Pharmaceutical Innovation 
 
The discovery of penicillin is frequently referred to as the one of the most important 
breakthroughs in the history of pharmaceutical innovation. In fact, penicillin became 
the first widely used antibiotic agent that was capable of providing a defence against 
bacterial infections. Undoubtedly, the discovery and development of penicillin 
started the antibiotic revolution. This period of scientific breakthrough revolutionised 
the treatment of bacterial infections and in so doing, changed the course of medical 
history. Thus, the story of penicillin contains important lessons for pharmaceutical 
innovation today, and in particular, the importance of recognising the distinction 
between invention and innovation.  
 
In the final decades of the 19th century, scientists discovered that bacteria were the 
cause of many of illnesses. This theory is known as germ theory. It is widely 
attributed to Pasteur, who is acknowledged as the father of microorganism research. 
Indeed, Pasteur, Koch184 and Ehrlich185 were the first to identify the particular 
microbes that caused several major diseases, and they went on to contribute to the 
development of highly effective vaccines.186  
 
For instance, Ehrlich and his colleagues synthesised and tested more than 600 
molecules for therapeutic effects against syphilis, a widespread and essentially 
incurable disease. In an effort to optimise the biological activity of a lead compound 
through systematic chemical modifications, the scientists discovered the process for 
isolating Salvarsan, the very first organic anti-syphilitic. The discovery of this 
process is widely acknowledged as a great advancement from the use of inorganic 
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compounds. This discovery essentially created the basis for nearly all-
modern pharmaceutical research.187 The identification and characterisation of 
bacterial toxins as the central causes of diseases pioneered the discovery of 
penicillin.188 The discovery of general-purpose chemotherapeutic agents known as 
the sulphonamides had prompted the antibiotic revolution started in the era of 
chemotherapy following the discovery of general-purpose chemotherapeutic agents 
known as the sulphonamides.189 
 
The discovery of penicillin was coincidental. Nonetheless, the story of its discovery 
was compelling. Alexander Fleming, from St. Mary’s Hospital, London, returned 
from holiday to find some mould growing in one of his discarded staphylococcus 
culture plates. This enabled him to discover the anti-bacterial action of a specimen of 
mould. He found that the mould had drifted onto and killed the bacteria that he was 
culturing in a Petri dish.190 Although his efforts to stabilise penicillin failed, he and 
his assistants managed to produce it in a very weak form. The very first version of 
penicillin could inhibit the growth of other microbes from a swab. Thus, it could 
facilitate the flourish of B. Influenza. Furthermore, penicillin was able to signal the 
presence of influenza. This was an important milestone in terms of diagnosing the 
disease. Furthermore, the discovery gave impetus to the process of developing a 
vaccine against B influenza. Given the fact that there were several problems in 
relation to replicating the experiment successfully coupled with penicillin’s lack of 
effectiveness at treating influenza, Fleming decided to stop the research project.191 
He did, however, write an influential scientific article regarding the discovery of 
penicillin and its effects.  
 
Almost a decade later, two scientists, Howard Florey and Ernst Chain, from the 
University of Oxford, took Fleming’s invention a step further. Florey and Chain 
managed to isolate the bacteria-killing substance found in the mould i.e. penicillin. 
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Fleming’s paper prompted Chain’s research into penicillin. By working on the 
problems that defeated Fleming, Chain stabilised and purified the active substance. 
Furthermore, the controlled experiments produced a number of positive results in 
relation to mice with bacterial infections. A full-scale test on a few human cases also 
proved to be successful. While the initial experiments were successful, Florey and 
Chain faced the dilemma of carrying out full-scale clinical trials. Furthermore, it was 
necessary to produce a large amount of penicillin in order meet the wartime demand 
in the Britain.  
 
Indeed, when Florey and Chain advanced their research on penicillin, Britain was 
already in the midst of the World War II (WWII). Nevertheless, the solution to the 
practical problems faced by Florey and Chain, did not lie in Britain.  The British 
drug industry was unable to carry out the production of penicillin in bulk.  The 
industry was already facing problems concerning wartime shortages for the existing 
range of drugs. Furthermore, the British industry generally took a conservative 
attitude regarding experimental medicines, and hence, it was reluctant to invest in 
new inventions.192  
 
However, Florey’s enthusiasm transformed the speculative experiment of penicillin 
into a research programme. The reason for this was that Florey was not only a good 
scientist but he was also an innovator and entrepreneur. Thus, when he failed to 
persuade any of the British companies to produce penicillin, he did not give up and 
go back to his lab, as many other scientists would have done. He went to America 
and visited a number of the pharmaceutical companies there. He explained the 
invention of penicillin to US companies. Initially, he managed gain the support of the 
Committee on Medical Research of the United States Office of Scientific Research 
and Development. It was at this stage that the U.S drug industry, including the 
leading firms such as Merck, Squibb and Pfizer, decided to devote funds to a massive 
research and production effort that focused on industrial manufacturing of 
penicillin.193  
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The story of penicillin illustrates the key interaction involved in innovation. 
Furthermore, it serves as anecdotal evidence in favour of Schumpeterian theory. 
Kingston, for instance, argues that the contrast between what was done by Fleming 
and what was done by Florey clearly illustrates Schumpeterian theory, and in 
particular, it shows the clear-cut line that exists between inventor and innovator. 
Fleming discovered penicillin. However he was unable to realise the potential of his 
invention. Due to research problems, he was unable to take his discovery any further. 
Like many other scientists, he was committed to science. He wrote a paper on the 
discovery of penicillin and its potential usage. In this context, Fleming presents a 
very good model of the Schumpeterian inventor.194 Florey, however, was the 
Schumpeterian innovator of the penicillin. Florey believed in penicillin and he 
explored the industrial potential of the invention.  He did this to ensure a high level 
of production of penicillin so that the invention could meet its therapeutic potential. 
In fact, when the American medical profession took a conservative approach towards 
penicillin, he directly intervened. He went to a battlefield in North Africa and 
advocated the healing potential of penicillin. He showed the doctors how to 
successfully treat wounds with penicillin. If it had not been for Florey’s enthusiasm 
and his persuasive powers, penicillin would not have been widely available during 
the WWII.  
 
For Kingston, Florey is an innovator because he set goals for himself and he took all 
necessary steps to achieve them.195 The Schumpeterian definition of an innovator 
focuses on the entrepreneur who is able to see the potential of the invention and who 
is capable of coping with the inevitable resistance that innovators face when they 
attempt to move outside of established practice. Florey was totally committed to the 
penicillin project. The resultant difficulties that occurred regarding the development 
of the drug did not prevent him from advocating the production of penicillin. His 
colleagues at Oxford, described him as ‘not a profound visionary, like Copernicus or 
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Galileo or Faraday; he was not an outstanding experimental innovator like Pasteur or 
Koch or Ehrlich: he was not a towering scientific intellect like Newton or Darwin or 
Einstein. But he had one supreme virtue: he knew exactly what had to be done next, 
and he got it done.196’  Once again, this description proves to be remarkably accurate 
with respect to Schumpeter’s innovator i.e. the person who ‘seeks out difficulties, 
changes in order to change, and delights in ventures.197’ Therefore, in the story of 
penicillin, it was Florey who ended up getting things done and thus, he was able to 
turn Fleming’s invention into ‘an untried technological possibility.198’  
 
Apart from providing anecdotal evidence of Schumpeterian invention and innovation 
theory, the penicillin story reveals a number of important real-life lessons that have 
relevance for pharmaceutical innovation today.  
 
Above all, the foremost lesson that can be drawn from the history of penicillin is 
acknowledgement of the advantage of ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’. In 1945, 
Fleming, Chain and Florey received the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine 
from King Gustav V of Sweden, in recognition of the fact that they had made one of 
the most important and valuable contributions to the development of modern 
medicine. In his banquet speech, Fleming highlighted the role of teamwork as crucial 
to the success of penicillin. He emphasised ‘team work may inhibit the primary 
initiation of something quite new but once a clue has been obtained team work may 
be absolutely necessary to bring the discovery to full advantage.199’ Florey, similarly, 
expressed his gratitude to all of the scientists who were somehow involved in the 
project or supported it. He then concluded:  
 
‘Let us all fervently hope that what can be achieved in the way of friendship 
on the personal plane among scientists may soon be translated to wider 
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spheres so that the great technical achievements of mankind can indeed be 
used for its benefit.200’ 
 
In fact, penicillin was the greatest invention of the last century. It has been described 
as a ‘splendid example of different scientific methods cooperating for a great 
common purpose.201’ Florey and Chain owed a tremendous debt to Fleming’s initial 
invention. In the meantime, there was no possibility that Fleming could have 
received the Nobel Prize in Medicine without the efforts of Chain, Florey or the 
Oxford team.202 Hence, Florey and Chain stood on the shoulders of Fleming and in 
so doing; they were able to reach new heights. Florey was the real innovator of 
penicillin because he consistently believed that a successful outcome could be 
achieved only through the collaboration of several individuals. Thus, it can be said 
that, working under the undisputed leadership of Florey, the scientific enthusiasm of 
the Oxford team made a significant contribution to science and humanity.  
 
It is an interesting irony, and it is probably exceptional in the history of 
pharmaceutical innovation, that neither Fleming nor Florey tried to patent penicillin. 
Indeed, the antibiotic revolution was a result of cumulative research. There were no 
patents on the processes or the product of penicillin. Fleming never attempted to 
patent penicillin because he believed that it could had the potential to be used in drug 
discovery research.203 Florey had long arguments with Chain over whether to patent 
the process for the production of penicillin. Chain had studied and worked in 
Germany and thus, he adopted the German approach to patents. Recalling the 
German chemical companies’ tradition of patenting every type of pharmaceutical 
process, Chain felt puzzled that Florey had a negative attitude towards patents. 
However, Florey truly believed that any kind of patent application would have 
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violated the academic ethos of the time.204  Notwithstanding this fact, it should be 
noted that it is difficult to say whether any attempt to patent penicillin could ever 
have been successful, given the publication of Fleming’s article on penicillin.205 
 
Chain was not the only person who was puzzled that neither Fleming, nor Florey, 
was willing to patent penicillin. Almost a century after the discovery of penicillin, 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry described the decision not to patent 
penicillin as a perfect example of a lost opportunity. The conventional wisdom of the 
industry states that penicillin didn't become commonly available until 1941 due to 
the fact that Fleming did not patent it in 1928 when it was first discovered. 
Nevertheless, the history tells a different story. Florey was able to assure penicillin 
production in the US in exchange for the patent rights. It was Andrew Moyer, an 
American government scientist, who first patented the method of penicillin 
production, in 1948, not Fleming or the Oxford team. It has often been noted that it 
took several years to develop and produce penicillin because there were no patents 
and thus, no incentives for any pharmaceutical company to invest in penicillin.206 
Nonetheless, the reality is different from what is commonly argued. The historical 
facts that occurred, namely the wartime conditions at the time, and the limitations on 
pharmaceutical production that existed in Britain at the time, were arguably the main 
reasons why penicillin had to be taken to the US for production. In a hypothetical 
scenario, which envisages Fleming patenting penicillin when he discovered it, it 
remains unknown as to how much longer it would have taken before the mass 
production of penicillin was possible. Clearly, penicillin was a result of a process of 
cumulative research and the development of the drug was made possible only 
through the collaboration of several individuals. In other words, if there had been 
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patent restrictions on penicillin, it is likely that there would have been no input from 
Chain or Florey. Without Chain or Florey, there would have been no penicillin, at 
least for the period of patent protection. Arguably, this would have, led to there being 
no available penicillin during the WWII. Undoubtedly, this scenario would be highly 
undesirable, given the fact that penicillin was widely used during the WWII and it 
undoubtedly saved many lives.  
 
Since the War, the technology for producing penicillin was subjected to numerous 
patents. ‘The American monopolisation of a great British discovery207’ led the 
American pharmaceutical companies to be the economic winners of the patent race.  
They subsequently extended their patents to the other potent antibiotics i.e. 
streptomycin, aureomycin, chlormeycetin etc.208 The antibiotic revolution 
contributed to patent policy liberalisation in the US. The replacement of  flash of 
genius requirement by the inventive step requirement or non-obviousness test 
improved the ability of pharmaceutical companies to utilise patent system for 
antibiotic inventions. Thus, it was now the turn of the American pharmaceutical 
industry to conquer the world market. The increasing rate of scientific advancement 
in antibiotics, coupled with strong patent protection and aggressive marketing tactics, 
enabled American companies to grow into pharmaceutical world powers.209   
  
There are number of lessons, in relation to discovery, invention, innovation and 
patents, that can be drawn from exploring the story of penicillin. In his seminal work 
on antibiotics, invention and innovation, Kingston argues that there are real-life 
lessons for pharmaceutical innovation within the penicillin story. He notes, for 
example the fact that government intervention contributed to the innovation of 
penicillin. Kingston further argues that penicillin could not have been innovated on a 
large-scale basis without the intervention of US Government agencies. In this 
context, it is arguable that the particular arrangements that were in place at the time 
allowed the free transfer of information between different pharmaceutical firms. This 
in turn enhanced the supply of penicillin during wartime.210 In fact, if these agencies 
had not been capable of operating efficiently, it is likely that penicillin supplies 
                                                       
207 KINGSTON, supra note 189, p.88 
208 PALOMBI, supra note 192, p.110 
209 Id. 
210 KINGSTON, supra note 189, pp.114-115 
 95 
would have been exhausted long before the end of the war. Moreover, the 
institutional structure surrounding the industry shifted significantly at this time. 
There was a great deal of public support for drug discovery and development. Public 
support had been quite modest before the war, but during the war it increased to an 
exceptional level. This undoubtedly helped to set the stage for a period of great 
prosperity.211  
 
Another important point to consider in the story of penicillin is the existence of 
university- industry collaboration. As mentioned earlier, as a result of the 
conservative attitude of the British pharmaceutical companies towards scientific 
research being undertaken in academic laboratories, Florey brought his research to 
the US For the British Industry, the idea of developing a viable drug from the 
biological production of penicillin was unrealistic and utopian.212 As noted above, it 
was initially the German chemical industry that established strong links with both 
academia and research labs. Furthermore, the long record of collaboration between 
various institutions and industries in the penicillin case demonstrates very clearly 
that a close relationship between industry and academia is essential for  successful 
pharmaceutical R&D. Merck & Co. Inc., for example, was one of the first companies 
which appreciated the critical role that university research played in the R&D 
process. When Florey did a tour of US pharmaceutical companies, Merck was the 
only firm that gave encouragement to Florey’s idea of producing large quantities of 
penicillin. For Kingston, the reason for this was that Merck understood the 
importance of university research and the company had already recruited researchers 
in order to work on Fleming’s papers. Hence, Merck was the only firm ready to 
commit itself to penicillin production.213 Moreover, Merck provided funding for the 
screening program initiated by Selman Walksman. This was a program that 
undertook tests on soil samples in anticipation of discovering antibacterial qualities. 
The screening efforts of Walksman and his team eventually led to the discovery of 
streptomycin, a new antibiotic effective against tuberculosis. In addition, the team 
undertook systematic screenings of substances occurring in nature.214 Finally, the 
U.S Patent Office decision to grant a patent for streptomycin to Merck has proven to 
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be a landmark decision.215 The decision216 changed the structure of the industry 
dramatically. It is widely accepted as a landmark case, which pioneered competition 
among American pharmaceutical companies through product development.217 
 
Undoubtedly, the discovery of penicillin has kick-started the antibiotic revolution in 
pharmaceutical innovation. As a result, antibiotics came into widespread production 
and are now used all around the world. Furthermore, it has dramatically changed the 
behaviour of the pharmaceutical industry. The pharmaceutical companies have built 
upon the lessons learned from the development of Aspirin, penicillin and 
streptomycin. Such as pharmaceutical companies have often used organic molecule 
synthesising, a process inherited from Aspirin. Furthermore, companies often 
undertake screenings of naturally occurring substances, a process inherited from 
penicillin,- in order to develop new and more powerful lines of antibiotics.218 
 
III.IV.III. Epoch Three: From Serendipity To Tailor Made Drugs 
 
During the period between 1950 and 1960, the American pharmaceutical industry 
was committed to excellence in in-house research and development. In consequence, 
American companies emerged as leaders in the world pharmaceutical market. In 
large part, this success was down to the launch of penicillin and streptomycin. In 
addition, new technological opportunities for drug development had emerged.  As a 
result, the pharmaceutical industry assigned a greater priority to the screening of 
natural products for therapeutic use. In particular, the industry made advances in the 
areas of extraction and purification. Many of the drugs developed within the time 
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period specified above followed the same patterns, which were based upon the 
discovery of substances found in nature.219   
 
By the 1970s, the number of substances that were being prepared, extracted, or 
isolated for medical research reached 130.000. New molecules and compounds were 
discovered through random screening and a large number of compounds were tested. 
Major serendipitous discoveries occurred at this time. Multiple drug screening 
efforts, which were aimed at discovering the mechanism of actions of the drugs, 
were a major part of pharmaceutical innovation.220 More importantly, screening 
efforts were undertaken to identify better compounds quickly and efficiently. These 
efforts led to the development of extensive libraries of molecules. The existence of 
these libraries was vital to subsequent drug development efforts.221  
 
1950s and 1960s were truly the golden age of the pharmaceutical industry. For 
instance, a number of important breakthroughs, such as the discovery of beta-
blockers, took place during this period. Rational drug design replaced the 
phenomenon of the accidental discovery. Nevertheless, starting from the early 1970s, 
studies started to report a substantial decline in drug innovation.  For example, a 
study, undertaken during the period between 1969 and 1989, showed that the number 
of new chemical entities launched per year dropped significantly, from 90 to 40. 
Furthermore, these results ultimately revealed that modified versions of existing 
drugs, often called me-too drugs, were becoming highly prevalent in the market.222  
 
In their seminal work, in 1973, Taylor and Silberston developed an extensive 
analysis of the pharmaceutical industry. The study findings raise an important 
question about the potential serious consequences of failing to keep up the 
momentum of discovery. According to the authors, the prospects for future progress 
in less tractable areas of science were reduced due to the fact that the larger portion 
of R&D investment was being made in the more tractable areas of drug research. 
Importantly, during the course of their survey, it was revealed that the end of the first 
chemotherapeutic revolution was almost in sight. As a result a much greater level of 
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R&D expenditure would be required in future to produce advances comparable with 
those of past.223  
 
The process of drug discovery and development was conducted not only by the 
industry but also by research hospitals and academic institutions. This led to a focus 
towards creating candidate drugs. Thus, university research arguably had a positive 
and significant impact on medical research. Furthermore, in the US, the close links 
between industry and university research provided for better utilisation of publicly 
funded research. Typically, the information about the structure of a drug receptor, or 
one of its natural ligands, is used to identity drug candidates. In the late 1990s, armed 
with such information, drug companies began to use powerful computer programs to 
search through databases containing the structures of many different compounds. 
This type of computer-aided drug design allowed researchers to select those 
compounds that were most likely to interact with the receptor, and these were then 
tested in laboratories.224 Nevertheless, as the pharmaceutical companies made 
advances in drug development, the number of newly discovered chemical entities 
dropped with each year that went by. Today, new molecules or compounds capture 
only a small part of pharmaceutical innovation activities. In fact, today, the industry 
increasingly relies on methods of inventing around existing molecules, such the 
introduction of new combinations or new drug delivery models.225 In this context, 
much innovation is focused on me-too drugs. The term me-too is usually used when 
referring to products that are structurally very similar to already known drugs.226 
There has been much controversy over me-too drugs. The pharmaceutical industry 
has been under fire in relation to investment in the development of me-too drugs, 
rather than bringing forward new drug candidates. Indeed, according to statistics 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), between the years of 1989 and 2000, 
65 % of the new drugs that were approved for sale in the US contained active 
ingredients found in existing products. Interestingly, 54% of these new drugs 
‘differed from the marketed product in dosage form, route of administration, or were 
                                                       
223 TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 93, pp.364-365 
224 TWYMAN R.: “Rational Drug Design; Using structural information about drug targets or their 
natural ligands as a basis for the design of effective drugs.”, The Human Genome Project, Wellcome 
Trust, available at http://genome.wellcome.ac.uk/doc_WTD020912.html 
225 MALERBA et.al, supra note 101, p.6 
226 Medical Dictionary Definitions, available at 
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=33748 
 99 
combined with another active ingredient’ and further to this, 11% ‘were identical to 
products already available on the US market.227’ 
 
Over the period between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, it was widely believed 
that no new pharmaceutical company would be able to enter the market due to the 
impossibility of competing with the industry’s giants.228 Research based 
pharmaceutical companies’ capacities in relation to random screening methods were 
built up through internal organisation processes and the development of tacit skills. 
Building up the necessary skills and research capacities required huge investment. 
Furthermore, these skills and capacities were difficult to imitate, once established 
and thus, they became barriers to market entry for new companies.229 Nevertheless, 
in recent years, the advancements in science and in technology have driven industrial 
change in pharmaceutical companies. The development of new drug research 
techniques has been constant. There have even been a number of radical new 
approaches adopted by companies. For instance, modern genetic methods began to 
be used for the identification and synthesisation of therapeutic modules.  In addition, 
gene sequences have been described and identified by scientists. For example, the 
usage of high-speed DNA-sequencing techniques enabled the identification of 
specific proteins that underlie disease mechanisms. In this way, pharmaceutical 
innovation became more associated with the area of biotechnology. Genentech230 
was the first successful biotechnology start-up. It was founded in 1976, in the US. 
Since its inception, it has served as a model for most of the university spin-offs, 
which have had the aim of applying scientific discoveries to commercial drug 
development.231 
 
In essence, innovation in the industry today is based to a great extent on organic 
chemistry, biochemistry and chemical engineering. These developments in 
biotechnology, however, have led to advances in many new areas such as chemical 
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engineering, molecular genetics, protein chemistry and encymology. These areas 
have now become part of pharmaceutical innovation.232 For instance, the 
biotechnological revolution led the emergence of biopharmaceutical drugs, which are 
based on proteins. These protein-based drugs are derived directly from living 
organisms such as vaccines, human blood and plasma, proteins, and monoclonal 
antibodies.233  Biotech drugs are becoming increasingly significant and sales of these 
drugs are growing faster than sales of synthetic compounds234 in the market. For 
example, biotech drugs accounted for an average of 18.2% of all products launched 
over the period between 1996 and 2000. As such, by the end of 2000, there were 76 
biotech drugs that hit the market. At the same time, 369 more biotech drugs were in 
human clinical testing with an aim of 200 disease targets.235   
 
There is little doubt that the biotechnological revolution changed the structure of the 
market. As a result of the revolution, a dense network of collaborative relationships 
emerged between university start-up firms and the larger pharmaceutical companies.  
For instance, a number of spin-off companies became the main suppliers of 
technology and R&D services, whereas the established pharmaceutical companies 
assumed the role of capital and complementary assets provider. It became evident 
that pharmaceutical innovation requires not only the integration of different 
disciplines, but also techniques, and experimental procedures and routines. The 
reason for this is that the relevant knowledge is fragmented and dispersed. 
Nonetheless, the rate of technological change is still very high. Thus, it remains 
unlikely that a single institution could internally develop all the necessary ingredients 
for bringing new products to the marketplace.236 
 
Furthermore, the remarkable advancements in large-scale DNA sequencing of 
genetic endowments coupled with the presence of individuals willing to administer 
the drugs, led to the emergence of pharmagenomics. Pharmagenomics research aims 
to identify the human genetic basis. This genetic basis identifies individual 
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variability in drug response.237 Rather than the traditional one-dose-fits all approach, 
it became necessary to take a novel approach towards the areas of customised 
medicine and tailor-made drugs. There is now wide optimism about the future of 
pharmaceutical innovation. The breakthrough advances in science and technology 
have enabled computer-aided structurally based drug design, low-cost molecular 
manipulation as well as screening, DNA screening and recombinant genetics. Such 
improvements in drug discovery and development present major opportunities for the 
pharmaceutical industry. The attitude of the industry further supports the view that a 
new golden era is about to begin for pharmaceutical innovation.238  
 
III.V. The Local Pharmaceutical Industry In Developing Countries 
 
Generic drugs are often the only medicines that developing country nations are able 
to access and afford. The availability of a wide-range of generic drugs is of utmost 
importance for poor people within developing countries as part of their fight against 
poverty. Thus, developing countries typically excluded patent protection in relation 
to pharmaceuticals. They offered little protection for patents. These countries 
regarded it as an effective policy for public health and access to medicines. 
According to the study of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in 
1988, among the 98 members of the Paris Convention, 49 excluded pharmaceutical 
products from protection and 22 excluded chemical products.239 Hence, over the last 
25 years, pharmaceutical companies from developing countries, including but not 
limited to India, China and Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa have developed into 
giants in generic medicines. 
 
To cite few examples, the rise of the generic industry in India began in the 1970s 
with the adoption of the Indian Patent Act, which reduced the scope of patentability 
for food, chemicals and pharmaceuticals to only processes and not products. It is 
widely accepted that this lack of patent protection, particularly for pharmaceutical 
                                                       
237 See, MANCINELLI L., CRONIN M. & SADÉE W: “Pharmacogenomics: the promise of 
personalized medicine.”, PharmSci, V.2, E.1, 2000 
238 SCHERER, supra note 102, p.12  
239 WIPO, “Existence, scope and form of generally internationally accepted and applied standards 
norms for the protection of intellectual property”, WO/INF/29 September 1988, issued as GATT 
document number MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/R” Ev.1 
 102 
products, was a key to the growth of the generic industry in India.240 Indian 
companies also expanded their business to include generic export markets overseas. 
As a result of the existing patent regime, the Indian local pharmaceutical industry 
emerged as competitive suppliers in the world generic market. In doing this, the 
industry moved from being an industry dependent on imports to an industry capable 
of generating increasing export surpluses.  
 
The instrumental use of a weak IPRs regime in building up local capabilities 
gradually became a phenomenon observable within developing countries. The trend 
began in India, and it spread to many other developing countries including Brazil, 
Argentina, Mexico, Taiwan and Egypt.241 The presence of relatively weak patent 
laws in these countries ultimately had an important impact on the countries’ health 
and development policies.  
 
Brazil, for instance, as a part of national economic development strategy in the Post-
War era, established a strong state-owned generic pharmaceutical industry. This 
industry was ultimately privatised in the 1960s and 1970s. As an integral part of a 
development strategy, and in an effort to achieve sustainable local production, the 
Industrial Property Act of 1971 abolished patents for pharmaceutical products and 
chemicals in order to allow the local industry to absorb and assimilate existing 
knowledge and technology and thus, enhance the productivity of the local industry.  
In the meantime, the governments in developing countries took a large role in the 
development of the local pharmaceutical capacity and the centralised drug purchases. 
By the 1980s, Brazil was one of the global powerhouses in the area of generic drugs, 
an industry worth $ 2 billion. Furthermore, Brazil was the largest exporter of generic 
drugs in Latin America.242  
 
On the other hand, Turkey inherited its first patent law from the Ottoman Empire, 
which was a translated version of the French Patent Law (1844). This law excluded 
pharmaceutical compounds, as well as many other kinds of medicinal products from 
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patent protection. Nevertheless, the law provided patentability for pharmaceutical 
processes. In the 1960s, the country started to suffer from heavy foreign exchange 
losses.  Essential medicines were being purchased at prices several times higher than 
they would otherwise have been under normal circumstances. Medicines were 
expensive and unaffordable for a large proportion of the population. Thus, in May 
1961, the Constitutional Assembly abolished process patents due to the perceived 
problem of the monopoly positions exercised by the patent holders.243 Due to the fact 
that the healthcare system was funded entirely from the tax base, the government 
emerged as the largest buyer of drugs in Turkey. Hence, the Turkish government was 
primarily focused on making locally manufactured generic drugs cheaper than 
branded drugs. Moreover, having the largest generic drug manufacturing capacity in 
the Middle East and Mediterranean region, Turkish generic companies penetrated 
established export markets in neighbouring countries.  
 
In other words, the lack of patentability for pharmaceuticals in developing countries 
enabled the local generic companies to copy drugs and manufacture them without 
being held liable for infringement of patents. Within a short period of time, these 
companies emerged as strong competitors of ‘Big Pharma244’ nationally, regionally 
and internationally. Indian companies, for instance, dominated the huge markets for 
drugs in low-income countries in Africa and Asia. The Brazilian generic industry 
became the largest exporter in Latin America. The South African national strategy 
for the fight against HIV/AIDS, aimed to increase access and affordability of 
essential medicines. This strategy included expanding into the generic market, as 
exemplified by other African countries, in order to treat the HIV/AIDS crisis. 
Consequently, the extensive manufacturing capacity of generic companies and the 
wide availability of generic medicines in developing countries compelled 
multinationals to cut prices dramatically. Facing the threat of generic competition in 
developing countries and significant trade deficits, Big Pharma began to lobby the 
US government and Congress to take action against developing countries with weak 
                                                       
243 See, Turkish Official Gazette, 12 May 1961, For The Justification of Constitutional Assembly 
244 The term ‘Big Pharma’ is ambiguous; it generally refers to large multinational pharmaceutical 
companies representing more than two fifths of the pharmaceutical market. ’Big Pharma’ had a total 
revenue of $ 251 billion and R&D spending of .$ 44.5 billion in 2006. The fact of multi-nationality, or 
the decree of internationalization, is widely accepted as another important feature of ‘Big Pharma’. 
See, HELD et al. :”Impact of ‘Big Pharma’ Organizational Structure on R&D Productivity”, Schriften 
zur Gesundheitsokonomie, 2009 
 104 
IPRs regime. Subsequently, in an effort to establish links between trade and 
intellectual property, the US trade policy changed direction dramatically during the 
1980s. This adjustment of US foreign trade policy eventually led to a demand for a 
fundamental change in world trade policy. This, in turn, was followed by a call for 
worldwide IPRs protection from other developed countries, particularly in relation to 
innovative pharmaceuticals. In order to keep pace with the forces of economic 
globalisation, the developing countries arguably did not have any option but to 
become parties to the resultant treaty, TRIPS.  
	  
III.VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter gave an outline of the process of pharmaceutical innovation. In an 
attempt to provide further context to the research findings, it was necessary to 
ascertain the key drivers of pharmaceutical innovation. Having demonstrated this in 
the previous chapter, it is clear that there is a growing body of empirical research that 
appears to support the view that patents are the primary appropriability mechanism 
that stimulates R&D activities in the pharmaceutical industry. Consistent with the 
available empirical evidence, it is provided herein that patents are one of the dynamic 
inducements that spur R&D investments. In the course of the wider discussion of this 
area, it is also argued that first-mover advantages demand structure as well as other 
variables, i.e institutional setting, government incentives play a relative role with 
regard to R&D in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Furthermore, the historical evolution of pharmaceutical innovation indicates that 
until the industry completed its transformation into a technology developer, patents 
did not play an important role in terms of spurring pharmaceutical innovation. An 
analysis of the history of pharmaceutical innovation presents compelling evidence to 
show that innovation is a transformative process. Hence, the transformative nature of 
innovation should be taken into account in relation to the execution of key priorities 
and capacity building. This analysis further demonstrates that drug discovery is a 
long-term investment, which includes not only the drug discovery process but also 
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significant innovation activity. Thus, patents protect not only invention but also this 
significant innovation activity in pharmaceuticals.  
 
By giving an account of the business model prevalent within the pharmaceutical 
industry in developing countries, this chapter aimed to refine the understanding of 
the key interactions and tensions between developed and developing countries. 
Indeed, it is clear that the growth of the generic drug industry in developing countries 
during the 1980s became one of the most significant factors that ultimately laid the 
foundations of today’s global patent regime.  
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IV. TOWARDS THE END OF THE BEGINNING;                                       
TRIPS And Post-TRIPS Era In The Developing World 
 
 
 
 
“Now this is not the end.  
It is not even the beginning of the end.  
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning” 
Winston Churchill 
	  
IV.I. Introduction 
 
The tension that had arisen between multinational pharmaceutical companies, 
developed countries and developing countries regarding globalization and IPRs 
protection in developing countries resulted in the TRIPS Agreement. This agreement 
became the first multilateral treaty solely dedicated to intellectual property. TRIPS, 
taking effect on January 1, 1995, was introduced during the final part of the Uruguay 
round of the WTO negotiations. The introduction of TRIPS has proven to be a 
critical turning point in the history of intellectual property. There is little doubt that a 
new era for IP was initiated with the introduction of IPRs in the international trading 
system.   
 
Thus, TRIPS stands as a powerful symbol of the globalisation of IPRs. It covers a 
wide range of IP issues, including provisions on the domestic enforcement of IPRs 
and as well as a procedure for achieving binding dispute settlements. TRIPS has a 
unique character, which stems from the fact that it establishes the minimum 
standards for IPRs protection for all WTO members.  
 
There is currently a fundamental legal and political challenge for developing 
countries in relation to IPRs and innovation. This challenge must be overcome before 
developing countries can deploy efficient national innovation policies. Over the last 
decade, there have been a number of heated discussions and debates revolving 
around the subject of TRIPS. These debates have usually centred on the 
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implementation of TRIPS at a domestic level, as well as its potential impact on 
innovation and the subsequent costs of compliance. For developing countries, it is 
important to consider both the positive and negative outcomes of the enforcement of 
IPRs in developing countries in the post-TRIPS environment.  
 
Hence, this chapter gives an account of the developments, which shaped the post-
TRIPS landscape. Over the years, the TRIPS discussions have been expanded to 
include political and socio-economical considerations and a wide range of issues 
have been raised. It should be noted that these considerations and issues also need to 
be considered with regard to overall policy design. However, a detailed discussion of 
these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. This chapter briefly outlines the 
TRIPS flexibilities as well as the developing countries’ options in implementing 
TRIPS. The interested reader is directed toward the current literature on TRIPS for 
detailed information concerning the topics covered in this brief outline. 
 
This chapter, further, examines how a deeper understanding of TRIPS could provide 
useful solutions for minimising the potential negative side effects of patents, or IPRs 
more broadly. Finally, this chapter attempts to fill in the gaps between the theories of 
IPRs and innovation.  
IV.II. The Beginning: The TRIPS Agreement 
 
The TRIPS Agreement is part of a package. In other words, certain concessions had 
to be made in order to receive certain trade benefits. The negotiations was based on 
incomplete information and as a result, it was regarded as an imperfect bargain for 
the developing countries.245  The combination of hardball diplomacy coupled with a 
lack of appreciation on the part of the developing countries regarding the possible 
future impact of the undertakings enabled the developed countries to win the battle 
and achieve the first global governance regime for IPRs as part of the new WTO 
system.246 
                                                       
245 For TRIPS Negotiation Narrative, See GERVAIS D.: Intellectual Property Trade and 
Development, Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in a TRIPS-Plus Era, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2007 
246 MAY C. & SELL S.: Intellectual Property Rights, A Critical History, London, Lynne Reiner,  
2006, p.158 
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It is possible to view the TRIPS Agreement as unique because of the way it was 
negotiated. There was a key part strategy i.e. to get the right mix of issues on the 
table, even if they were previously unrelated, in order for these issues to be linked for 
bargaining purposes. This was known as linkage-bargain diplomacy. Thus, the issue 
of intellectual property was negotiated across sectors247 or to put it quite simply; 
IPRs were traded in negotiations for deals on fruits or textiles.  
 
TRIPS may be described as a constitution like agreement because it reaches into the 
nation-state, giving rights to individuals.248 It contains more than mere wishes. 
According to legal scholars, the TRIPS method of dictating rules to countries, 
whether developed, developing or least-developed, regarding what they must do and 
when and how they must do it, is unprecedented in multinational treaties. As a result, 
there has been widespread discussion over whether this will have far-reaching effects 
on national legal systems to an extent that goes far beyond the realms of intellectual 
property.249  
 
The Agreement establishes a balance between rights and obligations. The principles 
of TRIPS are detailed with an explicit reference to ‘the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge’.250 This represents a 
compromise between developed and developing countries. From the perspective of 
the developed countries, it reflects the prevailing justification for the granting of 
IPRs in relation to technological fields i.e. that it is a tool for the promotion of 
innovation. On the other hand, it also reveals the concerns of the developing 
countries regarding the transfer and dissemination of technology.  
 
	  
                                                       
247 RYAN M. P.: Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and Politics of Intellectual Property, 
Washington, Brookings, 1998, p.92 
248 CHARNOVITZ S.: “The WTO And The Rights of The Individual”, Intereconomics , V.38, 2001, 
p.98 
249 MOSSINGHOFF G., “ National Obligations Under Intellectual Property Treaties: The Beginning 
of a True International Regime”, 9 Federal Circuit Bar Journal, V.4, 2000, p.603 
250 See, Article 7, TRIPS Agreement 
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IV.II.I. TRIPS And Developing Countries 
 
Throughout the TRIPS negotiations, the developed countries regarded a strong IPRs 
regime as the main promoter of innovation, from which all the regions of the world 
benefit. Nonetheless, developing countries have tried to voice their concerns over 
this matter, using the counter argument that tighter IPRs strengthens the monopoly 
power of large pharmaceutical companies that are based in industrial countries, to the 
detriment of the less developed countries.251 Thus, during the negotiations patent 
rights were a central part of the discussions. A key issue was the recognition of 
patentability for pharmaceuticals. Recalling from the previous chapter, developing 
countries historically viewed patent law differently to developed countries and they 
typically excluded patent protection in relation to pharmaceuticals.  
 
However, after a number of long and tough discussions between both sets of parties, 
agreement was reached. TRIPS granted patent protection to any invention, whether it 
was a product or process, in all fields of the technology, without any discrimination. 
In addition to patentability of pharmaceuticals, further protection in relation to 
undisclosed information and trade secrets was also confirmed. Thus, TRIPS remains 
an effective compromise between developed and developing countries over the scope 
of IPRs protection. It tries to balance the needs and desires of all the members in 
order to harmonise the world IPRs regime, and particularly the patent systems. 
However, doubt still remains regarding whether conflict has surpassed over 
compromise, even though the world may not be ready for a globally harmonised 
patent system.  
 
Arguably, when the developing countries signed up to TRIPS, they gave away more 
IPRs concessions than they received in return. For instance, the TRIPS assumptions 
regarding technological self-sufficiency of developing countries have proven to be 
inaccurate.252 In this context, under the TRIPS patent regime, the local 
pharmaceutical companies from developing countries appeared to be most likely to 
                                                       
251 HELPMAN E.: “Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights”, Econometrica, V.61, 
N.6, 1993, p.1248 
252 REICHMAN J. & DREYFUSS R.: “Harmonization Without Consensus Critical Reflections On 
Drafting A Substantive Patent Law Treaty”, Duke Law Journal, V.57, 2007, p. 97 
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suffer from a technological gap. They had potentially been forced to undergo 
structural adjustments in order to assure their long-term survival in the market.  
 
Thus, the implementation of TRIPS led to a wide-ranging debate regarding the 
positive and negative sides of introducing strong IPRs regimes into developing 
countries. These concerns have historically played an inordinate role in shaping 
changes to the political landscape since the enactment of TRIPS. 
 
Consequently, the harmonisation of IPRs under TRIPS was a painful process for 
those countries, which were not in a position to absorb the deadweight losses that 
resulted from the global protection of IPRs.253 This gave rise to the serious problems. 
In other words, the strategy of TRIPS represented an unprecedented experiment that 
effectively accelerated the introduction of higher IPRs standards into countries that 
would not ordinarily be expected to adopt these standards.254  
 
The ambition of TRIPS was high. The Agreement was presented to developing 
countries as an instrument for securing a long-term interest towards the goals of 
sustainable development and innovation. However, not long after the signature of 
TRIPS, its controversial provisions gave rise to discussions that focused on the costs 
and side effects of introducing IPRs into developing countries. To a great extent, the 
patent regime has been linked to rising healthcare costs and problems regarding 
access to medicine problems. Many developing countries, especially the least 
developed ones, are faced with public health problems. These countries have 
experienced the difficulties related to the increasing prices of medicines. It became 
evident that patents substantially affected the price, access and generic entry into the 
market of drugs. As a result, TRIPS has come under fierce criticism. 
 
In this context, it is important to discuss the unsuccessful legal challenge that was 
taken by the multinational pharmaceutical companies against the South African 
government. It is widely accepted that the multinational pharmaceutical companies 
                                                       
253 OPDERBECK D.: “Patents, Essential Medicines, and The Innovation Game”, Vanderbilt Law 
Review, V.58, 2005, p.507 
254 MASKUS K.E: Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, Institute for International 
Economics, 2000, Washington, p.144 
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emerged from TRIPS as one of the biggest winners.255  Given the relatively powerful 
position of the multinational pharmaceutical companies, it was no surprise when the 
companies sued the government of South Africa. The companies claimed that the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Bill, that allowed compulsory licences 
and parallel imports, infringed both TRIPS and the South African Constitution. This 
case turned into a public relations disaster for the pharmaceutical companies. 
Following a significant amount of pressure from both the public and a number of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the pharmaceutical companies dropped the 
case in 2001. This is widely believed to have been a significant event in the history 
of IPRs. 
 
The emergence of patent issues in relation to increasing public health expenditures 
and access to medicine coupled with the raised level of public awareness following 
the South Africa case, eventually led to the introduction of the Doha Declaration. 
This document aimed to establish a fair balance between the need for access to 
medicine and the need to protect IPRs. The Doha Declaration was a strong political 
statement. Furthermore, it demonstrated that when a group of countries does not feel 
that a treaty has given them a fair deal, they could continue the political fight at a 
later date.256  
 
The pharmaceutical companies lost face in the eyes of the public in the South 
African case. Hence, this is widely recognised as the lost battle. The Doha 
Declaration was another battle lost by Big Pharma to the developing countries. 
However, analysis of the wider picture shows that the war was not completely lost. 
The three leading IPR-based industries in the US were not entirely satisfied with the 
terms of TRIPS or the compromises given to the developing countries as part of the 
Doha Declaration. TRIPS set certain minimum standards. However, the industries 
wanted more. Thus, the term TRIPS-plus emerged. It was decided that the globally 
visible WTO negotiations, coupled with the growing public awareness of the 
negative sides to IPRs, meant that a forum shift was necessary in relation to IPRs 
negotiations. A one-to-one system of free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations was 
                                                       
255 REICHMANN J.H.: “ Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating 
the Options”, Comment, Pharmaceutical Regulations, V.37, I.2, 2009, p.247 
256 GERVAIS, supra note 245 
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envisaged. These negotiations were held behind closed doors. There is little doubt 
that strong trade and power asymmetries existed between the developed and 
developing countries during these closed negotiation sessions.  
 
The TRIPS-plus provisions have the potential to influence the future of IPRs 
normatively, at the international level. These provisions mandate an increased level 
of protection. They also argue in favour of stricter terms of enforcement. This 
includes inflexible limits regarding the scope of existing flexibilities in relation to 
TRIPS and other multinational instruments. Thus, the extensive title of TRIPS-plus 
has started to be widely used in reference to provisions that either exceed the 
requirements of TRIPS or eliminate the flexibilities underpinning TRIPS.  
 
It is important to state that a collateral problem had arisen due to the extra-legal 
pressures, which were applied to developing countries to induce the countries to 
decline the system of TRIPS flexibilities, and to fall in line with the ill-suited TRIPS-
plus solutions.257 The high number of FTAs, or bilateral investment treaties, shows 
that TRIPS is being increasingly marginalised, although its passing has not been 
officially pronounced yet.258 It appears that TRIPS was just the beginning of a long-
term strategy for developed countries that places a high emphasis on the success of 
multinational companies. From this point of view, much work still remains to be 
done in order to eliminate the TRIPS flexibilities completely. 
 
As developing countries begin to wake up from the pipe-dream that the enactment of 
strong IPRs standards will necessarily bring benefits for development, sustainability 
and economic growth, the focus must be given to establishment of a clear 
equilibrium between the public interest and intellectual property. The increasing use 
of TRIPS-plus provisions illustrates that the status quo of developing countries must 
change in order for these countries to continue to develop and prosper.  
 
For instance, it is clear that the sole introduction of TRIPS i.e. the compatible norms 
of IPRs into the legal system of a developing country will not in itself generate 
                                                       
257 See, SELL S: Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002 
258 EL-SAID M: “ Editorial: Free Trade, Intellectual Property and TRIPS-Plus World”, Liverpool Law 
Review, V.28, 2007, p.8 
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massive developmental gains. In fact, it may indeed entail substantial welfare costs. 
This phenomenon has been observed in many countries, which have changed their 
IPRs laws in response to bilateral pressure.259 For the countries below the certain 
threshold of development, the global IPRs regime introduced by TRIPS is very 
unlikely to contribute to increased growth and prosperity.260  Yet, some countries still 
argue positively about the merits of intellectual property.261  
 
Catching-up in the post-TRIPS era is more costly than ever. The historical analysis 
of catching up process in industrial countries reveals that they enjoyed great freedom 
to choose appropriate institutions and flexibility regarding the IPRs system. More 
importantly, a strong IPRs system, as imposed to developing countries, did not exist 
anywhere in the world.262  In fact, IPRs regime in those countries co-evolved with 
the economy of the country and thus been modified over the stages of economic 
development in response to changing needs of the day.263 
 
Nonetheless, the good policies of yesterday are not necessarily the good polices of 
today.  Developed countries are trying to prevent developing countries from using 
the bad catching up policies, which they pursued to climb up the ladder.264 In today’s 
world, there is little doubt that the implementation process of TRIPS engages 
governments and business elites at a fundamental level. This is a debate about a 
particular economic development strategy, which poses both economic and political 
threats to the established relationships of business and governments.265 In order to 
optimise the potential benefits within today’s trade regime i.e. to stimulate 
innovation and creativity, TRIPS is needed. However, simply ratifying TRIPS will 
                                                       
259 In response to US pressure under authority of its Special 301 trade law, many developing countries 
reformed their intellectual property right laws even before TRIPS was signed.  
260 PARK G. & GINARTE J. C.: “Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth”, Contemporary 
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263 ODAGIRI H., GOTO A., SUNAMI A. & NELSON R.: “ Introduction” in ODAGIRI H., GOTO 
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264 CHANG H.J: Kicking Away the Ladder—Development Strategy in Historical Perspective , 
London,Anthem Press, 2002, pp.126-156 
265 RYAN, supra note 247, p.144 
 114 
not be enough. TRIPS has to be used appropriately i.e. within a system of 
governance.  
 
Building up the necessary institutional and economic capacities to regulate the use of 
IPRs does not happen overnight.266 Under TRIPS and TRIPS-plus, developing 
countries are expected to take self-restrictive actions. Thus, the focus should on each 
country’s local economic and social circumstances. IPRs regimes should be tailored 
to consider each country’s domestic technical capacities. There is no one-fits-all 
approach or even a standard recipe for the implementation of TRIPS. Countries are 
different, regions are different and further to this, legal cultures differ. Each case 
should be considered on its own merits. It is therefore essential to gain a better 
understanding of TRIPS. It is often argued that it is important to use established 
flexibilities extensively since these will provide a starting point for the development 
of a number of policy tools that are embedded in the national innovation strategy.267 
In this context, a key objective of this thesis is to test the validity of this statement. 
 
IV.II.II. TRIPS Flexibilities 
 
The limited understanding of the TRIPS regime of patent rights, as well as its 
interaction with innovation, presents a fundamental legal and political challenge to 
developing countries. The TRIPS Agreement allows some margin of appreciation in 
relation to devising a patent system. It allows room for different interpretations of the 
terms. Thus, while designing the patent regime, the country’s local needs and 
technological capabilities can potentially be taken into account as part of the 
domestic legal regime.  
 
It is accepted that the patent regime should aim to serve the goal of development. 
Thus, the TRIPS flexibilities should be used extensively. More importantly, each 
country should endeavour to ensure that some wiggle room is available in order to 
enable each country to pursue its own policy objectives, based on its own level of 
                                                       
266 DRAHOS P.: “An Alternative Framework fort he Global Regulation of Intellectual Property 
Rights”, CGKD, WP, 2005, p.17 
267 CORREA C.: Designing Intellectual Property Policies in Developing Countries, Kuala Lumpur, 
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development.268 Tailoring the TRIPS regime of patent rights to a country in a way 
that protects IPRs in order to support the development of science and technology 
should be considered to be part of the national innovation system. Hence, it will be 
possible to develop and deploy efficient innovation policies for the local generic 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
There are numerous loopholes and flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement. It is 
arguable that these have yet to be properly addressed by developing countries. For 
the purposes of this thesis, it is important to develop a better understanding of the 
economic and social consequences of the TRIPS regime of patent rights and its 
constructive ambiguities.269 This will possibly shed further light on the question of 
how developing countries can best allow their own national innovation systems to 
thrive.  
 
IV.II.II.I. General Flexibilities 
 
 
TRIPS establishes minimum standards of IPRs; however members are given the 
opportunity to adopt a more extensive protection of IP than what is required, 
provided that such protection does not contradict the provisions of TRIPS. 
Furthermore, it has been clarified that the Members are not obliged to adopt 
standards that are more extensive than the Agreement. It therefore provides a buffer 
for the member countries against so–called TRIPS-plus provisions270 which have 
been imposed by the US and EU.  
 
TRIPS establishes a balance between the interests of the public in access to 
information and technology and the interests of those creating new works and 
inventions in securing a return on their investment. This is necessary in the context 
of trade to avoid distortion of the system. It follows that TRIPS can only survive as 
an instrument of international public policy if it is able to appropriately balance these 
                                                       
268 YU P.K:  “The First Ten Years of the TRIPS Agreement: TRIPS and Its Discontents”, Marques 
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269 Ibid., p.387 
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potentially competing interests.271 Thus, the developing countries should favour the 
pro-competitive approach with regard to the implementation of TRIPS.  
 
The way in which the Agreement is implemented may have important implications 
regarding the conditions for the access to and the use of technology, particularly in 
developing countries as well as on their economic and social development. 
Therefore, it may easily be suggested that it is of crucial importance to try and 
identify the options left by the Agreement to implement its provisions in a manner 
that is consistent with each member’s interests and strategies.272 
 
As one of the flexibilities incorporated by TRIPS, members are free to determine the 
limits of their regime with regard to exhaustion.  The Agreement provides 
admissibility to the international exhaustion system. Under this system, once a legal 
copy of the product has been put into circulation somewhere in the world; the rights 
in respect of such a copy are exhausted. The recognition of the principle of 
international exhaustion in TRIPS can be regarded as a logical reflection of the 
globalisation of the economy.273  
 
Thus, the Doha Declaration reaffirmed that members are free to establish their own 
regime for such exhaustion without challenge. Doha Declaration also allows parallel 
importation under Article 6.274 Parallel imports provide an important device for 
disciplining markets. They also help to induce suppliers to commercialise their 
products on reasonable conditions, as well as being a powerful tool to increase 
efficiency.  
 
The objectives introduced by Article 7, as well as the principles within Article 8, 
accommodate important factors that are necessary for the interpretation and 
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implementation of the rights and obligations under the Agreement. It is important 
that these provisions are as effective as the other provisions of TRIPS.275 The Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health further confirmed the interpretation value 
of these articles. It is stated that TRIPS shall be regarded as a means for the 
realisation of public policy objectives via the inducement to innovation and 
therefore, the access to the results thereof by those who need them.276 
 
Furthermore, the reading of Article 7, in conjunction with Article 8, may enable 
developing countries to legitimise the exceptions to exclusive rights, such as research 
and humanitarian access to drugs in the context of patent rights.277 
 
Article 8 facilitates specific actions taken by the members regarding policy issues 
such as protecting public health or adopting measures against abuse of IPRs. 
Therefore, it is regarded as a tool that can potentially provide a basis for broader 
exceptions than Article 7.278 Similarly, it is observed that the purposes of the 
measures formulated under Article 8.1 have two equally important parts. The first is 
the promotion of public health and nutrition and the second is the endorsement of the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic and technological 
development.279 
 
The principles enumerated in Article 8 must be borne in mind during the national law 
legitimization process. This must be achieved in a manner consistent with public 
health and other public interests. The enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement should 
therefore not prevent members from adopting measures to protect public health, as 
well as pursuing the overreaching policies as defined in Article 8.280 
	  
IV.II.II.II. Patent Specific Flexibilities 
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IV.II.II.II.I. Patentable Subject Matter 
 
Article 27 requires patents to be available for all types of products and process 
inventions. Arguably, the text was revolutionary.  It introduced the principle of non-
discrimination based on grounds such as the field of technology, the nature of 
invention, the place of the invention and whether the products are imported or locally 
produced.   
 
It is likely that developing countries face difficulties in writing laws that are capable 
of addressing, in specific and limited ways, these important social concerns. 
However, it should be noted that Article 27.1 does not constitute an obstacle for the 
establishment of differential obligations with regard to non-infringing imported and 
locally made products. The non-discrimination clause only applies in cases where the 
rights enjoyed by patent owners are different substantially or procedurally, 
depending on the foreign or domestic origin of the products.  
 
It can be argued, therefore, that the main impact of this provision of TRIPS will be in 
relation to compulsory licensing. The interpretation of the last sentence of Article 
27.1 is likely to lead many countries to consider importation as equivalent to local 
production for the purposes of working on an invention. For instance, Article 68 (1) 
(I) (II)
281
 of the Brazilian Patent Law constituted an exception to this rule. Hence, the 
Brazilian law was challenged by the US
282
 before the WTO.  
 
There is no comparable non-discrimination clause in other sections of TRIPS. The 
Panel on Canada- Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
283
 held that Article 
30 and 31 were subject to Article 27.1. However, the factual and legal exceptions 
and modalities of compulsory licences require the provision to be applied to certain 
fields of technology rather than forcing the provision to be applicable to fields where 
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Patent Act 
283 WT/DS114/R, 17 March 2000 
 119 
such measures are not required.
284
 Thus the obligation under Article 27.1 is limited 
only to discrimination based on three elements, as indicated in the provision. These 
elements are the place of invention, the field of technology, and the issue of local 
production or importation. It does not prohibit bona fide exceptions in relation to 
dealing with problems that may exist only in certain product areas.
285
  
 
To put it simply, the issue of compulsory licenses for essential medicines would not 
be regarded as a full field of technology. Hence, this will be limited with regard to 
the number of inventions, which are of the utmost importance for public health. 
Thus, it may be deemed not to violate the Article 27.1 prohibition on discrimination 
regarding fields of technology.
286
 Therefore, non-discrimination in relation to 
imported or locally produced products, as interpreted by Article 27.1, shall be read in 
conjunction with Article 28.1. This suggests that the products mentioned in Article 
27.1 are infringing products, not the products of the patent owner himself, since 
patents only confer exclusionary rights in relation to the former.
287
  
 
The Doha Declaration noted that health and pharmaceuticals was an issue that 
demands special attention regarding the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. It 
follows that public health-related patents should arguably be treated differently than 
other patents. Members are given the freedom to provide exceptions in relation to 
referred issues. In accordance with Article 27.2, non-patentability may only be 
established if it is necessary to prevent the commercial exploitation of the invention 
in order to protect the interests of public health.
288
  
 
The Article does not provide a definition of the invention. It allows space for 
members to define invention within their own legal terminology. Regarding 
patentability, it gives members considerable flexibility in relation to applying the 
three criteria of novelty, inventive step, and industrial applicability. The members 
have the freedom to implement these three conditions of patentability in accordance 
with their level of development, provided that they respect the basic definitions. 
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Article 27.1, in conjunction with Article 1.1, appears to recognise that patentability 
depends on novelty, inventiveness and the susceptibility of industrial application as a 
minimum standard. It follows that WTO members may not refuse patents for 
inventions that meet these requirements. Therefore, it may be suggested that the 
TRIPS Agreement lacks teeth, even though it has normative ambiguities and 
regulatory gaps.289 The gaps and ambiguities that exist within the terms of the TRIPS 
Agreement furnish the members with a certain amount of room to manoeuvre at the 
national level.290  
 
Likewise, patentability of the 2nd or 3rd indication of a pharmaceutical product i.e. the 
so called Swiss type claims291 is an important issue for the design of a patent policy 
that is sensitive to public health concerns.292 The effect of this provision has been 
particularly important in areas, which were covered by the extension of the 
patentability criteria, such as the area of pharmaceuticals.293 
 
In this context, it should be emphasised that during the last decade developing 
countries faced a considerable amount of bilateral pressure from developed 
countries. This pressure was put on developing countries to ensure that new TRIPS-
complaints legislation accommodates certain kinds of new products.294 
	  
IV.II.II.II.II. Rights Conferred 
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A number of different elements formulate the right to exclude others from exploiting 
the invention. These have been listed in Article 28. However, there is a clear 
reference to the two traditional categories of inventions i.e. products and 
processes.295 
 
The Agreement clarifies that patents confer a negative right to the holder. This 
negative right prevents others from doing certain acts in relation to the invention. It 
can be contrasted with a positive right, which has application in relation to products 
or processes. By way of illustration, a patent on a certain pharmaceutical product 
gives the patent holder the right to prevent others from producing or selling that 
product. Nonetheless, it does not give the right to actually sell that medicine. The 
medicine has to be registered by the national Drug Regulatory Authority in order to 
be marketed. This distinction should be regarded as a crucial issue in relation to the 
interpretation of Article 28.296 
 
Nevertheless, it has been observed that some of the countries have misused the rules 
by granting the patent owners a right to oppose the regulatory authorities in relation 
to infringing products. Hence, the regulatory authorities now have an obligation to 
request information about the eventual existence of a potentially conflicting patent 
right, before the authorities are able to register or grant marketing approval to any 
product. This is a sort of administrative enforcement of patent rights, not only 
because the right is enforced ex officio by the government agencies in question, but 
also because it creates a direct obstacle against the administrative regulatory act of 
registering infringing products, regardless of the product being commercialised.297 
Such measures go far beyond the rights conferred in Article 28. This measure has the 
natural consequence of making it more difficult for generic products to enter the 
market.  
 
Thus, developing countries are advised that they should not replicate such unsound 
practices. These practices are of little use other than that acting to expand patent 
rights under Article 28. They also curtail rights under Article 30, which has 
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discouraging effects on the early registration of generic products. This delays their 
entry into the market, which in effect undermines innovation and hinders the generic 
industries’ ability to compete.298 
 
IV.II.II.II.III. Patent Applicant Conditions 
 
Article 29 regulates the disclosure of any invention. The provision gives space to the 
members with regard to requesting identification from the applicant regarding the 
best mode of carrying out the invention. The disclosure should be clear and 
complete. It should also be made ‘in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the 
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art’.
299
 
	  
IV.II.II.II.IV. Exceptions To Patent Rights 
 
One important but highly controversial right is enumerated in Article 30. This right 
‘establishes the general parameters for exceptions’.
300
 This provision was the subject 
of intense debate throughout the negotiations. It is possible to observe issues of 
underlying conflict by examining the eventual wording of Article 30. Furthermore, 
the Canada case provided a comprehensive and detailed interpretation of Article 30 
as well as the three-step test, which may be acknowledged as a filter. These three 
conditions must be satisfied in order to introduce an exception to the exclusive right;  
• Exceptions must be limited. This refers to explicit curtailment of the 
exclusivity of rights 
• Exceptions may not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of the 
patent 
• Exceptions may not unreasonably prejudice the normal exploitation of the 
patent owner, taking into account the legitimate interests of third parties.  
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These three conditions are to be regarded as cumulative. In other words, each one is 
a separate and independent requirement that must be satisfied. A failure to comply 
with any one of the three conditions results in the Article 30 exception being 
disqualified.
301
  
 
The limiting effect of the exception is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
302
 The 
normal exploitation of patents has been interpreted so to exclude all forms of 
competition that could potentially detract significantly from the projected economic 
exploitation of the patent.
303
  
 
Hence, members are authorised to establish narrow limits in relation to the exclusive 
rights attached to patents.
304
 In light of current international and comparative patent 
law the following exceptions may be deemed legitimate within the scope of Article 
30:  
• The importation of a product that has been put on the market elsewhere 
by the patentee, with his consent, or by an otherwise authorised person. 
• Acts done privately and on a non-commercial scale, or for a non-
commercial purpose. 
• Using the invention for research and experimentation as well as for 
teaching purposes. 
• Seeking regulatory approval for the marketing of a product before the 
expiry of the patent. 
• The preparation of medicines for individual cases according to a 
prescription. 
• Use of the invention by a third party who undertook, or started to 
undertake, bona fide preparatory acts before an application for a patent, or 
its publication.
305
 
 
The Dispute Settlement Panel on the Canada case ruled that Article 30’s general 
exception provision did not outweigh the patent owner’s exclusive rights. These 
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rights allow the patent holder to prevent every act of competition that could 
significantly endanger his economic remuneration in relation to the exploitation of 
his patented invention.
306
 Thus, the authoritative interpretation of Article 30 may also 
provide the most expeditious, most effective, least burdensome, least costly and most 
legally predictable solution to developing countries in relation to this question.  
	  
IV.II.II.II.V. Other Acceptable Use Without The Authorisation Of The 
Right Holder 
 
A compulsory licence system, as a political mechanism, can be used to broaden 
access to patented inventions. This is often done in order to achieve a number of 
public purposes, rather than the uniquely private interest of the right holder.
307
 It is 
widely accepted that a great battle was won on behalf of the public interest with 
regard to the question of compulsory licenses. This question initially prompted the 
negotiations for the TRIPS Agreement in the first place. Ironically, when compared 
to the Paris Convention, a more clear and detailed legal framework for compulsory 
licenses is provided by the TRIPS Agreement.
308
 
 
Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement addresses the issues of compulsory licences, 
non-voluntary licences and licences of right. The provision sets out the specific 
conditions but does not define the cases where a licence may be granted. Article 31 
specifies some of the conditions that must be met by member. These include 
remedying a practice that is determined, after a judicial or administrative process, to 
be anti-competitive, permitting the exploitation of a patent which cannot be exploited 
without infringing another patent, preventing abuses which might result from the 
exercise of exclusive rights conferred by the patent, providing redress regarding 
issues that arise out of the insufficient working of the patented invention or 
alternatively in the public interest, i.e. cases of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or of public non-commercial use.
309
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Nonetheless, the members’ freedom to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency subject to limited by the Agreement itself. A national emergency is a 
mere example of a situation of extreme urgency. The Agreement, however, does give 
members near-total freedom to determine when situations of national emergency or 
extreme urgency arise that could potentially justify the granting of compulsory 
licences. The freedom to issue and determine the grounds for issuing compulsory 
licenses was also confirmed by Article 5 of the Doha Declaration as an issue of 
flexibility.  
 
In this context, a public health crisis may represent a national emergency, or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, pursuant to Article 31(b). There is no requirement 
for prior negotiation with the patent owner before a compulsory licence is issued. 
Thus, epidemics of infectious diseases such as HIV or swine flu etc. may constitute a 
case of national or extreme emergency. The potential conditions that are required in 
order to grant compulsory licences could be illustrated in the sub-paragraphs of the 
Article.  
 
Until quite recently, the effective usage of compulsory licenses was quite rare. 
Nonetheless, health authorities in developing countries have finally begun to use the 
compelling threat of compulsory licenses to reduce the price of branded drugs. 
Indonesia, for instance, used the potential threat of compulsory licenses against 
pharmaceutical companies, in order to urge them to invest in local production of 
pharmaceuticals.
310
 Over the period 2006-2007, first Thailand
311
, and shortly after, 
Brazil
312
 issued compulsory licenses as a safeguard to ensure access to affordable 
medicines. Those decisions bore the fruit of the initial steps taken by developing 
countries in order to implement the Doha Declaration’s requirement that the TRIPS 
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Agreement should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of the 
members' right to protect public health based on a politically backed legal strategy.
313
 
 
Doha Declaration 
 
The Doha Declaration aimed to establish a balance between the need for access to 
medicines and the global call for IPRs protection.
314
 
 
According to Drahos, TRIPS was regarded as a form of networked governance. In 
this system, the powerful groups built up an ever-increasing circle of influence. This 
was achieved through the use of trade coercion. Hence, the Doha Declaration may be 
appreciated as the only real victory for developing countries. This victory concerns 
the group of developing countries that managed to isolate the US, and its 
pharmaceutical industry, during the negotiations.
315
 Thus, to some extent issue of 
compulsory licences helped to provide a remedy to the developing countries. As 
noted above, the Doha Declaration permits a country to issue compulsory licences in 
order to meet the health needs of its domestic territory.
316
 It declares the conditions 
for establishing a waiver and it sets forth the conditions for its operation. It is 
necessary to state that it envisages an exceptional situation occurring before a 
compulsory licence can be issued. 
 
The Doha Declaration presents a number of potential short-term benefits for some of 
the least-developed countries.
317
 The main purpose of the Doha Declaration was to 
clarify the uncertainty that had arisen in many developing countries surrounding the 
use of TRIPS flexibilities. Most of the developing countries lack the experience and 
administrative know-how in relation to the regulation of patents. Furthermore, the 
political and administrative systems of developing countries are not mature enough 
to face the challenges of the patent system. For instance, it is certainly true that in 
most of those countries there is little experience in granting compulsory licences. 
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On 30 August, 2003, and following two years of negotiations, the General Council of 
the WTO adopted the Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. The solution is essentially a 
waiver of the export restriction of Article 31. Thus, the provision allows the total 
amount of goods produced under a compulsory licence to be exported. Article 31bis 
is the first amendment to the TRIPS Agreement. It comes into effect when two thirds 
of the WTO membership has ratified the change.
318
 The relevant system, as 
articulated under paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, is presumed to operate in a 
scenario in which there is only one global supplier of a patented drug and therefore, 
there will be no available sources of generic products. 
	  
IV.II.II.II.VI. Term Of Protection 
 
Article 33 provides a single standard for protection, for a period of 20 years from the 
filing date. The Article does not require any kind of patent term extensions.  
 
IV.II.II.II.V. Protection Of Undisclosed Information 
 
The TRIPS Agreement requires that members provide protection in relation to 
marketing approval data, under certain conditions. Countries have considerable 
flexibility with regard to the application of Article 39.3, because it is narrowly 
drawn. This is provided as a reward for the investment in data protection, rather than 
as a reward for the creativity, or inventiveness, that is necessarily involved in 
generating the data.
319
 
 
The relevant test data is protected to the extent that the national regulations require 
the submission of such data. The provision does not provide protection for test data 
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that is submitted voluntarily. It only covers undisclosed tests and other pieces of data 
that are expressly required by the authorities. Information that resides in the public 
domain does not fall within the scope of Article 39.3.  
 
Article 39.3 refers to a new chemical entity. However, it does not provide any 
guidance or clarification regarding the meaning of new. Thus, the members are given 
flexibility to define what is meant by new according to their own patent regulations. 
Furthermore, the development of the data must involve a considerable effort. As a 
result, it clearly requires the members to protect undisclosed registration data against 
unfair commercial use and disclosure. 
 
In addition, the provision makes a clear reference to Article 10bis of the Paris 
convention. Article 10bis defines unfair competition as any act of competition 
contrary to honest commercial matters. It should duly be noted that the notion of 
honesty in commercial matters does not have a universal meaning. Further to this, 
the relevant commercial practices can vary among the different members.  
 
While interpreting the terms of Article 39.3, it is necessary to give increased 
attention to the distinction between data exclusivity and data protection. There is a 
worrying trend to associate data exclusivity to the TRIPS Agreement.  Article 39.3 
does not make reference to the term of data exclusivity or to any other term of 
exclusivity. The provision merely deals with data protection. The provision is 
intended to prevent unfair commercial use of data by third parties. It does not require 
the protection of secrecy.
320
 The members’ obligations are limited to using 
information effectively. This information is required by, and submitted to, the 
government. At the time of submission, and following the decision, the data remains 
undisclosed.
321
 
 
Data exclusivity rules prevent the regulatory authority from being able to rely on the 
originator’s data when registering a generic version of the same product. It therefore 
creates a de facto market exclusivity for originator companies. Hence, the generic 
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companies are effectively forced to delay the launch of their product until the end of 
the exclusivity period.  
 
On the other hand, Article 39.3 requires members to protect undisclosed registration 
data against disclosure and unfair commercial use. This protection against disclosure, 
except where necessary to protect public, is highlighted in the provision as an 
independent obligation.
322
 Namely, the regulatory authorities are required to not 
publish the registration data. Furthermore, the authority is not allowed to share data 
with third parties.  
 
Accordingly, the question arises whether the use of bio-equivalence studies, instead 
of full clinical trials, represents an example of unfair commercial use. A test of 
bioequivalence is based on the generic company’s data. It demonstrates that both the 
safety and quality of the generic drug is at exactly the same level as that of the 
originator. Neither the generic company nor the regulatory authority is able to use the 
originator’s data. Even though sometimes the regulatory authority is allowed to 
indirectly rely upon the data, it can only do so for the purpose of non-commercial 
use. Further to this, the term unfair commercial use in Article 39 refers to practices 
such as industrial espionage. Moreover, the provision does not to interfere with the 
work of a governmental body, which is tasked with protecting the public.
323
  
 
It should also be noted that the scope of the duty to prevent unfair commercial use is 
defined as a presumption. This is a conduct liability rule, rather than an exclusive 
property right. Hence, it requires non-use of the exclusive data, including any health 
and safety conclusions, which the data establishes.
324
  
 
The TRIPS-plus solution requires the compliance of developing countries to the 
utmost level in relation to TRIPS.
325
 Thus the provision effectively requires 
incorporation of data exclusivity in order to provide exclusive protection of the data. 
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In the context of the TRIPS-plus policies, the duration of the exclusivity period may 
vary among the developed countries from five to ten years.
326
 Hence, developing 
countries are well advised to carefully consider the potential costs and negative 
effects of data exclusivity on local innovation. Therefore, developing countries 
should aim to implement TRIPS in a pro-competitive way. This would potentially 
distinguish between the concepts of data exclusivity and data protection. It would not 
be more stringent or more restrictive than TRIPS.
327
 
 
IV.III. Towards The End Of The Beginning  
 
TRIPS Agreement widely regarded by developing countries as an unfair deal. Even 
now, fifteen years after the emergence of the Agreement, there are still ongoing 
discussions focusing on the question of whether the Agreement is unbalanced. In 
fact, it is arguable that today’s international IP regime, which is based on TRIPS, 
was enacted as a response to the call of the strong, and unfortunately, the voices of 
the weak largely went unheard during negotiations. As Chang puts it, that is how the 
world works; the strong i.e. the developed countries call the shots and the weak, 
developing countries have little choice but to follow orders.328  
 
Developing countries have long been concerned about the Agreement and its 
consequences. However, it is not in interest of developing countries to dwell on the 
past. They now have to accept that TRIPS is the legal framework for global IPRs. 
Nonetheless, IPRs should not be overrated, as they constitute only one component of 
the innovation system. The upshot is to consider IPRs as part of a portfolio of 
instruments where other elements of this portfolio also need to be strengthened. Of 
particular importance in this respect is redesigning IPRs regime to increase its 
benefits and reduce its costs, which is most likely to boost economic efficiency and 
increase the pace of innovation.329  
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Hence, in the course of a wider strategy, developing countries may consider taking a 
holistic approach, focusing on growth prospects through innovation policies. The key 
lesson for developing countries is that a country can develop a national IPRs 
strategy, which works within the TRIPS framework, and that, also matches the 
nature of its innovation strategy and local realities. In fact, according to Kuan, while 
recognising the need to adopt international patent standards, countries might still 
have the option of adopting ‘a more sophisticated framework in which there are 
degrees of differentiation in outcomes and standards by content and time, to cater to 
the specific needs of each technological industry and nation.330’ 
 
In this context, Helpman argued that the absorptive capacity of developing countries 
largely depends on each country’s unique resource base. This necessarily includes 
the availability of a sufficiently skilled labour force as well as a suitable level of 
organisational know-how.331 Maskus identifies the various activities that must be 
carried out in order to increase absorptive capacity. These activities include the 
closing down of companies that undertake infringing activities and the placing of 
market-power pricing. This often occurs with regard to sensitive areas such as the 
pharmaceutical industry. Considering the hampering effect in strengthening the IPRs 
regime on the basis of economic development, he also highlights the high cost of 
innovation and the increase of potential abuses.332 Nevertheless, in most of the 
developing countries, there is little doubt that the profits from free riding and piracy 
outweigh any IPRs.333 According to Gervais, a balance may be struck by achieving 
an optimal degree of protection, which appropriately protects and rewards creativity 
and ingenuity, and thus, providing an incentive to continue creating, while not 
deterring the creativity and inventiveness of others.334  
 
One should note that the real engagement, exploitation and contribution of local 
innovation and expression depend upon an effective implementation of TRIPS, and 
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the enforcement of these provisions within national political economies.335 TRIPS 
stands out as an influential initiative of international law and organisation. However, 
neither the specific laws of IPRs protection, nor the judicial reforms necessary for 
their effective enforcement, will be easily implemented into the legal systems of 
developing countries.336  
 
A great deal of latitude depends upon the political willingness of countries to set 
their IPRs policy in accordance with their own national needs and priorities. Thus, 
one of the key aims of this thesis is to identify whether TRIPS can effectively be 
used to build up IPRs capabilities and formulate sound policies to get the most out of 
the system. For developing countries, the main challenge is to transform the IPRs 
regime from a rent transfer mechanism into an effective instrument in order to drive 
local innovation.337 IPRs are just one of the broader set of measures that are required 
to increase levels of R&D, knowledge development and economic growth. 
Innovation is the outcome of knowledge-production i.e. it is an intensive dynamic 
process. A successful, national system of innovation must have many component 
elements other than IPRs. Therefore, developing countries should overlook the 
negative aspects to introducing, or increasing the strength of, IPRs protection and 
enforcement. Developing countries should plan for longer-term economic benefits, 
utilising the framework of national innovation policies. 
	  
IV.VI. Conclusion 
 
TRIPS was not the end. It was not even the beginning of the end. But it was, perhaps, 
the end of the beginning. In the long term, there cannot be a lot of optimism about 
the future of a half-hearted IPRs system. It is generally accepted that the next ten 
years will bring a new multinational agreement that strengthens the IPRs regime of 
TRIPS and thus, establishes new international norms. Hence, the developing 
countries do not have much time to catch up. There is a crucial need for the 
development of proper institutions and effective policies that can facilitate the 
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transfer and development of technology and promote innovation in developing 
countries.  
 
TRIPS changed the nature of the development game. New game has its own set of 
rules but this does not necessarily mean winner-takes-it-all. One may hypothesises 
that the way to becoming a winner in this game starts with learning the rules and 
identifying a winning strategy. Once developing countries truly understand what 
makes the more developed states so successful, they too can develop their own 
strategy and achieve success. 
 
The underlying issues are complex. In relation to patents, and IPRs more broadly, 
much remains to be done in order to encourage technological learning and local 
innovation. Nevertheless, it may be hypothesised that once developing countries 
improve the understanding of the TRIPS regime of IPRs as crucial component of 
national innovation system and look forward, they can start benefiting from the 
global IPRs regime. 
 
Hence, the following chapter aims to shed a light on complementary policy essentials 
to the IPRs regime that support a conventional national innovation system setting and 
thus, contribute to the project of sustainable growth and development. 
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V. LOOKING AT THE BIG PICTURE: NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM 
 
 
V.I. Introduction 
 
Since the introduction of TRIPS, the IPRs landscape has changed dramatically. 
Eventually, IPRs came to be linked with innovation. It is widely accepted that IPRs 
are economic assets that are necessary to develop world-class standards of 
innovation and creativity. Thus, they should be considered as forming part of a 
broader set of measures that are designed to optimise the development and utilisation 
of knowledge.338  
 
While many scholars and international organisations approach IPRs simply from a 
legal angle, the one of the main aims of this thesis is to engage and open up debate 
about IPRs as an essential component of innovation by integrating legal, political, 
technological and socio-economic considerations. The debates are still ongoing 
between countries, politicians, NGOs and academics on TRIPS and innovation. 
Nevertheless, one thing is clear - TRIPS still remains in place. Thus, this chapter 
assesses the question of how to reconcile TRIPS with the priorities of developing 
countries. It hypothesises that a better understanding of the nature of TRIPS, and its 
components, can help to raise awareness of the need for a comprehensive innovation 
policy. Hence, it outlines the issues surrounding the concept of IPRs and innovation. 
The objective is to highlight and present the most significant sequences of innovation 
and explore how these indicators can be interpreted and used in relation to policy 
design. The chapter identifies complementary policy essentials and discusses how 
these factors contribute to the national innovation system. It offers a comprehensive 
overview of legal and economic literature.  
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V.II. Intellectual Property Rights: A Prerequisite For Innovation?  
 
The systematic promotion of innovation has arguably resulted in innovation 
becoming a part of the development agenda. Innovation, particularly in developing 
countries, increasingly takes account both legal and economic scholars. A large and 
growing body of literature has explored the subject. However, no solid conceptual 
framework has been demonstrated so far. It has been stressed that innovation and 
economic growth, and therefore development, are somehow linked to each other. 
Innovation, in fact, has the potential to drive a country’s long-term economic 
performance. The innovation process in developing countries is usually described as 
imitative, adaptive and incremental in nature. Of particular importance in this respect 
is the correlation between innovation, imitation and intellectual property. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the on-going project for establishing a strong IPRs 
regime worldwide, as envisaged by TRIPS, is adversely affecting the technological 
activities of companies in developing countries, by choking the knowledge 
spillovers.339 Hence, the role of IPRs in the innovation process is crucial for 
designing effective innovation strategies in developing countries. According to 
theoretical research, the optimal level and impact of IPRs in the innovation process 
could be variable as a result of the processes of economic development. As in the 
case of developing countries, adoption of the developed world’s standards of 
protection could result in the level of protection exceeding the optimal level. Hence, 
the implementation of today’s IPRs regime relies largely on the size of the potential 
market as well as the nature of local R&D in a country.340 Thus, the successful 
exploitation of IPRs in the innovation system and the corresponding maximisation of 
levels of economic growth require a comprehensive knowledge of optimisation 
strategy.341  
 
Depending on the characteristics of a country and provided that R&D in the country 
is highly productive; it is possible that stronger IPRs protection could have positive 
effects in relation to developing economies. This is likely to result in significant cost 
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reductions depending on the overall market share of the product. On the other hand, 
in countries with little or no R&D activities, strengthening IPRs protection may lead 
to welfare reductions. This is because right holders would typically engage in 
monopoly pricing which would distort consumer choice.342 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of empirical research on the 
subject of innovation and the optimal use of IPRs. These studies are diverse. 
However, some general findings do emerge. Recently, Park carried out a number of 
selective surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between IPRs and international innovation from an economist’s perspective. He 
attempted to discover whether developing countries are able to derive any benefits 
through e.g. an increased level of technology transfers. Among the theoretical 
models he surveyed, Eicher and Penalosa’s model is useful for drawing some overall 
lessons about the impact of IPRs on innovation in developing countries.343  
 
In 2006, Eicher et al., constructed a model within which, a critical market size is 
required before IPRs can positively influence innovation. Thus, they introduced the 
concept of threshold effects as a component of the development dimension of IPRs. 
For markets that exist below the threshold size, no significant relationship between 
patents and innovation was found. In contrast, for the markets above the threshold 
size, a high degree of innovation was feasible, if patent rights were strong and 
enforceable. Further to this, IPRs would typically become strong if research activity 
is vibrant enough to create vested interests within such a system. Two sectors were 
introduced in the model. The first sector was involved in imitation and the other 
sector was involved in the performance of R&D. The model demonstrated that in 
order to go from the low-level equilibrium to the higher level, a minimum market 
size is required. On the one hand, in the case of weak patents, the returns from 
investment in R&D are low. Thus, few funds are available to invest in institution 
building and in further innovation. On the other hand, in the case of a sufficient level 
of IPR protection, returns on R&D investment are high. Hence, a sustainable level of 
funds is available for institutions and innovation. According to Park, the model of 
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Eicher et al. clearly demonstrates that the impact of IPR on innovation is variable 
depending on the level of economic development.344 In the context of this wider 
debate, it suggested that IPRs might offer major benefits to developing countries and 
provide a greater degree of technology transfer through a number of different 
channels. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence indicates that socio-economic factors, 
such as a country’s imitative ability and its level of development, play a major role in 
such a process.345 
 
In this regard sequences of innovation may provide the context for further 
discussions. Innovation process involves three sequences. Firstly, a country imitates 
foreign technology. This is known as the imitation phase, which itself requires some 
level of technical skills. Secondly, a country modifies foreign technology in order to 
suit its domestic needs and markets. This is known as the local innovation phase. 
Finally, a country starts to produce innovations, either as new products or processes, 
or as products based on improvements of existing ones. These products are globally 
competitive and hence, this is known as the global innovation phase.346  
 
Quantitative studies indicate that the strength of a patent regime is strongly 
connected to the level of development of a country. It is empirically demonstrated 
that the global minimum standards for patent protection, as introduced by TRIPS, are 
not likely to contribute to increased growth in countries that exist below a certain 
threshold in developmental terms.347 Moreover, Thompson and Rushing, using panel 
data collected from 55 developed and developing countries over the period between 
1970 and 1985, found that a system of strong IPRs, coupled with effective 
enforcement policies, results in more rapid economic growth in countries with an 
initial level of GDP that is greater than or equal to $3,400. These results further 
support the argument that the cost of strengthening the IPRs regime and thus, 
granting an increase in monopoly power to the developed countries, comes at the 
expense of developing countries. The empirical results also confirm the assertion that 
patent protection is necessary to encourage entrepreneurs to start off the chain of 
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events that eventually leads to economic expansion.348  Thompson and Rushing 
further demonstrate that there is a positive association between high levels of patent 
protection and improvements in total factor productivity, and hence, levels of 
growth, in wealthy or developed countries.349  
 
In fact, Chen and Puttitanun’s theoretical model350 suggests that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between the optimal strength of IPRs and rates of economic 
development. This strengthens the empirical foundation of these arguments. 
According to the study, in less developed economies, which are in the imitation 
phase according to former theory, governments are more likely to choose low levels 
of IPR protection, since the quality of local innovation is low and encouraging local 
imitation facilitates the copying and diffusion of high-quality foreign innovations. 
However, in more developed economies i.e. countries which are in the last phase of 
local innovation, or in the global innovation phase, the quality of local innovation is 
higher.351 Thus governments choose stronger IPR protection in order to provide 
stronger incentives for research and innovation.352 The theoretical model is tested 
empirically by evaluating separate systems of equations that measure rates of IPRs 
protection in relation to rates of innovation. The model is based on panel data that 
was collected from 64 developing countries over the period 1975-2000. The 
empirical results demonstrate that there is a U-shaped relationship between IPRs 
protection and a country’s level of development. Furthermore, IPRs protection has 
been proven to have a stronger impact on innovation in countries with a higher level 
of development.353  
 
The non-linear relationship between levels of IPR protection and levels of 
development suggests that as economies move from low to middle income status, 
they develop greater abilities to imitate new technologies. Hence, the strength of 
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patent protection tends to shift towards lower standards.354 Besides, any assumption 
that there is direct line between IPRs and innovation bypasses the real-life 
experiences of developed countries. This can be observed from the absence of 
meaningful IPRs protection throughout the pre-TRIPS period.355 The empirical 
evidence has shown that successful industrialised countries completed their 
transformation from ‘developing’ to ‘developed’ within a relatively weak patent 
system. However, it must be noted that the absence of a strong patent system did not 
hamper the industrialisation of countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Japan. 
The weak IP regime allowed a certain amount of free riding. This was significant for 
the industrialisation of a number of countries.356 As Chang puts it, when they were 
themselves developing countries, the developed countries’ IPRs regimes were 
deficient by the standards that are demanded of today’s developing countries. He 
elaborates that the policies that the developed countries typically used in the past are 
precisely the same as the policies that the developing countries were utilising, pre-
TRIPS, and which they are now prevented from using by TRIPS.357  
 
A well-known example of this is German dye industry. The German firms became 
strong competitors in the worldwide dye market in the absence of an effective patent 
regime in the early 20th century. In his comparative study of the dye industries of 
Germany and Britain, Murmann concluded that had the German patent law arrived 
earlier, fewer firms would have entered into the industry. As a result, only the most 
efficient firms would have survived, as was the case in Britain.358  
 
Indeed, it has been long suggested that a country’s choice of patent laws has often 
been influenced by the nature of the country’s technologies. By way of illustration, 
the Swiss chemicals industry was initially skeptical about the introduction of a patent 
system since this would constitute a barrier to technology transfer from abroad. 
Hence, the Swiss patent law provided for a specific exclusion in relation to a certain 
category of inventions i.e. the category of dyeing and chemical processes. Thus, the 
law excluded any invention that could not be presented by a model or physical 
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replica.359 Nonetheless, the Swiss patent law did not satisfy the German chemical 
industry. Hence, the German industry lobbied for the extension of patent protection 
to chemicals. During the German-Swiss tariff negotiations of 1904, the German 
government requested that the Swiss patent law be amended. However, the Swiss 
government initially resisted this amendment. Despite this the Swiss government 
eventually declared that unless the Swiss patent law was changed by the end of 
1907, Germany had authorisation to raise duties in relation to the importation of 
coal-tar dyestuffs from Switzerland. Consequently, the patent law was amended in 
June 1907. However, on request of the Basle chemical industry, chemical processes 
were excluded from patentability.360 Swiss law did not grant patentability to these 
inventions until 1954. Nevertheless, the patent-less period361 did not appear to 
hamper the rate of pharmaceutical innovation in Switzerland. 
 
In today’s world, it is arguable that the stronger countries have the power to call the 
shots. As a result, the weaker countries tend to merely follow the actions of the 
stronger countries. Thus, it is said that many developing countries have been forced 
to adopt the IPRs policies of the stronger, developed countries.362  
 
In the post-TRIPS era, catching-up with the developed countries is more complex 
and costly than ever for the developing countries. Today, most developing countries 
are characterised by strong import growth and in particular, a relatively high rate of 
technology-intensive import growth rather than the presence of strong local 
innovation clusters. Thus, the global shift to higher-value-added activities creates a 
fundamental challenge for developing economies.  However, a review of history 
reveals that the industrialised countries generally enjoyed greater freedom to choose 
the appropriate institutions for the protection of IPRs than the majority of developing 
countries do today. During the period when the current group of developed countries 
were developing, a strong IPRs system did not exist anywhere in the world.363  In 
other words, the IPRs regime in developed countries co-evolved with the economy of 
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the country. Thus, the IPRs regime could be modified during each stage of economic 
development, in response to changing needs.364 The next chapter, which analyses the 
country case studies, will demonstrate how the US and Japan in particular have 
historically taken advantage of the IPRs system to the advantage of their economic 
and technological development.  
 
Nonetheless, it is arguable that the following analogy provides an accurate 
description of the attitude of the developed countries: they are attempting to kick 
away the ladder which they themselves used to climb.  It must be reiterated that in 
order to be successful, a country must be able to adapt its policy focus to changing 
economic and political circumstances.365  
 
Therefore, the successful implementation of a patent regime in the innovation system 
of a country inevitably requires taking account of the interplay between economics 
and the technical dynamics of the country.366 For instance, the recent economic study 
of Mohtadi and Ruediger proved the existence and importance of threshold effects 
and it further demonstrated that in a poor economic environment i.e. an economy 
characterised by the absence of stable economic institutions, by a low human capital 
stock, or by a weak financial system, the fixed cost of innovation may be so high that 
it could actually prevent a firm from being successfully able to innovate.367 The 
study also reported that the introduction of IPRs into a poor economic environment, 
which exists under a certain threshold, would not necessarily improve the situation. 
The existing threshold can be calculated by assessing the availability of human 
capital, the quality of institutions and the development of the financial markets. The 
current level of this threshold usually affects the decision of a firm to either innovate 
or imitate. Thus, economic analysis has clearly demonstrated that in the absence of 
sound economic conditions, an imitating firm would not have an incentive, even with 
the introduction of IPRs, to begin to innovate.368  
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The development of scientific and technological infrastructure and the building up of 
local capacities are the keys to a successful system, where IPRs are expected to 
stimulate innovation. As stated above, empirical study has reported that the 
introduction of IPRs into a poor economic environment will not necessarily improve 
the situation.  
 
Furthermore, the model developed by Chen et al. reveals that a simple adaption of 
the developed worlds’ IPRs standards would be inefficient for promoting innovation 
in developing countries. It is clear that more is needed and it is vital to consider the 
threshold effects, as well as issues surrounding the larger market and larger research 
sector that are required for an IPRs regime to provide real incentives for increasing 
R&D expenditures. As Park has observed; 
 
‘Strengthening IP rights from an initially low level to a somewhat higher 
level may not suffice to provide necessary incentives or the wherewithal to 
provide a legal infrastructure to support research and innovation (such as 
research facilities, a court system, IPR administration, specialised 
professionals, or a market for licensing)’. 369 
 
According to Khan, the major lesson that should be derived from the economic 
history of the US is that the entire IPRs system was correlated in tandem with the 
level of development and in light of the overall institutional environment. In other 
words, the IPRs system was developed in tandem with the development of other 
institutions, in accordance with the needs and interests of the wider economy. 
Likewise, Stiglitz elaborates that IPRs should be seen as merely part of a portfolio of 
instruments. In other words, many other elements of this portfolio are also required. 
He confirms the importance of IPRs but he ascertains that the level of this 
importance has been exaggerated, because this constitutes only one component of the 
innovation system. Of particular importance in this respect is redesigning the IPRs 
regime in order to increase its benefits and reduce its costs. This project would be 
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most likely to boost levels of economic efficiency and increase the pace of 
innovation.370  
 
In this context, if the debate is to be moved forward, a better understanding of IPR 
norms in developing countries is needed. TRIPS was the centrepiece of a global 
effort to promote the enforcement of IP laws371, which sets minimum standards of IP, 
at a common denominator level, for all member countries. The correct 
implementation of TRIPS requires a combination of careful analysis of the suitable 
IP policy relevant to a country or region as well as maximum enhancement of the 
TRIPS flexibilities. Thus, one may argue that in order to establish a linkage between 
IPRs and innovation, developing countries should integrate TRIPS in a broader 
sense, seeing TRIPS as a whole package. The simple adoption of the IPRs norms into 
the legal system, without paying due attention to the distinctive characteristics of 
each country, and the relevant flexibilities, would probably not help innovation and 
economic vitality.  
 
 
V.III. The Concept Of An Innovation System 
 
From the standpoint of development, the IPRs regime is often viewed as a critical 
component of the innovation process.372 A system of innovation generally describes 
the vital economic, social, political, organisational, and institutional factors that have 
the potential to influence the development and diffusion of innovation.373 
 
Lundvall first coined the term innovation system in 1985 to describe the interplay 
between firms and institutions involved in knowledge production. Under this 
definition, independent organisations constituted a system of innovation that focused 
on relationships. Adam Smith, the celebrated 18th century economist, identified the 
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role of both experience-based and science-based learning as the basis for stimulating 
innovation. This in turn signified the importance of a vertical division of labour for 
the wealth of nations. The idea of the system of innovation also goes back to 
Friedrich List’s conception of ‘National System of Political Economy’. In this 
system, the role of innovation was clearly recognised as vital for the future of all 
nations; 
 
‘The present state of the nations is the result of the accumulation of all 
discoveries, inventions, improvements, perfections and exertions of all 
generations which have lived before us: they form the intellectual capital of 
the present human race and every separate nation is productive only in the 
proportion in which it has known how to appropriate those attainments of 
former generations and to increase them by it own acquirements.374’ 
 
Hence, List acknowledges the interdependence of tangible and intangible investment 
at the national level. He further points out the necessary link between industry and 
the institutions of science and education. Furthermore, he also identifies the fact of 
interdependence between the importation of foreign technology and the provision of 
domestic technology. He advised nations not only to acquire the achievements of 
other more advanced nations, but to also improve on these achievements by making 
their own efforts.375  
 
The use of the term innovation system by Lundvall was aimed at making people 
aware that a level of interplay also took place between basic research (producers), 
applied research (users), universities (knowledge producers) and industry 
(knowledge users).  This shift in perspective is attached to supply and demand, 
which plays a crucial role with respect to the growth of the innovation process.376  
 
Modern innovation theory typically analyses the level of interaction that occurs 
between the various actors that are usually involved in the innovation process. It also 
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examines the interplay between different institutions. Modern theory reformulates 
this data into a single policy framework instead of distinguishing between the inter-
related fields.377 Furthermore, modern theory is specifically aimed at highlighting the 
‘cultural landscape of the institutions that engage in scientific research, accumulate 
and disseminate knowledge, educate employees, develop technology, which create 
and distribute innovative products and processes; in this category also belong 
appropriate regulatory regimes  (standards, norms, laws) as well as government 
investments in appropriate infrastructures378’ constitute the research and innovation 
system of a society.  
 
The generation of innovation depends upon the encouragement of new initiatives in 
order to bring new ideas to the implementation stage. For Kuhlman, the innovation 
system represents all the diverse sectors of society that attempt to reach into other 
areas via the education system or through entrepreneurial innovation.379 In line with 
this thinking, there is a strong connection between the learning and innovation 
processes. This connection is regarded within the context of an institutional setting, 
as the ‘common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws that regulate the 
relations and interactions between individuals and groups.380’ Hence, it is widely 
recognised that ‘no innovation system is identical to another, just as no society is 
identical to another.381’ 
 
In a narrow sense, a greater focus can be placed on the interplay between 
universities, research departments, and overall technological policy. The relevant 
institutional conditions may be patent laws or other mechanisms related to the 
enforcement of IPRs. This kind of system can be seen by observing the economic 
structure of the US economy, which mainly depends upon huge corporations 
operating on the basis of science and research.  
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Nevertheless, a number of case studies have found that a significant number of major 
inventions have historically been discovered by smaller firms.382 In particular, for 
certain industries, like the software industry, where the fixed-costs of invention are 
low and the level of commercialisation is short-term scaled, it is clear that small 
companies and individuals383 dominate the market.  Additionally, Katz and Sharipo 
found that industry leaders have often made major innovations in markets where 
patent protection is most strong. However, if imitation is easy for companies, 
industry followers or entrants will not usually make major discoveries.384  
 
Furthermore, Lundvall has emphasised that innovation has always taken place in 
small and medium-based firms that have a low level of R&D investment. Thus, he 
proclaims that these companies clearly have the ability to continually implement new 
technologies in order to make production more efficient.385 This level of dynamism 
reveals the crucial importance of small companies for developing countries and small 
economies.  
 
V.III.I. National Innovation System 
 
Over the years, the ‘national innovation system’ (NIS) concept was applied in many 
countries in relation to modern innovation research and as a result, the theory 
enjoyed significant recognition from policymakers in industrialised economies. The 
theory offered an alternative approach to explaining economic growth and it 
eventually became a common analytical tool for international organisations such as 
the European Union (EU), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  
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Freeman was apparently the first to use the concept of national system of innovation 
as an essential element of economic analysis.386 The concept refers to the collection 
of organisations, institutions, policies, and linkages that affect creation, development, 
commercialisation and diffusion of new technology within an economy.387 It 
encompasses the connections between the actors involved in innovation as a key to 
improving a country’s technological performance. To a certain extent, providing an 
assessment of the way actors relate to each other within the economy is vital for 
determining the innovative performance of a country.388 
 
Lundvall’s idea of a system of innovation refers to the institutions that typically 
intervene during the learning process. These institutions include universities, 
specialised research organisations, science based industries and other professional 
units engaged in the production of tangible goods. Ludvall’s definition refers to the 
innovation as ‘the outcome of user-producer interactions’.389  
 
Freeman primarily draws attention to the potential for institutions to provide a new 
impetus for technical and economic change. Taking stock of the accumulated 
evidence and the experience of the German dyestuff industry, Freeman has noted the 
importance of in-house industrial R&D departments. The German dyestuff industry 
was the first to introduce in-house R&D department in 1850s. The reason for this 
was in order to put the business of research for new products and development of 
new chemical processes on a regular, systematic and professional basis.390 As a result 
of this approach, Germany became a major industrial power, possessing the 
dominant chemical and pharmaceutical industries in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. The German government invested in education and training, supported the 
provision of in-house research, and encouraged collaborations between industry and 
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university. Furthermore, the government supported the industry with its trade 
policies.391  
 
The enormous success of the German chemical industry initiated a change in 
industrial behaviour. For instance, it directly led to the growth of government 
laboratories, research institutes and university research bodies. The German industry 
was the first science-based industry that allowed a lab-created invention to be 
quickly transformed into a commercial product. It should be noted that the industry 
also built up its technological capacities at this time and it completed its 
transformation into a world leading industry in the absence of a domestic patent 
system. The absence of patents did not hamper the industry. On the contrary, it 
provided for a certain amount of free riding on foreign technologies. This led to the 
improvement of methods to produce cheap magenta, which led to further 
development that eventually transformed the industry into a strong competitor in the 
world market. Indeed, the German government granted patents for chemical products 
only when the companies were prepared to shift from the position of being imitators 
of dyes to being innovators of new products.392  
 
The German experience clearly demonstrates the strong correlation between 
government policies and the R&D priorities of the industry. It provides evidence that 
flexibility is important in relation to the overall design of the national innovation 
policy. Hence, it is suggested that the effectiveness of the national innovation policy 
in a country is highly dependent upon the translation of policy instruments into 
policy mixes. These policy mixes must be capable of offering complementary and 
mutually reinforcing support.393 
 
In light of this, it is clear that every developing country wishing to succeed in a 
global knowledge-based economy must develop a national innovation system that is 
properly ‘constituted by elements which interact in the production, diffusion and use 
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of new and economically useful, knowledge’.394 Thus, Gervais argues that 
development policies should be aimed at achieving objectives other than merely 
obtaining new imports. Although obtaining imports may be useful, it would not be 
efficient for the reason that building up domestic IP generating activities is vital. This 
can be achieved in part through FDI, technology transfer and acquisition.395 
 
The concept of the NIS is a recent phenomenon for developing countries. It emerged 
as a significant economic and political issue in the latter half of the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, it is now widely acknowledged that a well-designed innovation system 
is vital for economic development and the provision of social improvements in 
developing countries. At present, the world is moving in the direction of a 
knowledge-based economy, which is directly based upon the production, 
distribution, and use of knowledge and information.396 As a result, there is a greater 
reliance on the areas of knowledge and technology.  Recent descriptions of NIS 
policies address technological innovation. These policies involve not only R&D 
policies, but also taking assessments of the actual workings of the marketplace. 
These initiatives also accord with the earlier observations, which showed that the 
innovation process involves not only economic factors, but also institutional, 
organisational, social and political factors.397 According to the OECD, the fluidity of 
knowledge flows among enterprises, universities and research institutions is crucial 
for the smooth operation of innovation systems.  In this context, tacit knowledge, or 
know-how, is exchanged through informal channels. On the other hand, codified 
knowledge, or information that is codified in publications, patents and other sources, 
are deemed to be correlated with the mechanisms aimed at enhancing knowledge 
flows in joint industry research. Examples of these joint projects can be seen with the 
development of public/private sector partnerships, technology diffusion and 
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movement of personnel.398 Moreover, the innovative performance of a country 
depends to a large extent on an assessment of how the actors relate to each other. 
According to the OECD, these are all elements of a collective system of knowledge 
creation and use.399 
 
Furthermore, IPRs play a crucial role in encouraging economic development. A NIS 
contributes to the growth of the technology sector and the resulting dissemination of 
knowledge. In order to achieve optimal knowledge economy conditions, countries, 
and specifically, the developing countries, are required to create effective innovation 
strategies, aimed at prioritising technology transfer and information flow. 
Nonetheless, the setting of these priorities depends to a large extent on the effective 
management and exploitation of different types of IPRs.  
 
Thus, it is of crucial importance that IPRs be appreciated as one of the important 
components of a successful national innovation system. Nevertheless, this thesis 
hypothesizes that each component of NIS must be evaluated within its political, 
economic, social and cultural context. In line with this, it is important to not place 
undue emphasis on a single component of NIS, whether it is the IPRs component or 
the government incentive component, or the university-industry linkage component. 
To do so would simply not be enough to bring about success in terms of innovation 
output. In reality, the post-TRIPS experiences of developing countries have shown 
that IPRs alone will not be enough to create economic growth. It is important to step 
out of the frame and see the whole picture, not just the legal aspects surrounding 
IPRs. Gervais has stated that ‘intellectual property is but one train in a 
comprehensive knowledge and innovation policy, and the trains of surrounding 
norms and must also make it to the station if the objective is to attained.’400 
 
Developing countries, and the weaker developing countries in particular, have long 
been told to bear in mind that without the necessary ‘complementary essentials in 
place that entail a critical level of skills, information, capital and markets401’, an IPRs 
regime is unlikely to support development and economic growth. Hence, according 
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to UNCTAD, for instance, implementation of broad-based science, technology and 
innovation policy initiatives, aimed at promoting and facilitating capacity building 
for the enhanced absorption of new technologies at the enterprise level, is a 
prerequisite for developing countries.402  
 
In the context of this wider debate, one may suggest that countries must tailor their 
particular approach to each specific context. Furthermore, the innovation system can 
be strengthened within a comprehensive and coherent set of policy initiatives. These 
initiatives include, but are not limited to, further structural reform of enterprises, 
liberalisation of trade and investment, promotion of financial and innovation systems 
in order to commercialise new technologies, expansion of educational opportunities 
to build up human capital resources and specification of rules for maintaining 
effective competition in developing country markets.403 
 
As such, apart from assuring political stability and economic growth, initiatives can 
embed the IPRs regime within a broader view of social policies and hence, link the 
initiatives to capacity building initiatives that collectively seek to promote local 
innovation. The relevant initiatives that would typically support effective 
exploitation of IPRs include providing for socio-economic measures. These measures 
are typically drawn from the standpoint of the innovation system. This includes 
establishing policies in relation to enhancing domestic capabilities, serving local 
needs and demands, building up human capital resources, establishing strong links 
between university and industry, and restructuring public institutions.  
 
V.III.I.I. Setting Priorities And Enhancing Domestic Innovation 
Capabilities 
 
According to Odagiri et al., in order to achieve rapid technological progress in 
developing countries, large-scale improvement of the capacity to absorb and use new 
technologies is required. Catching-up is the first step that eventually leads to 
innovation and development. This term describes a multi-dimensional phenomenon. 
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It includes ‘the process in which a late-developing country narrows its gap in income 
(as one may specify by the word ‘economic catch-up’ and in technological capability 
(equally technological catch-up) vis-à-vis leading country.404’ 
 
For Fagerberg and Godinho, successful catch-up policies have not only focused on 
the adoption of existing techniques in relation to established industries, but also on 
innovation, and in particular, the organisational kind of innovation.405 If a country 
aims to upgrade from imitation to local innovation phase, the country must be able to 
assimilate the knowledge and innovative activities of the developed countries into its 
own system. Catching up is a historical and institutional process as well as an 
evolutionary tradition. Thus, it is a prerequisite that the contextual and institutional 
factors present in each country are assessed. In a hypothetical scenario i.e. where two 
countries import the same set of technologies, it is likely that the countries would not 
be able to achieve the same catch up speed. Catching-up involves learning the 
engineering know-how and it also requires the organisation, coordination and 
management of related activities under a very different set of institutions. Thus, for 
Odagiri et al. the country is able to develop its own social capability levels in relation 
to the local realities i.e. in relation to the position of the legal, economic and 
scientific institutions in the country.406 
 
During the catching-up process, it is necessary that countries adopt the imported 
technologies to their own local needs. Following this, countries should concentrate 
on local capacity building as part of the next sequence. Furthermore, there is a 
common misconception that catching-up is simply about copying or reverse-
engineering. However, it is important to take account of strategic priorities as well as 
the domestic realities of the adopting countries. This process necessarily requires 
making creative modifications in order to tailor foreign practice in line with national 
conditions. The adaptation of foreign technologies on a country’s own terms will 
often lead to an increase in the use of industrial capabilities. Facilitating 
advancements in relation to existing technologies typically allows a smoother 
transition towards innovation and development. For Stiglitz, increasing the pace of 
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development often depends upon attaining the right combination of global and local 
knowledge. The scientific knowledge that exists in industrialised countries typically 
involves substantial elements of adaptation and thus, it can be said to combine both 
global and local knowledge. Thus, Stiglitz recommends that developing countries 
make efforts to complement the adoption of foreign technologies with the expansion 
of local knowledge.407 
 
Lundvall has asserted that there is no way of designing an effective innovation policy 
without first analysing the domestic innovation system and therefore identifying the 
mechanisms that produce and reproduce knowledge and competence.408 For instance, 
in Europe the creation of free innovation zones within Europe has been proposed as 
an alternative to the traditional Brussels-oriented innovation policies.409 The main 
idea behind free innovation zones lies within the start small and build on successes 
approach. The system is essentially based upon the local realities of Europe. In this 
scenario, the policy makers are expected to designate a sector with a promising 
future. In choosing this sector, it is necessary that Europe already have the relevant 
built-in technological capabilities. It is necessary that policy makers consider 
creating a stable and flexible legal environment in order to stimulate innovation. This 
effort involves review and reform of the existing legislation. Thus, the envisaged 
system would further include a mechanism to promote patent protection in relation to 
the specific inventions that are to be developed in the free zone. It would also include 
tax incentives for investors and businesses in order to promote collaboration with 
researchers in the zone.410  
 
This initiative in Europe could potentially provide guidance to developing countries. 
It could help developing countries to develop innovation strategies aimed at 
enhancing domestic innovation capabilities. However, it should be noted that before 
designing innovation strategies for the future, it is required that each developing 
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country set its own priorities and enhance its own domestic innovative capabilities. It 
is important to carefully observe the components of innovation in each developing 
country and to take account of the prospective results of the flow of innovation. In 
this area, these factors come into prominence as key factors for the enabling of 
domestic innovation.411 Since the knowledge-based global economy requires an 
ability to innovate by improving on the worldwide state of art and/or making 
adjustments to existing products and processes in relation to local and regional 
preferences. Thus, economic theory requires that prospective innovation policies be 
designed in order to balance the level of incentives required to encourage investment 
in innovative activity with the promotion of technology transfer itself.412 
	  
V.III.I.II. Serving Local Needs And Demands 
 
According to Lundvall, the institutionalisation of policy fields in developing 
countries must be aimed at contributing to increased levels of local innovation. In 
this context, the fundamental aim of innovation policy must be framed by the process 
of reviewing and redesigning the various linkages that exist between the different 
parts of the national system.413 
 
It goes without saying that innovation strategies must aim to serve local needs and 
local demands in developing countries. A common failing of development policy is 
to concentrate solely on markets in developed countries in relation to exports, while 
avoiding local needs and the related developing domestic market. The developing 
markets and specific local needs of developing nations differ from the respective 
markets and needs of developed nations. Innovation is a dynamic process and 
innovation levels often respond to the changing needs of the market. Hence, one may 
hypothesise that investing in R&D and innovation in a manner that properly supplies 
the demand of developing markets is necessary within a long-term success strategy 
for economic growth and development. As Trajtenberg has observed:  
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‘...there is no such  thing as just one way of going about R&D and innovation, 
namely, plugging into the global network of high tech, in order to supply the 
demand emanating mostly from developed countries. Rather, there are vast 
areas of economic activity where innovation is needed to serve local needs, 
local demand, whereby local may mean a large fraction of the world 
population.414’ 
 
Thus, economic theory asserts that enabling competition between rivals encourages 
firms to find ways to lower costs, improve quality, develop better products and/or 
focus their products towards different markets. This may be illustrated by examining 
the example of the US automobile industry during the 1970s. When the Japanese 
automobile firms Nissan and Toyota penetrated the large US market, these 
companies were regarded as little fishes in a very competitive pond. Their only 
option to escape competition was to make better and cheaper cars. The reason for 
this was the fact that the leading US firms were not interested in small cars, where 
profits were low. Thus, the Japanese companies concentrated their efforts and 
innovative activities solely on small cars. Eventually, the Japanese companies 
became the market leaders in the small cars market.415 
 
In a similar vein, Trajtenberg416 has drawn attention to the relative lack of innovation 
in the pharmaceutical industry in relation to neglected diseases.417 Today, the 
pharmaceutical industry spends billions of dollars developing drugs to cure Western 
illnesses but the industry spends comparatively little on research into healing the 
diseases that kill millions of people in the developing world. According to the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), nearly one billion patients suffer from a neglected 
infectious disease.418 Nevertheless, the number of drugs developed for these diseases 
is limited – it accounts for only 1% of the drugs that were placed on the market.419 
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Thus, the developing world needs pharmaceutical innovation that satisfies the 
priority health care needs of the rest of the population. In other words, Trajtenberg 
argues that the pharmaceutical industries in developing countries should not act as an 
effective subsidy to the existing industries in developed countries by concentrating 
solely on profit-driven blockbuster drugs.420 The local industries in developing 
countries should maximise their opportunities to build up their capacities to 
undertake R&D on treatments for those diseases which particularly affect the 
developing world.421 A well-defined strategy would concentrate on pharmaceutical 
innovation for local needs. Furthermore, this strategy is likely to provide a return on 
investment over the long term and thus, bring economic growth.  
 
According to Mytelka, creating optimal incentives for innovation is critical because 
simply pumping up the supply side in the context of human capital i.e. the provision 
of researchers, would not suffice to encourage innovative research. It is therefore 
important to distinguish between the supply and demand sides of industry. Policies 
aimed at inducing R&D, which is specifically focused on domestic healthcare 
problems could be assessed on the supply side. On the other hand, the demand side 
could be focused on matching local demand in the health care system with local 
innovation.422  
 
Therefore, in addition to concentrating on the promotion and support of formal R&D 
in those technologically advanced sectors, developing countries should also consider 
the collective impact of small and informal innovations in traditional sectors. One 
should emphasise that the participation of these existing sectors to the innovation 
process will not only provide localisation of innovation but also growth and 
sustainability.423 
 
 
                                                       
420 TRAJTENBERG, supra note 17, pp.16-17 
421 AUBERT J. E: “Promoting Innovation In Developing Countries; A Conceptual Framework”, 
World Bank Institute, July 2004, p.25 
422 See, MYTELKA, supra note 380, p.425 
423TRATJENBERG, supra note 17, p.6 
 157 
V.III.I.III. Linkage Of The University System To Local Industry 
 
Universities and publicly funded research organisations are widely acknowledged as 
potential contributors to dealing with local health care challenges, especially for 
developing countries.424 In the context of this wider debate, Aubert points out the 
dislocation of the university system in relation to local realities, particularly in 
relation to the labour market, in developing countries. This potentially constitutes a 
significant barrier in relation to the innovation climate in developing countries.425 
The universities in developed countries have a long history of development successes 
and they have played a major role in developing human and institutional capacities 
as well as generating new technologies. Since the 1970s, governments have launched 
numerous initiatives by linking university research to industrial innovation. In 
addition, governments have further sought to spur local economic development 
based on university research. One initiative is the creation of a science parks within 
university campuses, which provide support for business incubators, as well as the 
provision of public seed capital funds and other such bridging institutions.426  
 
Hence, Nelson highlights the importance of the university system as a critical 
institutional feature for innovation. He states that:  
 
‘One important feature distinguishing countries that were sustaining 
competitive and innovative firms was education and training systems that 
provide these firms with a flow of people with the requisite knowledge and 
skills. For industries in which university-trained engineers and scientists were 
needed, this does not simply mean that the universities provide training in 
these fields but also that they consciously train their students with an eye to 
industry needs.427’ 
 
According to Nelson, providing an examination of university research in the US and 
Germany illustrates this point very clearly. In his collection of studies on national 
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innovation systems, it was suggested that the US and Germany surged ahead of other 
countries at the turn of last century in the science-based industries due to the fact that 
the university systems were much more responsive to the training needs of the 
industries.428 Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that Japanese universities played 
an essential role in Japan’s early industrialisation processes by assisting the local 
industry to upgrade its technological capacities – which eventually gave the industry 
a competitive advantage.429 
 
The link between the university system and industrial innovation has been widely 
investigated. It is accepted that technological change in relation to important 
segments of the economy has been based significantly upon academic research.430 A 
number of studies431 have also revealed that university research tends to lead to more 
significant advances in industrial innovation in the areas of biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals than in other sectors. It is also reported that university research 
results in more pharmaceutical trigger R&D projects.432 
 
Thus it can be said that academic research lays the groundwork for scientific 
innovation. It tends to deal with new theoretical and empirical findings as well as 
new types of instrumentation that are crucial for scientific innovation. Nevertheless, 
it provides only the tools and starting points for this process. It does not necessarily 
provide the specific invention itself.433 Therefore, the linear model of innovation, 
seen below, may serve a basis for understanding the contribution of academic 
research to the areas of science and technology in relation to the economy. This 
model of innovation is structured around three stages: basic research, applied 
research and development (contributing to production) and the diffusion stage. The 
basic research phase starts the innovation process, then it is developed with the area 
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of applied research, and it eventually continues with the development process, which 
leads into product creation and diffusion.434 
 
Figure VI.I. The Linear Model of Innovation 
 
This model was widely used during the industrialisation process that followed 
WWII. In understanding that ‘science invents, industry adapts and society 
conforms435’, the model played an influential role in policy debates regarding the 
science and technology areas of industry. In the US, for instance, the linear model of 
innovation was used to justify the allocation of public funds to R&D activities. Thus, 
the US government extensively funded scientific and engineering research at 
universities and the R&D activities of companies.  
 
Universities were described as being at the main normative base of the linear model 
of innovation. In other words, universities exist at a unique locus point of scientific 
research. The theoretical foundations of the model consistently drew upon the notion 
that government should fund basic research.436 Nevertheless, the linear model of 
innovation has not escaped from criticism.  In recent years, it has been made subject 
to fierce and continual debate. It has been argued that the model underrates the 
complexity and variegated nature of innovation. Thus, much modern research on 
innovation focuses on the systematic and interactive nature of innovation as well as 
the co-operative relationships that exist between the actors. Non-linear innovation 
theory regards innovation as a collective process involving not only firms and 
universities, but also other agents and institutions that necessarily interact with each 
other. For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to say that basic research, or more 
broadly scientific research, still constitutes the fundamental, but certainly not the 
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unique, source of technological advancement, and thus of economic growth.437 
Particularly in the context of life sciences, basic research is a fundamental 
component, and in most cases a pre-condition, for product development.  This is 
because the drug discovery and development process involves a process of ‘trial and 
error and experimentation without a clear priori understanding of how and why the 
drugs should work.438’ Thus, scientific research is a key component of technological 
advancement in the area of life sciences. This assessment leads to the conclusion that 
public support for basic scientific research must remain a core component of 
government policy.  
 
Thus, modern innovation theory rests upon an examination of the interactive process 
of innovation. Universities are collaborators within this interactive process. 
Knowledge-based innovation systems increasingly rely on the triple helix model of 
innovation capturing multiple reciprocal relations at different points.439 This model 
strictly avoids the myth of linear innovation and introduces a spiral model of 
innovation where the institutional spheres overlap, collaborate and cooperate with 
each other.  
 
 
Figure IV.II. Triple Helix Model of Innovation 
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For Gervais publicly funded R&D is an essential component for enabling the 
assimilation and diffusion of foreign technologies during peak periods when the 
technological capacities of a country tend to be highly dependent on foreign 
technology.440 Thus, a careful assessment of the university system is critical for 
efficient priority setting. This requires a good understanding of the consequences of 
academic research and of government policies that seek to accelerate the transfer of 
research results from university laboratories to industrial firms. Therefore, initiatives 
that are aimed at enhancing returns from university research investment must 
acknowledge the importance of university research. The importance of universities in 
this area can be easily quantified by examining the relevant output levels.441  
 
Indeed, one may suggest that providing for extensive funding in the area of applied 
research, as well as increasing investments in relation to experimentation and 
diffusion activities are ultimately essential requirements for developing countries. In 
recognition of this fact, greater attention must be drawn to the particular educational 
and institutional capacity building needs of each developing country. It is arguable 
that the establishment of strong links between universities and companies in 
developing countries will motivate the industry to participate in further innovative 
activities. Therefore given the importance of university research to innovation, it is 
suggested that developing countries must enhance their educational and institutional 
capacities.   
 
What governments can do is to bring in policies that are aimed at encouraging the 
formation of regional economic clusters, as well as spin-off companies that are 
founded upon university research. One example of such a cluster is seen with the 
Silicon Valley model. Alongside, Mowery emphasises the importance of 
implementing policies that are aimed at stimulating university patenting and 
licensing activities. An example of such a policy is the Bayh-Dole type legislation, 
which is widely acknowledged as an important policy instrument in the context of 
linking university research to industrial innovation.442 It has been long suggested that 
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universities must be equipped with the necessary business skills and organisational 
flexibilities in order to successfully innovate. In Europe, for instance, the creation of 
market-friendly and industry-friendly universities is encouraged within the 
framework of the future of EU innovation policy. It is clear that the policy makers in 
Europe have observed that the innovation process should not be considered to be 
complementary to existing structures, or driven solely by the technology transfer 
office. Policy makers have highlighted the constant need for an outward-facing, 
business-friendly, professional and systematic approach, which first and foremost 
requires root and branch reform at the university level within Europe.443   
 
In the context of this wider debate, the US experience in general, and the 
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act in particular, could be taken into account. The 
following chapters will expand this issue further. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that 
certain safeguards should also be considered by developing countries. Developing 
countries should not blindly adopt the US model, because this may lead developing 
countries to expect a far greater return than they are likely to ever receive.444  
 
V.III.I.IV. Restructuring Public Sector Organisations And Institutions 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the public sector organisations gradually erode the 
implications of effective innovation strategies in developing countries. There are 
numerous public sector organisations in developing countries that exist for the 
promotion of enterprise development, but the support system of these organisations 
is relatively beleaguered.445 The relevant structures and institutions that exist within 
developing countries need to be improved.446 The fundamental distinction between 
innovation policies lies between initiatives that are aimed at promoting innovation 
within the institutional context, and initiatives aimed at changing the institutional and 
organisational context in order to promote innovation, which includes reforms of 
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public institutions, universities, education, labour markets, capital markets, etc.447 
Empirical evidence gathered from innovation case studies conducted at India, Cuba, 
Iran Taiwan, Egypt and Nigeria has shown that the sheer number of organisations i.e. 
universities, research institutes and private companies, is far less important than the 
actual practice of organisations with respect to learning, linkage formation and 
investment.448 
 
It should be noted that it is not easy to establish new, efficient institutions and 
organisations for the promotion of innovation. Even where it is possible, the 
organisations often lack flexibility and can easily become politicised. On the other 
hand, undertaking a move from technology user to knowledge producer and 
innovator does not seem possible without reforming the traditional public sector 
organisations of a country. It is also necessary to recalibrate the habits, practices and 
mindsets of economic agents, and in particular, to reform the practices related to 
learning, linkages, long-term investment and innovation.449 
 
Indeed, creating an institutional climate capable of contributing to innovation in 
developing countries requires the presence of independent organisations that take a 
business-oriented approach.450 Moreover, the promotion of interaction between 
government departments, members of the business community, trade unions, and 
knowledge-based organisations may well be necessary to develop socially relevant 
and clear innovation policies. Indeed, Lundvall argues that in order to achieve a truly 
innovative policy turn, all public organisations must be involved in this process.451  
As far as policy restructuring is concerned, the process must also involve an explicit 
consideration of learning by government. Thus, the adoption of an approach based 
upon learning rather than planning is a necessary condition for the successful 
enhancement of the innovation process.452 
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In addition, IP institutions, such as patent and trademark offices, necessarily play a 
crucial role. IP institutions are required to provide efficient support for innovation 
i.e. enabling the collection of fruits of the innovation process. In this respect, the 
international IPRs regime can help to provide economic growth and sustainability.453 
These offices should be funded, considering the importance of their technical and 
educational role in the innovation cycle. It follows that the efficiency of the market 
for ideas often depends upon the efficiency of the local IP institutions in educating 
local users about IPRs. In this way, the international IP system can be used to 
develop a vibrant local IP community i.e. by bringing users of the system and IP 
service firms together.454 
 
A growing body of empirical research appears to support the view that IPRs can be 
adapted quickly over time, to suit the needs of each territory. However, the findings 
of Weinhold and Reichert indicate that in practice, the necessary changes actually 
occur very slowly. As a result it is possible to state that the IPRs regime must be 
embedded within the larger society. Furthermore, it can be discussed in relation to 
greater institutional quality issues such as the rule of law and the independence of the 
judiciary.455 
 
V.III.I.V. Government Funding Of Innovation Activities 
 
Today, developing countries are effectively the new players of the old innovation 
game. In general, innovation strategies involve firms working together with other 
actors, such as government departments, official innovation-support units, business 
incubation centres, research institutions and others.456 Within developmental 
innovation policy, the usage of targeted incentives and subsidies can encourage 
economic activity in relation to the creation and acquisition of new knowledge, the 
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building up of human capital and the attraction of foreign investment.457 Thus, it is 
recommended that developing countries create a concrete developmental 
environment that is supportive of innovation and entrepreneurship.   
 
Incubation has proven to be a diversified and integrated service for entrepreneurial 
ventures. It contributes to national innovation rates and economic growth levels. In 
this context, it may be hypothesised that business incubators constitute an important 
instrument for the development of an economy. This can be achieved through the 
support of entrepreneurship and innovation. They serve as a consultant organisation 
for knowledge resources and policy coordination for both enterprises and innovation 
systems.458  
 
Thus, business incubation demands investment - it requires funds for incubating 
common property innovations for which individual demand in the short run may not 
be possible. Hence, public investments should aim to establish an environment 
favourable to business creation and private sector R&D. This support can be 
established with the use of integrated packages that apply to all levels. These 
packages can apply at the micro level for enterprise upgrading, and at macro level for 
the building of a broad climate conducive to innovation.  
 
V.III.I.VI. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
FDI may also be considered for developing countries. It provides a way for 
stimulating change and bringing in new technologies to a country. It should be noted 
that a simple increase of FDI flows alone does not necessarily bring about 
innovation.459 There is a common belief that having FDI in a country will 
automatically create a coherent and comprehensive innovation policy for that 
country. However, Gervais persuasively argues that FDI should not be considered as 
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an innovation strategy because it is not necessarily a precursor of innovation - it is 
more akin to an instrument of economic development.460  
 
However, FDI and innovation are positively correlated.  As Fu has suggested, a 
developing country can enjoy the contribution of FDI in four ways. Firstly, FDI 
generates more sophisticated technology. R&D generated by foreign firms and R&D 
labs tends to increase the innovation outputs in the host country. Secondly, FDI 
facilitates knowledge transfer through the supply chain from foreign to local firms. 
Thus, spillovers that emanate from foreign innovation activities may have positive 
effects in relation to innovation performance within the region. Thirdly, FDI may 
positively affect local innovation capacity through the competition effect. Finally, 
FDI may contribute to regional innovation capabilities by introducing advanced 
practices in innovation management, thereby providing for greater efficiency in the 
innovation process.461 
 
Furthermore, the explicit usage of FDI-related spillover may be utilised for 
technological advancement. The absorptive capacity of the host country must be 
acknowledged when formulating a catching-up strategy.462 Innovation is an 
evolutionary and accumulative process. Due to this process, only the countries with 
the capability to identify, assimilate and develop the necessary knowledge will have 
the ability to benefit from the advanced technology that is embedded in FDI.463 
Narula argues that the lower the technological gap between the local and foreign 
industry, the higher the absorptive capacity of the former is. Thus, the higher the 
expected benefits will be in terms of technology transfer to the local industry. It is 
clear that the ability to absorb and utilise foreign technology is required as a 
necessary condition for innovation spillover to take place.464  
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In this regard, the OECD has suggested that FDI contributes to both factor 
productivity and income growth in host countries. Furthermore, this growth is 
beyond what domestic investment would normally trigger.465 In order to create the 
right climate for FDI, good governance support is required on the part of the host 
country. The absorption capacity of an economy, the availability of a skilled labour 
force with up-to-date skills, and the flexibility to adapt to new technologies and new 
management styles are the main assets that a developing country must possess in 
order to attract FDI.466 Finally, Maskus comments that as a part of the regulatory 
system, the protection and enforcement of IPRs is fundamentally vital. In fact, this 
factor is not more vital than the relevant tax regime, investment regulations, 
production incentives, trade policies, and competition rules.467  
 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the importance of the correlation between FDI 
and the IPRs regime is not universally supported by available data. It is arguable that 
in IPRs-sensitive areas, FDI is discouraged when IPRs protection is weak. Across all 
sectors, low IPRs protection encourages foreign firms to focus on distribution rather 
than local production.468  
 
Further to this, Javorcik has observed that US firms are much more concerned about 
IPRs protection in a host country when they consider manufacturing FDI than when 
they plan investments in sales and distribution outlets. Moreover, economic analysis 
tends to demonstrate that weak IPR protection has a strong deterring effect on FDI. 
This is particularly clear in relation to the four technology-intensive sectors: drugs, 
cosmetics and health care products, chemicals, machinery and equipment and 
electrical equipment.469 The lack of, or inadequacy of, IPRs rights may also create 
uncertainties regarding the possible returns on FDI. This is a particular problem for 
R&D intensive industries and for firms possessing innovative technologies.   
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Since competition for FDI is fierce, many countries are strengthening their IPRs 
regimes. However, for the countries that have nothing more to offer other than a 
strong IPRs regime, FDI remains a wish-dream. A strong IPRs regime alone is not 
sufficient to attract FDI inwardly. This is proven by the fact that FDI is not present 
within the Sub-Saharan African countries at the same level that it is present in China, 
Brazil and other high-growth, large-market developing economies that actually have 
weak IPRs regimes.470   
 
As an UNCTAD study on Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment states:  
 
‘When governments compete to attract FDI, there will be a tendency to 
overbid in the sense that every bidder may offer more than the wedge. The 
effects can be both distorting and inequitable because the costs of incentives 
are ultimately borne by the public and hence, represent transfers from the 
local community to the ultimate owner of a foreign investment.471’ 
 
In such a fiercely competitive market for FDI, it becomes harder for countries to 
derive advantages by merely strengthening their IPRs regimes. Furthermore, it is 
well known that it has been the poor countries that in particular have become 
relatively poorer as a result of the enactment of TRIPS. 
 
To conclude, the current economic analysis suggests an important role for IPRs in 
providing incentives for inward FDI. Nevertheless, other factors such as the relevant 
trade regime and the relevant tax and competition laws472 may also play a 
determinant role in attracting FDI. The following chapters will highlight some of 
these factors in more detail.  
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V.IV. Conclusion 
 
 
Both legal and economic research summarised in this chapter strongly emphasises 
that the IPRs framework is the key component of national innovation systems. A 
review of the literature indicates that the enactment of an IPRs regime is therefore 
necessary in order to induce local innovation. Nevertheless, innovation is not about 
IPRs alone. Innovation has many other components.  Thus, it may be hypothesised 
that there is a constant need for developing countries to develop a broad 
understanding of complex concepts such as innovation and development and to also 
understand how to formulate and implement effective innovation policies. 
 
Developing countries have genuine and diverse characteristics in terms of 
development, economy, culture, etc. There is no standard one size fits all strategy 
that can be successfully adopted by each developing country. Thus, the application of 
national innovation systems differs across countries. However, the basic elements 
generally remain the same. Thus, this thesis argues, through case study analysis, that 
the role and significance of IPRs in a successful innovation strategy can be taken in 
conjunction with the potential role that utilisation of TRIPS flexibilities could play in 
an effective catch-up strategy. Hence, by acquiring a better knowledge and 
understanding of the TRIPS regime, and in particular by examining the existing 
TRIPS flexibilities, developing countries may more easily be able to identify the 
gaps between innovation and intellectual property. As a result these countries will be 
more able to find ways to fill these gaps.  
 
In fact, developing solid understanding of innovation policies largely depends upon 
the utilisation of the technological and organisational possibilities that are available 
today at the national level. A careful examination of the important components of 
successful innovation systems throughout the world appears to be vital. In so doing, 
each country will then be able to tailor its own policy schemes in consideration of its 
own ‘national peculiarities in all walks of development economics and regions.473’ 
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Thus, in order to assess what policy measures might be appropriate in addressing the 
gaps that exist between innovation and intellectual property, the next chapter 
examines the structure of innovative activities at the national level in a number of 
selected highly industrialised countries.  
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VI. INNOVATION COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
 
 
 
VI.I. Introduction 
 
This chapter will give an account of the case studies of national innovation systems. 
The core elements of this chapter are studies based on the experiences of four 
countries. The countries surveyed are the United States, Japan, South Korea and 
Israel. Each case study provides an analysis of contemporary issues with regard to 
innovation and each case study assesses how these issues have been addressed in 
each country. Particular focus is given to patent regimes, and specifically, the impact 
of patent laws on the catching-up process. Thus, the primary objective of this chapter 
is to identify and present the most relevant indicators for innovation and to explain 
how these indicators can be interpreted and used in policy design. The case study 
method is adopted to embody a deep knowledge of innovation and to generate a 
number of theoretical propositions for explaining the potential outcomes.  
 
In this regard, the case study of each country will set the context, then assess both 
past and current experiences. In doing so, the study will define the relevant issues, 
analyse the various models or strategies, describe the current approaches and identify 
any obstacles and criticisms.  
 
As an early developing country, the US case study is concentrated on the relevant 
legal framework within its NIS. The second case study, on the Japanese innovation 
system, gives an overview of Japanese experience in this area. It illustrates the 
changing role of the IPRs system throughout the development process of the 
country. The third case study discusses the experience of Korea as a relatively late 
catching up country. The study reveals the characteristics of the Korean national 
innovation system as well as the patent regime. It provides anecdotal evidence of 
how industrialisation and overall technological capacity building within the 
pharmaceutical industry was pursued in Korea under a relatively strengthened patent 
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regime. The final case study focuses on the unique experience of Israel. It gives an 
account of innovation practices in the country. Specific focus will be given as part of 
this study to an examination of the whole set of strategies that have been adopted for 
the protection of IPRs. At the same time the study will look at how IPRs were 
utilised to promote the capacity building of local pharmaceutical industry. 
	  
VI.II. National Innovation System Of The United States 
 
The United States is the world’s innovation leader. It has achieved this position 
through a commitment to basic research, a world-class workforce and the provision 
of a climate that rewards innovation. Previous studies have determined the 
characteristics of the US’s national system. The factors that have been identified 
within the US system include the abundance of cheap, accessible materials, energy 
and land, taken in conjunction with successive waves of immigration. These factors, 
which are highly specific to the US make the system quite unlike the national 
systems in Europe.474 In this context, economists have long recognised that 
technological advancement and the availability of enhanced human capital are the 
principal engines of the US innovation system.475  
 
Furthermore, the NIS of the US refers to the institutions that perform R&D as well 
as the level and sources of funding for such R&D. Part of the system also includes 
government policies, such as the federal antitrust policy, the enforcement of IP laws, 
and the enactment of a regulatory policy that prioritises technological development. 
As part of this process, the US government provides funds for the training of 
scientists and engineers and it also encourages technology adoption.476  
 
Thus, the US system mainly focuses on the related functions of producing and 
applying new knowledge. This knowledge is primarily classed as technical 
knowledge. The system therefore encompasses many important activities. Most of 
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these activities are carried forward by private-sector entities operating under the 
influence of the market. The system is self-organised rather than being designed. 
Furthermore, the network of institutions and linkages has largely arisen through a 
myriad of actions undertaken by the system’s constituent agents. Unlike other 
national innovation systems, the operation of the American system does not involve 
a regime of strict proportionality. Neither does it involve a requirement of constant 
return to scale.477 
 
In the US, the presence of highly mobile employees, networked firms, venture 
capital, university excellence and university spin-off firms are the major factors that 
contribute to increased scientific and technological development. The cultural 
openness of US universities creates a fertile environment that fosters intellectual 
development, high achievement and overall integrity. The importance of these 
factors is evidenced by the fact of ever increasing levels of university inventions 
within the US.478 The high level of innovation in the US can also be correlated to the 
presence of a strong IP regime. Yet, a striking feature of the transformation of US 
policy towards a strong IPRs rights began with the strengthening of the patent 
regime.  
	  
VI.II.I. The US Patent Regime 
 
In contrast to the position in Europe at the time, during the industrialisation process 
in the US, patents were potentially accessible and available to a broad spectrum of 
the population. Patents were not complex and costly as they were in Europe. 
Specifically, there was a wide usage of patents, or IPRs more broadly, by the well-
developed middle class population. This factor provided the basis for unprecedented 
levels of innovation in early American industrialisation.479 Furthermore, these 
characteristics helped to create a golden age for independent inventors. In time, this 
                                                       
477 POPPER S. & WAGNER C: “ New Foundations for Growth: The US Innovation System Today 
and Tomorrow”, Science and Technology Policy :Institute, 2002, p.5 
478 HICKS M. D: “ A Broad Overview of the U.S Innovation System” , 
 available at http://crds.jst.go.jp/GIES/archive/GIES2006/participants/abstract/12_diana.pdf , 
(26.09.2010) 
479 WEINHOLD, supra note 455, p.894 
 174 
prompted the growth of specialised inventors and intermediaries, which also 
contributed to economic catch-up.480 Moreover, there was a correlation between 
accessing to markets and patenting activity, which make it clear that inventors were 
responsive to material incentives as well as to the availability and security of 
property rights in technology.481 
 
The patent system of the US is outlined in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US 
Constitution, which states: 
	  
‘Congress shall have (the) Power… To promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Investors the 
exclusive Right to their perspective writings and discoveries.’  
 
In the late 19th century, the US started to switch from its historic status as a borrower 
of technology to a source of industrial technology. Simultaneously, Congress acted 
to strengthen patent law. For instance, at this time, Congress extended the duration 
of patent protection. The patent reforms in the country prompted the development of 
industrial research. Furthermore, the reforms anticipated the growth of the market for 
the acquisition and sale of industrial technologies. According to Mowery, while the 
search for patents incentivised industrial research, the impending expiration of these 
patents catalysed establishment of industrial research laboratories482.  
 
Today, the patent system in the US acts as an incentive to innovation. It is 
supplementary to other important innovation policy tools. Furthermore, it requires 
periodic examination in order to ensure the vitality of the NIS.483 
 
The US patent system is based on the concept of the public good. The innovation 
cycle in the US is premised upon the idea that the production of new knowledge is a 
public good. It is often argued that the absence of a patent system may lead to an 
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environment where free riders are able to take advantage of the knowledge pool 
without having to contribute to it. Due to the inability of inventors to capitalise on 
their inventions within such an environment, it is stated that innovation will only 
occur on a lesser scale. Thus, the patent system is justified as being an essential 
component of the innovation cycle in the US. The market exclusivity that is granted 
by patents provides a remedy for potential market failure. Furthermore, it allows 
inventors to capture the invention’s market value.484  
 
Nonetheless, the US innovation system has come under much criticism due to the 
recent increase in patent protection. The reason for this is that increasing patent 
protection in recent times has not spurred innovation. In fact, there is evidence that it 
has impeded the development and use of new technologies.485 Some years ago, the 
US patent system appeared to be ideal. The system fostered and promoted 
innovation. However, today there are increasing concerns about the effectiveness of 
the current US patent system.  The US patent system has been fiercely criticised for 
undermining the US competitive advantage in relation to developing new 
technologies. The US Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty486 
effectively changed the patent laws, and in particular it changed how the laws were 
to be applied in the area of biotechnology. The court’s decision facilitated the 
patenting of new organisms. This was justified as a way of promoting the progress of 
biotechnology in the country. Nevertheless, policy changes have made patents easier 
to get and stronger in scope. Generally there have been broader claims, of a longer 
duration, and with extended eligibility487. In the meantime, court decisions have 
generally interpreted patent law in order to make it easier to enforce. For instance, 
there have been increased levels of monetary damages for breaches in recent times. 
Given the breadth of the current regime, patents are increasingly used as offensive 
competitive weapons, rather than as defensive protectors.488  
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Over the past few decades, there has been an extraordinary increase in the number of 
US patents. Nevertheless, the increase in quantity has led to a corresponding 
decrease in quality. The fact that it is relatively easy to obtain a patent has given rise 
to problems such as the presence of patent thickets, strategic patenting, patent trolls 
and portfolio races. Thus, the patent system, which is intended to foster and protect 
innovation, is generating waste. This has led to uncertainty, which hinders and 
threatens the innovative process. According to Jaffe, the US has system effectively 
converted the weapon that a patent represents from something like ‘a handgun or a 
pocket knife into a bazooka, and then started handing out the bazookas to pretty 
much anyone who asked for one, despite the legal tests of novelty and non-
obviousness’.489 Correspondingly, he asserts that the behaviours of inventors and 
firms have changed as a result. The overall winners of the innovation wars in the US 
have ultimately been the big firms. These firms can afford to pay for the best lawyers 
and thus, the firms can withstand the risk of litigation. The losers of this war have 
often been the smaller companies, some of whom have possessed the brightest 
scientists and the most original, valuable inventions, but have lacked the financial 
powers to defend their position.490 
 
Even though there are growing concerns about the effectiveness of the US patent 
system, the US system is increasingly dominant in determining worldwide patenting 
behaviour. For instance, the previous reluctance of many patent systems to recognise 
new types of invention, such as software, has changed following the US affirmation 
of patentability. Thus, the US courts tend to be preferable for companies that are in 
process of taking patent litigation cases resulting in worldwide settlement 
agreements. Gradually, the US patent system, and the rulings of the US courts, have 
the potential to affect more and more innovators in Europe and Japan.491 
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VI.II.II. The Other Drugs; Generics And Hatch-Waxman Act 
 
The development of the US pharmaceutical industry was illustrated with the 
example of penicillin in a previous chapter. The mass production of penicillin during 
WWII, and the antibiotic revolution thereafter, prompted an increase in R&D 
activities in the US with regard to drug development and discovery. As a result, US 
pharmaceutical companies soon became world leaders in the global drug market. 
The institutional and legal framework in the US assisted the industry to sustain and 
develop. However, during the 1980s, the industry started to lose momentum in 
innovation with regard to drug development. It became evident that a greater level of 
R&D expenditure would be required in order to produce advances comparable with 
those of the past. This prompted an increase in prices and an increase in the number 
of me-too drugs that were produced.  
 
The term generic drug usually describes a pharmaceutical product that is intended to 
be interchangeable with an innovative product. Once the patent expires, the generic 
drug is manufactured without a licence from the innovator company and it is 
marketed under a non-proprietary or approved name.492 Generic drugs use the same 
underlying substances as the innovator product and thus, these drugs have the same 
efficiency as branded drugs. However, generic drugs are often relatively cheaper 
than their branded counterparts and thus, these drugs pose a challenge to existing 
market structures.493 At this time, there were significant barriers and limitations for 
generic entry into the market. For instance, generic companies were required to carry 
out extensive clinical trials in order to get an approval from the FDA. Thus, the 
significant barriers for entry into the market deterred generic companies from 
undertaking the requisite efforts. In an attempt to accelerate early market entry of 
generic drugs and to assure market competitiveness in price and variety, the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act, known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
was enacted in 1984.  
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The Act strengthened patent protection for innovative drugs by extending the patent 
term. However, it also weakened the market position of brand-name drugs by 
facilitating the entry of generic competitors once the patent had expired. Hence, the 
Act had two contradictory objectives. Firstly, it aimed to make lower-costing generic 
copies of approved drugs more widely available. It also tried to assure that there 
were adequate incentives to encouragement investment in relation to the 
development of new drugs.494  It established a ‘regulatory framework designed to 
balance incentives for continued innovation among research-based pharmaceutical 
companies with opportunities for market entry by generic drug manufacturers.’495  
The aim of this was to strike the right balance between public demand for lower 
price drugs and the need to promote innovation.  
 
Furthermore, the Act provided incentives to generic companies to encourage them to 
challenge drug patents. Thus, the generic companies were given the opportunity to 
challenge a patent when they had created a generic version of the patented drug that 
did not infringe, or when they had established the patent’s invalidity. Under the law, 
the generic company that was found to be first in time to challenge the patent would 
be awarded exclusivity, regardless of whether litigation actually ensued thereafter.496 
 
Thus, the Act promoted generic medicine competition within the US. As of 2007, 
there were 7,000 generic drugs on the US market, whereas before the introduction of 
the Act the number of generic drugs on the market was much more limited. In 1984, 
for instance, there were approximately 150 drugs that went off patent without the 
development of any generic follow-on drugs.497  The reason for this was that it was 
necessary at the time for generic manufacturers to conduct expensive tests and 
clinical trials in order to prove safety and reliability of the drug. This situation 
created a de jure and de facto right. It allowed the larger firms to effectively exclude 
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the generic manufacturers and keep them out of the market. After the enactment of 
the Act, generic companies were only required to demonstrate that product was 
effectively bioequivalent to the pioneer drug. In accordance with the Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) system, a company submitting an application for a 
generic version of a drug that demonstrates bioequivalence may use the extensive 
safety and efficacy studies conducted by the pioneer drug as evidence of its safety.  
 
Nonetheless, in order to compensate for the negative effects of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and extend market exclusivity, the large pharmaceutical companies began to 
seek, and ultimately obtain a great variety of patents. Many of these patents were of 
little scope or merit. The inspection of the system was founded upon the listings of 
Orange Book. This includes the listing of drug products that were approved on the 
basis of safety and effectiveness by the FDA. It is clear from an examination of the 
Orange Book that most approved products have more than one listed patent. 
Furthermore, some of these patents claim unapproved uses, crystalline forms of the 
active ingredient, specific formulation, tablet shape or other subject matter.498  In 
most cases, it is clear that a new patent on the same invention appears in the Orange 
Book shortly before the expiration of the basic patent protection. This creates an 
additional barrier for generic companies to enter into market since the generic 
company is required to re-certify to this later-listed patent.  
 
It must be noted that any patent infringement case which is filed by the patent holder 
against a generic company, within 45 days of receipt of notice, effectively delays 
market entry of the generic drug for an additional 30 months.499 The Medicare Act500 
introduced in 2003 modifies certain provisions covering generic drugs that were set 
forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act. The Medicare Act allows only one 30 month delay, 
per product, subject to the ANDA application. 
 
In this context, the Orange Book system has been subjected to substantial criticism. 
It is suggested here that the Orange Book ought to be listed by drug product. As a 
result of this, generic manufacturers must be required to certify the given drug 
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product. According to critics, the FDA is competent enough to determine whether 
the generic product is equivalent to the original product. This eliminates any 
potential risk pertaining to misuse of the system. Moreover, the requirement that the 
generic drug must be bioequivalent to the original product would mitigate any 
potential problems. 501 
 
According to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first generic company that files an ANDA 
application should get 180 days of exclusive marketing.502 During this market 
exclusivity period, the first-to-file generic company can sell the generic drugs at a 
higher price before other generic competitors are able to enter the market. The 
submission period is measured as of the day the ANDA application is filed and the 
exclusivity period is measured from the first day of marketing the listed drug. In 
most cases, the inevitable long and costly patent disputes delay many generic drugs 
from entering the market. Hence, it is suggested that in a case of expiry, due to the 
arbitrary status of the first ANDA application, the second ANDA filer should receive 
exclusivity for 180 days.503  
 
During the 20 years since the Hatch-Waxman Act, diverse opinions have emerged 
concerning pharmaceutical innovations. Some commentators believe that the 
exclusivities introduced by the Act may provide important incentives. By way of 
illustration, pharmaceutical firms are given additional incentives to continue to 
develop new information regarding approved drugs. Firms are also encouraged to 
engage in more ambitious research and development efforts. However, the Act has 
been subject to considerable criticism by pharmaceutical companies. One of the 
major criticisms is that by lessening patent protection and decreasing the period of 
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exclusivity. As a result of the decrease in profits, the incentive for companies to 
invest in further innovation also decreases.504 
 
As one of the key lawmakers of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Henry Waxman, states:  
 
‘In drafting the Hatch-Waxman Act, we worked hard to strike the right 
balance between the need to improve access to affordable generic drugs and 
the need to reward brand-name drug companies for the costs in the process of 
developing those new drugs’.505  
 
Regardless of all the discussions concerning the application of the Act, it does 
represent a careful balance between access and innovation. This balance is essential 
for economic vitality and public health.   
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the robust generic industry in the US owes its very 
existence to the Hatch Waxman Act.506 It must be noted that Article 30 of TRIPS 
establishes general parameters for exceptions to patent rights. Furthermore, the US 
experience illustrates that the continuum of the business of developing and 
manufacturing generic medicines relies heavily on safe harbour provisions. Any 
country aiming to provide initiatives to encourage the local pharmaceutical industry 
ought to take into account the US experience. It follows that some lessons can be 
drawn from the US approach to patent exceptions. This is reflected in the Hatch-
Waxman Act. It is also necessary to explore the possibilities of using of TRIPS 
flexibilities and sidestepping any bilateral pressures.  
	  
VI.II.III. University-Industry Collaboration And The Bayh-Dole Act 
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There is an unambiguous relationship between the success of the US innovation 
policy and the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. The Bayh-Dole Act 
provided incentives for universities, faculty investors, and private companies to 
engage in the commercialisation process. Thus, the Act is regarded as a catalyst for 
economic growth. The Act has proven to be fundamentally important for 
encouraging the transfer of technology from university to industry.507  Furthermore, 
the Bayh-Dole Act takes advantage of patents as a legal instrument, facilitating the 
transfer of technology, information and know-how.  
 
The main rationale behind the Act is the commercialisation of invention. By drawing 
a strict line between invention and innovation, the Act assumes that the true value of 
an innovation step comes after the invention. It follows that IP protection enables the 
conversion of inventions into assets. These assets can be sold, licensed, developed, 
and used as collateral for financing. In other words, IPRs turn inventions into 
commodities that can be traded within the marketplace.508  
 
The most remarkable legacy of the Act is that it established an environment that 
encourages companies to take the risk of investing in R&D. Thus, it is clear that 
university research509 advances pharmaceutical innovation significantly and directly. 
Most of the blockbuster medicines that are currently being marketed by American 
pharmaceutical companies were invented in university labs. Nevertheless, drug 
development cannot be simplified to encompass merely R&D activities. It involves a 
costly and long innovation and commercialisation process. This process 
encompasses costly clinical trials, the regulatory process, the packaging and 
marketing of the drug etc. Thus, collaboration between inventive universities and 
innovative companies is a prerequisite for pharmaceutical innovation. 
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Since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the levels of medical and biological R&D 
have grown significantly. Funding for university R&D in the area of medical 
sciences constitutes the largest portion of financial support. A recent study found 
that the cost of medical and biological R&D takes up almost 52% of total R&D 
expenditures in 2005.510 
 
Nevertheless, many analysts now assert that the strategy of the Bayh-Dole Act has 
not been successful. Many critics argue that cooperation among government 
departments, companies, and academic institutions provides many opportunities for 
conflicts of interest. This can lead to redirection of research, less openness in relation 
to the sharing of scientific discoveries, and a greater emphasis being placed on 
applied research rather than basic research.511  
 
The life sciences, and particularly biological and medical sciences, account for the 
biggest slice of university funding. The federal government continues to be the 
primary source of funding for university R&D in these areas. In 2002, for instance, 
48% of the federal R&D budget was spent on the medical and biological sciences.512 
Therefore, the huge share of life sciences in R&D budget generated concerns due to 
the fact that the benefits that are granted to the pharmaceutical companies come at 
the expense of the public under the Act. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
funds the early stages of research and testing. This research constitutes the 
groundwork for drug development. Hence, it is asserted that a high proportion of the 
drugs that have been brought to market in the past 30 years were mostly based on 
taxpayer-backed research at academic institutions or the NIH. In fact, 45 of 50 top-
selling drugs got government subsidies totalling nearly $175 million in 1998.513 
 
However, the pace of innovation has been substantially reduced in recent years. Due 
to the high costs of investment that are associated with in-house R&D, the current 
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efforts of pharmaceutical companies favour the development of me-too drugs and 
therapies. On the other hand, most of the R&D that leads to blockbuster drugs comes 
directly from publicly funded universities and government laboratories. Furthermore, 
this initiates a fierce level of competition among pharmaceutical companies. 
Nowadays, pharmaceutical companies compete aggressively to licence publicly 
funded R&D. Thus, companies have been made subject to considerable criticism for 
competing not to find new drugs, but for the limited number of drugs that are 
available to licence.514  Considering the high drug prices that currently exist in the 
US, there is a widespread belief that the public, which shares the cost and risk, 
should also be involved more directly in the benefits.515 Daniel Zingale, formerly 
executive director of AIDS Action illustrates this situation very clearly:  
 
‘...imagine if General Motors could get the American taxpayer to heavily 
subsidise its research and development, fund government programs that 
purchase half of its cars and get many of those same taxpayers to buy a new 
car each and every year’.516 
 
Critics also argue that the strategy of the Act encourages the patenting of 
fundamental research, which in turn prevents further biomedical and pharmaceutical 
innovation. On this basis, many analysts now assert that the strategy of the Act has 
not been successful. Eisenberg and Rai, for example, have emphasised that certain 
patents hinder the process. The reason for this is that permitting universities to patent 
discoveries under federal funding ‘…draws no distinction between inventions that 
lead directly to commercial products and fundamental advances that enable further 
scientific studies.517’  
 
Active university involvement in commercialisation generates further concerns. It is 
arguable whether Bayh-Dole Act has in fact shifted the university away from the 
pursuit of its traditional goals.  Delays in publication and the free flow of 
information from academia and greater secrecy in the research process has 
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discouraged the advancement of knowledge and it has prevented scientific progress 
in universities.518 According to a survey conducted in university research centres in 
the US, over half of the research centres permitted firms to request publication 
delays. Furthermore, 35% of institutions allowed researchers to delete information 
prior to publication. More interestingly, 63% of research centres allowed publication 
delays and 54% permitted deletion of information.519 It has been stressed that 
commercialisation of academic research has undermined the real value of 
universities as the nation’s primary source of knowledge creation and talent and that 
university research is skewed toward marketable products rather than basic 
research.520 
 
In spite of all the weaknesses, the resulting system has borne benefits beyond the 
imagination of the drafters of the Act. The Act has demonstrated that society can 
benefit from creativity only if a properly balanced legal and institutional framework 
is in place. Publicly funded innovations take place in the commercial market place. 
Thus, academic creativity is transformed into innovative products in the form of new 
medicines, materials, and chemicals.521 
	  
VI.II.IV. Concluding Remarks 
  
To sum up, both the legislation and the consequent interaction between federal and 
private organisations have had significant influence on the success of the US 
innovation system. Furthermore, several studies have shown that both the US 
antitrust policy and the IP system have helped to drive US innovation system. US 
antitrust policy is internationally unique in its scope. It has an unusual structure. 
Furthermore, the vertical specialisation of US industries affects the interaction of 
patent regime and antitrust policy.522  
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Arguably the American innovation system requires significant reforms in the areas 
of patent law and judicial practice. Nonetheless, the American tradition of patent 
laws has contributed a great deal to making the US the world leader in technology. 
The systematic structure of the US has helped to promote innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. It has also assisted US companies in becoming market 
leaders. The US experience shows the importance of the careful integration of 
university-funded research into the commercial market. It also shows the importance 
of interaction between the main actors in the innovation system. Moreover, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act is highly significant to the US pharmaceutical industry. The 
system establishes a level of equilibrium in terms of incentives for innovators and 
generic companies. In fact, the generic industry owes its very existence to this Act. 
The Act lead to the growth of generic giants like Teva. Ultimately, the US 
innovation system suggests a role for an improved strategy of IP protection in 
promoting innovation. This system encourages system linkages between public and 
private agencies and ensures vital knowledge flows and diffusion.  
	  
VI.III. The National Innovation System Of Japan 
 
When Freeman proposed the term ‘National System of Innovation’ in 1987, he had a 
concrete example in his mind. The paradigm example for Freeman was the case of 
Japan.  Freeman was impressed by the extraordinary success of Japan. In an 
influential article, Freeman praised Japanese performance in relation to R&D 
intensity. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese system worked on a simple 
basis involving copying, imitating and importing foreign technology. However, as 
Japanese products and processes began to out-perform American and European 
products and processes, this practice gradually became obsolete.523  
 
The Japanese system was designed to encourage industrial development through 
emphasising technology acquisition from abroad, domestic information diffusion 
and incremental innovation.  According to Maskus, when Japanese policymakers 
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designed domestic IPRs laws in the mid-20th century, they did so bearing in mind the 
fact that Japan was a technology follower. As a result they deliberately limited the 
scope and breadth of patent law. Furthermore, legislators excluded pharmaceuticals 
from patentability in order to provide an enabling environment for local innovation. 
According to Maskus, this constituted the fundamental key to Japan’s successful 
innovation system.524 However, the IPRs laws had to be reformed as the innovation 
policies shifted in the direction of R&D. Today, IP protection serves as a tool for 
encouraging technological, cultural and industrial development in Japan.  
 
During the 1960s, the Japanese government’s industrial policy was based upon a 
selection of would-be winners. These industries included automobiles, machinery, 
electronics, ships and petrochemicals. The promotion of these infant industries came 
through close cooperation with the private sector. By way of illustration, it is clear 
that the Japanese automobile industry today includes some of the best-known auto-
brands in the world. Nevertheless, fifty years ago, many people, including the 
Japanese, thought the Japanese car industry was weak. Nonetheless, Japan realised 
an economic miracle in the automobile sector. Chang illustrates the Japanese miracle 
in the automobile industry by exploring the example of Toyota. When Toyota 
exported its first cars to the US market, the export proved to be a failure. Customers 
in the US thought the cars looked lousy. Furthermore, customers were reluctant to 
spend serious money on a family car that came from a place where it was thought 
that only second-rate products were made. Thus, the cars had to be withdrawn from 
the US. Following that first catastrophic experience, fierce discussions were held in 
Japan about the future of Toyota. The received wisdom was that no industrialised 
country had got anywhere without developing serious industries e.g. automobile 
production. Thus, Japan needed a strong automobile industry. However, the industry 
needed more time to grow and become competitive. The Japanese government took 
the lead on the project and adopted a protectionist approach. This ensured high 
profits for the automobile industry in the country through high tariffs and draconian 
controls on foreign investment in the automobile industry. The government banned 
foreign cars. In fact, the government kindly asked General Motors and Ford to leave 
the market in 1939. The government also invested public funds in order to save 
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Toyota from imminent bankruptcy. In the meantime, Toyota improved its existing 
technological capabilities and skills. Crucially, Toyota began to engage in R&D 
activities. Eventually, half a century after the first unfortunate experience in the US 
market, Toyota’s Lexus has become something of an icon for globalisation.525  
 
Thus, successful policies must provide a strategic link between technological 
information and private capital. It is also necessary to facilitate the sharing of 
information between private players.526 According to Chang, if Japan had not 
followed a protectionist regime and ruled out revenue tariffs on foreign products thus 
preventing a foreign take-over of local markets and companies and thus, protecting 
infant industries its economy would not be as strong today. In other words, if Japan 
had followed the path advocated by the free-trade economists such as Friedman527, 
the Japanese would not now be exporting Lexus cars. In fact, the Japanese would 
still be fighting over who owns the mulberry tree -the tree that feeds silkworms.528  
 
During the 1970s Japan’s catch-up strategy began to shift towards a focus on R&D. 
The policies developed by the government increased basic scientific research. This 
increased the rate of technology development and it also supported the global 
scientific community.529 The government successfully took the necessary measures 
in order to increase basic research. These measures emphasised that research is an 
international public good and that it contributes to the world’s stock of knowledge. 
Within the innovation cycle, universities in Japan were considered to be of primary 
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importance as the most appropriate performers of basic research.530 During the 1970s 
and 1980s Japanese companies successfully utilised external knowledge as a 
foundation for building up core competencies. 
 
In the 1990s, the Science and Technology (S&T) Basic Law regulating the 
orientation of science and technology illustrated the government’s new approach to 
R&D policy. The first S&T Basic Plan was implemented in 1996 in order to achieve 
higher standards of science and technology. The aim of the Basic Law was not only 
to expand R&D, but to focus more on creativity, as well as sectoral and regional 
integration of R&D activities. It also sought the promotion of cooperative research 
mechanisms as well as a more liberal assignment of IPRs.531  
	  
VI.III.I. Japanese Patent Law 
 
Japan took full advantage of the IP system in order to enhance its industrial 
competitiveness. IP protection has proven to be vital for the stimulation of business 
innovation in Japan. During WWI, the Japanese government enacted the Wartime 
Law on Industrial Property, which revoked the patent rights of foreigners whose 
countries were in a state of war against Japan. This wartime suspension of foreign 
patents greatly contributed to catching up process of Japanese pharmaceutical 
companies. Following this, Japanese companies built up their own capabilities in 
relation to drug manufacturing.532   
 
Although the Japanese pharmaceutical companies were able to catch up with the 
German pharmaceutical companies following WWI, they were isolated from 
scientific and technological developments during WWII. For instance, they did not 
have access to penicillin. In post-war Japan, it became evident that wartime damage 
to infrastructure had been significant. Furthermore, Japan’s science and technology 
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industries were lagging behind the US and Europe. Thus, a new process of catch-up 
strategy was required.533  
 
The current post-war patent law was enacted in 1959. It clarified the requirements 
for an invention through the enactment of provisions such as the inventive step rules.  
Moreover, it fulfilled the requirements of a modern patent law. For instance, the law 
adopted a standard of absolute novelty i.e novelty being anticipated whenever an 
invention enters the public domain through publication.534  
 
Strengthening the patent law has lead to the creation of economic incentives for 
R&D in Japan. The patent law amendment of 1970, for instance, introduced a 
provision for the publication of yet-to-be examined patent applications within 
eighteen months. This publication system assisted knowledge dissemination in the 
country and it minimised duplicate R&D efforts.535 As was the case with the German 
patent system, facilitation the dissemination of technical information was considered 
to be as important as rewarding innovation. Thus, priority was given to the 
circulation of knowledge. This accelerated the momentum of further invention in the 
country.536   
 
The patentability of pharmaceutical products was granted in 1975. It was granted 
much earlier than most European countries e.g. Switzerland (1977), Austria (1987) 
etc. According to Odagiri et. al., this was a twofold process. Both international and 
domestic circumstances necessitated this amendment. The international reason was 
the Lisbon conference in 1958. This conference gathered momentum for the eventual 
amendment of the Paris Treaty. At this conference, the member countries 
recommended the adaption of product patents for chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Domestically, the majority of pharmaceutical and chemical firms, as well as 
members of the academic community, were in favour of the introduction of chemical 
product patents.537 The industry had already developed a high level of technical skill 
by this stage. Moreover, the big Japanese pharmaceutical companies were able to 
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modify foreign technology e.g. antibiotics. Thus, they focused their efforts on 
improving and generating less advanced technology.538 As a result of FDI 
restrictions in the country, Japanese companies tended to focus on the domestic 
market, where profits were assured. With minimal R&D effort, the companies were 
able to receive satisfactory profits.539  
 
Nevertheless, it was time for Japanese companies to engage in R&D activities and 
develop their own medicines. Arguably, the lack of pharmaceutical product patents 
inhibited incentives for the development of new medicines in Japan. The firms 
generally used process patents to exclude other firms from circumventing patent 
protection through the use of different production methods.540 Hence, the strong 
patent regime supported the production of globally competitive blockbuster 
products. The American and European companies were actively pursuing a strong 
patent regime in the county and there was also a threat that cheap generic drugs, 
coming from Asian countries, would flood the market. In other words, patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals did not conflict with local needs. On the contrary, the 
changing internal conditions of the industrial and technological structures 
necessitated a high level of patent production for pharmaceuticals at that time. Thus, 
local priorities, coupled with international motivation, lead towards the introduction 
of patents for pharmaceutical products.541  
 
Gradually, the Japanese patent law was amended several times in accordance with 
changing local needs. For instance, in 1988 the system of multiple claims was 
introduced and the patent term was extended for pharmaceuticals in order to 
compensate for loss of patent life due to the lengthy approval process. Furthermore, 
there was a shift from a system of one-patent and one-claim principles, which 
required numerous individual patent applications for multiple related inventions, to a 
system of multiple claims. This facilitated a single patent application which covered 
multiple inventions from one-patent. Constantly, the data exclusivity period was 
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granted to pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals for up to five. Further to this, 
patent protection was extended to a wider range of inventions.542  
 
Thus, the Japanese patent system has gone through a serious of revisions. It has now 
moved closer to the US patent system. Patent rights in Japan have undergone a 
significant transition. These rights have been extended and strengthened in order to 
cover a more broad range of technology including software, business models, 
microbiology and gene fragments. Nevertheless, in contrast to the general belief that 
patents promote innovation, the study of Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) has 
revealed that the recent patent reforms enacted in 1998 had only minor impacts on 
Japanese R&D and patenting. According to their study, there was no evidence of an 
increase in innovative effort or innovative output in industries other than the 
pharmaceutical industry that could be plausibly attributed to the recent patent 
reform.543 Alternatively, they perceived that a substantial increase in R&D spending 
preceded the legal and procedural reforms. Hence, going too far towards a strong 
patent system is undesirable because it does not incentivise innovation. The 
enforcement mechanism in the Japanese patent system was traditionally considered 
to be weak in relation to protecting inventors. Evidence indicates that Japanese 
inventors need further protection. Hence, it is critical to give priority to the 
enforcement aspects of the patent system, rather than strengthening and broadening 
the patent regime.544  
 
Nonetheless, empirical evidence shows that the pharmaceutical industry has received 
enormous benefits from the strengthened patent regime in Japan. The history of the 
Japanese pharmaceutical industry goes back to the 1970s. This was a time when 
pharmaceuticals were intentionally excluded from patentability. The industry tended 
to import technologies from foreign countries. As the industry strengthened, level of 
technology improved. It was acknowledged that the technology that had been 
developed in Japan needed to be protected. Hence, the Japanese legislature intended 
to provide incentives to the local industry to encourage R&D for new drugs. 
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Consequently, Japanese pharmaceutical companies shifted their approach from 
catching-up towards global innovation. Rather than inventing around, the law 
facilitated basic research on new chemical compounds. Not long after the 
introduction of patentability for pharmaceutical products in 1984, the Japanese 
Patent Office’s survey545 showed that there was a striking increase in the number of 
pharmaceutical companies that were involved in R&D projects for new drug 
development. The survey revealed the ratio of Japanese companies that had engaged 
in drug discovery and development had increased to 69% from 40% prior to the 
enactment of patent protection for pharmaceutical products.546  
 
The findings of a survey conducted by the Institute of IP in 2001547 confirmed the 
previous findings of Taylor and Silberston regarding the relationship between 
patents and innovation. Recalling Taylor and Silberston’s research, it is clear that the 
pharmaceutical and chemicals industries were the only outstanding exceptions to the 
general rule that patents are not effective for encouraging investment in R&D. In 
these industries patents were regarded as highly effective in investing in R&D. 
Along similar lines, an Institute of Intellectual Property survey affirmed that the 
pharmaceutical industry in Japan was sensitive to pro-patent policies in Japan and 
that the industry had experienced major effects from changes to the patent system.  
	  
VI.III.II. Moving Towards An Advanced Knowledge Economy 
 
The Japanese route of catching up fits well with the conventional list of sequences 
for innovation. According to these sequences, a country first starts with imitation of 
foreign technology and the industry develops a basic level of technical skill. In the 
second stage, incremental local innovation occurs within the context of existing 
                                                       
545 Japanese Patent Office,  “The Impact of Product Patent Protection for Materials on the Chemical 
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technologies. This typically involves making minor modifications and 
improvements, each of which are of small significance. However, cumulatively these 
alterations are of major significance in terms of gains in productivity and 
product/service performance.548 Following the local innovation phase, a country 
usually begins to produce new innovations, whether new products or processes or 
improvements of existing ones. This leads to the creation of products that are 
globally competitive.549  
 
In the early phase, the sequence of innovation repeated itself. As a result, Japan 
benefited from a head start in relation to the imitation phase. Japanese industry rose 
quickly to the innovation frontier in relation to would-be winner industries. These 
industries involve reverse-engineering and investment in in-house R&D. It is clear 
that during the local innovation phase the main emphasis was placed on process 
innovations, particularly of the organisational type. An example of these processes is 
the just in time system. This system allowed for the simultaneous exploitation of 
scale economics as well as ensuring flexibility. This lead to an efficient level of 
inventory management. It also led to a high level of quality and reliability. This in 
turn produced an ability to adjust to the needs of the end-user. Subsequently, the 
industry in Japan underwent extensive structural change. Finally, it established itself 
as among the global producers of innovation.550 
 
The government and the enactment of institutional instruments has played a dynamic 
role in Japan’s success. This role remains important for Japan’s continuing progress 
towards the establishment of a knowledge-based economy. By the beginning of 21st 
century, in order to achieve competitiveness in the Japanese market, the government 
established action plans in order to promote the creation, dissemination, and 
effective exploitation of rights. For the stimulation of business innovation, the 
Japanese government adopted pro-patent policies. This policy change occurred in the 
early 2000s. These pro-patent policies included the adoption of procedures for 
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accelerated patent examination, enacting a revision of the tort system, and creating 
an extension of patent protection in relation to new fields of technology.551  
 
The Japanese version of the Bayh-Dole Act552 created conditions that enabled 
Japanese universities to become catalysts for economic growth within the innovation 
system. Before the adoption of the Act, universities were not allowed to file for a 
patent application. Hence, university funded research was not commercialised, and 
in most of the cases university inventions entered the public domain via publication. 
Thus, the Act gave universities ownership and control of their inventions. 
Universities were empowered to establish their own technology transfer offices in 
order to license employee inventions. Nonetheless, innovative behaviour in Japan is 
still dominated by in-house R&D. By way of illustration, a significant fraction of 
R&D in pharmaceuticals is still performed in-house by Japanese pharmaceutical 
companies.  Japanese pharmaceutical companies do not rely upon universities, and 
the corresponding university start-ups, as much as their European and US 
counterparts.553  
 
In an effort to enhance university-industry interaction, the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (Monbukagaku- MEXT) was established. 
MEXT provides material support for IP personnel at university-oriented venture 
companies. MEXT also deals with technology transfer from universities to 
industries, from the early stage of idea development through to industrialisation. As 
a start-up policy, the ‘University-based Structural Reform Plan for Revitalizing the 
Japanese Economy’ was enacted to enable the licensing of university patents.554  
 
Thus, the Japanese system is still developing. The Japanese government began a new 
project in 2001 in order to shape the system of cooperation between industry, 
academia and the public sector.  In order to establish a comprehensive system 
promoting co-operation among industry, academia and the public sector, four 
priority measures have been identified:  
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553 KNELLER, supra note 539, p.1822 
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(1) consideration of economic and social needs for the promotion of research and 
development  
(2) effective return of research results to society  
(3) support and fostering of ventures growing out of universities 
(4) strengthening organisations and fostering personnel to support cooperation 
among industry, academia and the public sector.555 
 
Notwithstanding the efforts undertaken by the Japanese government, policies of this 
kind have a number of well-known limitations. Recalling the US experience, the 
relationship between industry and university is a complex one. Thus, the balance 
should be consistent between public and private interests. Universities should be 
responsive to the needs of society. However, over-encouragement of universities to 
undertake research work merely for the purposes of obtaining patents may very well 
lead universities away from their essential role as educative institutions.556  
 
It has been suggested that the Japanese recipe for innovation takes advantage of all 
the potential ingredients that exist. The Japanese model changes the role of public 
institutions,  which alleviates the administrative burden, and it also changes the 
culture in the different components involved in the processes.557 Still, critics believe 
that the government’s industrial policy needs a new approach. Traditionally, the 
promotion of innovation through the government-sponsored cooperative research 
schemes was concentrated on a small number of large, well-established firms. 
However, according to Goto, considering the important role of small and medium-
sized firms in the innovation cycle is vital. Hence, the government may give priority 
in future to the promotion of innovation within these companies.558 
 
VI.III.III. Concluding Remarks  
 
                                                       
555 See, Japanese Government Policies in Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 2001, 
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556 ODAGIRI et al., supra note 532, pp.108-111 
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During the years prior to the 1960s, Japan was nothing more than a catching-up 
economy. As a catching-up economy in the post-war period, Japan took full 
advantage of being a late comer. The Japanese drew valuable lessons from the 
experiences of other developed countries. The Japanese government adopted a 
protectionist approach. In doing so, Japan protected its infant industries, banned 
foreign investment and trade, increased tariffs, and engaged in industrial espionage. 
As part of this process, it wilfully violated patents and trademarks. Once the 
economy had matured, and Japan had joined the champions league of industrialised 
countries, the government began to advocate free trade in order to prevent the 
outflow of technologies. Hence, Japan became a strong protector of IPRs.559 Japan 
made its best endeavours to ‘take a leading role in the international discussion of the 
formation of the IPRs system’.560 
 
Over the few past decades, the Japanese strategy of catching-up has been presented 
as a success story. Other developing countries may follow this example in their own 
implementing innovation strategies. There are lessons to be drawn from the Japanese 
national innovation system. One of the most significant findings that emerged from 
Japan’s case study is that Japan benefited greatly from a well-constructed IPRs 
system. This system took account of suitable local needs and realities. Thus, the IPRs 
system in Japan was built upon the realities of a catching-up country. This IPRs 
regime was eventually transformed into a strong system that supported the global 
competiveness of the country. To put it simply, the IPRs system has evolved 
throughout the years in accordance with the economic and technological 
development of the country.561  
 
Nevertheless, the world has changed in last few decades and so has the international 
environment. In fact, examining the case of Japan shows the effects of the changing 
international dynamics. Japan had already passed the imitation and local innovation 
phase, and transformed its presence into a position of global competitive advantage, 
long before the TRIPS discussions began in earnest. If TRIPS had been enacted 
during the mid-twentieth century, Japanese companies such as Toyota or Takeda 
                                                       
559 See, CHANG, supra note 525, pp.64-66 
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Pharmaceuticals would have met substantial IPRs-related barriers. Hence, the TRIPS 
effect might have had negative repercussions for the development of the country.562  
 
Thus, the case study of Japan raises an important question. It is important to consider 
whether the policies and practices that were actively pursued by the Japanese 
government during the mid-twentieth century could provide useful guidance to 
developing countries. According to Odagiri et. al., the Japanese catch-up policy was 
founded upon a system that combined a flexible IPRs policy with a strict foreign 
trade regime and capital policy. However, pursing this policy is unlikely to be 
possible under the current WTO system. Nevertheless, the Japanese experience still 
offers some real life lessons for developing countries. These lessons include 
guidance regarding the path-dependant evolution of the IPRs system. It is also 
important to nurture IPRs-minded entrepreneurship. Establishing an effective 
competition policy and establishing the correct balance between industry forces and 
public sector intervention may also be counted as complementary measures in this 
account.563  
	  
VI.IV. The National Innovation System Of South Korea 
 
Although the industrialisation of South Korea only began in the early 1960s, its rapid 
economic development since then has made South Korea an important player in the 
world economy. Korea has been transformed from an agricultural country into a 
newly industrialised one during the past quarter of a century. In the 1960s, Korea 
had the same level of economic development as Ghana. The country was suffering 
from almost every possible difficulty that a poor country can face. However, by the 
end of the 1980s, Korea’s level of R&D investment and its high level of economic 
growth approached the levels of some of the most highly industrialised countries of 
Europe.564  Hence, Korea’s progress in terms of life-change indicators and economic 
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563 Ibid, pp.125-127 
564 KIM L: “ National System of Industrial Innovation: Dynamics of Capability Building in Korea” in 
NELSON, supra note 387, p.357 
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growth may well be illustrated with the hypothetical analogy of country such as 
Haiti developing into a country with the economic climate of Switzerland.565  
 
The Korean national innovation system is founded upon the presence of strong 
formalised, government-driven policy planning and decision-making.566 However, a 
serious weakness with the Korean system is its weak systematic linkages and its 
poor levels of interfaces between innovation actors. It also features an inefficient 
level of duplication of resource allocation and an uncoordinated setting of 
priorities.567 The system had been criticised on the basis that it was primarily guided 
by the catch-up model. For instance, during the 1970s the system lacked the 
technological capabilities necessary for industrialisation. Hence, the system relied on 
foreign technology and knowledge rather than domestic R&D.568 Nevertheless, by 
the 1980s the system had entered into a stage of transition. Over the course of this 
stage, a high level of investment was targeted towards indigenous R&D and the 
competitiveness of the country was strengthened by the use of creative imitation of 
foreign technology and local innovation. At this time, Korean companies developed 
skills in order to make incremental advances in relation to imported technology. 
Over the course of the final stage of development, Korean companies engaged in 
experimental areas, such as research into semiconductors, electronics and 
biotechnology. Furthermore, Korean companies drastically raised their level of R&D 
investment in order to strengthen their technological competitiveness.569 
 
The government functioned as an effective orchestrator of the catch-up process. In 
this context, the government’s strong commitment to technology-based national 
development, coupled with the efforts of private industry bodies in relation to 
competitiveness in the high-tech industries, are strong features of the Korean system. 
The positive contributions of the R&D activities have been reflected in a remarkable 
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growth of registered patents in Korea.  the high rate of R&D activities  has also 
encouraged the establishment of high-tech companies such as companies 
manufacturing semiconductor memory chips, liquid crystal displays and 
telecommunication equipment. In these areas, Korea has emerged as a world 
leader.570  
 
The private sector has been identified as the major benefactor of R&D in Korea. In 
consultation with the private sector, government has protected certain industries. It 
has done this through tariff protection, subsidies and other forms of government 
support. The government actively protected these industries until they reached a 
certain level of maturity that enabled the companies to withstand international 
competition571. Consequently, the government has extensively supported the 
corporate sector in relation to R&D activities through direct R&D subsidies, 
preferential financing and tax incentives.572 
	  
VI.IV.I. Examining The Korean Patent Regime 
 
Today, Korea’s patent regime is highly advanced when compared to the economies 
of other newly industrialised countries. The very first patent of law in Korea was 
based on the US patent system. Thus, the law adopted the first-to-invent regime. 
However, during the 1960s, Korea switched to a first-to-file rule. As a consequence 
of the catching-up process in the country, the patent term was shortened from 
seventeen to twelve years. More importantly, pharmaceutical and chemical materials 
were excluded from patentability.  Thus, Korean law provided protection for 
pharmaceutical processes, but not the products.  
 
Nevertheless, Korea introduced patent protection for pharmaceutical products in 
1986 as a result of international political pressure, particularly from the US 
government. The patent protection term was extended to fifteen years from the grant 
of a patent, or eighteen years from the application date, whichever is longer. 
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Moreover, five years of patent-term extensions were introduced in order to 
compensate for regulatory delays.  
 
In the early years of catch-up, it was largely the case that individual inventors 
applied for patents. Thus, the share of corporate patent ownership was quite limited. 
However, Korean companies started to use the patent system once they had built up 
their own technological capabilities and skills. Nevertheless, the corporate share of 
domestic applications was limited to 10% in the late 1980s. The introduction of 
pharmaceutical product patents generated economic losses in the short-term for the 
pharmaceutical industry. At that time, the industry relied heavily on generic drugs. 
As a result, the industry was incapable of developing globally marketable new drugs. 
The companies were still involved in the process of adapting and absorbing foreign 
technologies. Nevertheless, Korean companies soon changed their strategy. Many 
companies moved towards more innovative R&D and a number of companies 
formed alliances with technology-holders abroad. The limitations of imitative R&D 
were soon realised and consequently, new research labs were established. The 
number of approved research labs during the period between 1986 and 1988 was 
about four times larger than the preceding years. Moreover, in 1987 the proportion 
of R&D in relation to percentage of sales increased from 0.69 to 1.86 %.573 
However, the Korean market was a small one and as result, the pharmaceutical 
companies’ R&D budget was at a level below 4% of their overall sales. Thus, R&D 
expenditures still remained unimpressive during the 1990s when compared with the 
same levels in other countries.574 Nevertheless, during the late 1990s Korean 
companies began to invest heavily in R&D to close the R&D gap. Consequently, 
Korean firms have managed to invent sixteen new medicines, all of which are 
commercially viable. Currently, Korea ranks tenth in the list of countries capable of 
drug discovery and development.575  
 
The Korean success in the pharmaceutical industry can be illustrated by examining 
the Hepatitis B vaccine development story. During the 1980s, one of the major 
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health problems of Korea was Hepatitis B. The prevalence of infection was 
something between 8-15% before the introduction of the Hepatitis B vaccine.576 
Korean businesses typically imported the vaccine. As a result, the vaccine was of 
limited use. It was only available in small quantities and it was not affordable for 
everyone in the country. Thus, the government acted promptly in order to encourage 
local production. Korean companies focused their R&D departments towards the 
goal of developing a new vaccine. By collaborating with foreign companies, or by 
obtaining patented technology from abroad, the companies transferred knowledge 
and technology from abroad. Thereafter, companies modified foreign technology to 
suit their local needs. Hence, they were able to launch their vaccines successfully 
during the 1990s. Soon after this, Korean companies became global exporters of 
DNA vaccines. This resulted in a substantial decrease of prices in the international 
market. According to Lee and Kim, Korean pharmaceutical companies were not 
significantly inhibited by existing IPRs over vaccine technology. Companies were 
able to transfer technology within the limits of the IPRs system by establishing joint 
ventures or collaborations. Thus, companies took full advantage of their position as 
latecomers. Many companies adopted a stage-skipping catch up strategy. More 
importantly, the government played a critical role in the success of the Korean 
pharmaceutical companies. Thus, the government helped to secure a profitable 
market for producers. The government also provided export encouragement and 
subsidised the building of vacuum factories.577  
 
As with the case of Japan and the US, pharmaceutical innovation in Korea has 
passed through a path-following route. Korean companies primarily built up their 
skills and expertise in drug manufacturing during an era featuring a lack of patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals. When product patents were finally introduced in 
Korea, Korean companies were in a position to enhance their capacities for 
developing and assimilating new knowledge and technologies. However, they were 
not able to make modifications to foreign technology and thus, apply new 
knowledge to old technology. Therefore, in the short term there was a significant 
loss of wealth in the industry. The growing threat of Hepatitis B infection and the 
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lack of local production capability prompted the government and the industry to take 
action. The government provided the necessary incentives and guaranteed a 
profitable market for the industry. The industry utilised their corporate sources in 
order to gain access to foreign know-how. Instead of reinventing the wheel, Korean 
companies took advantage of being latecomers and they followed a stage-skipping 
catch up route. Thus, Korean companies invested directly into research and the latest 
foreign knowledge. This was achieved through joint venture arrangements in order 
avoid possible IPRs problems with the technology. The in-house R&D efforts were 
supported with the latest foreign technology.  The successful launch of vaccines 
during the mid-1990s confirmed that the Koreans had completed the local innovation 
stage and thus, Korea was ready to move on to the next stage.  
 
The importance of the government’s role in the industrialisation of Korea should not 
be underestimated. The presence of a strong government helped speed up the Korean 
catch-up process. According to Kim, ‘the government held the wheel and supplied 
the fuel, while private firms functioned as engines.578’  In fact, the government 
guaranteed the market and it also provided the necessary incentives. Moreover, it 
took a crucial role in enlarging the export market for the vaccines. The export market 
encouragement of the government facilitated the industry’s move up to the next 
level. It also fostered the global competitiveness of the Korean industry. Today, the 
two companies who actively took part in vaccine R&D - Green Cross and LG Chem 
- are the two leading, innovative players in the Korean industry. Thus, the Korean 
industry is independently capable of developing new drugs. Companies are no longer 
associated with imitative drugs. As stated above, the Korean industry has already 
invented sixteen new medicines.579 
	  
VI.IV.II. Catching Up To The Future  
 
The industry in Korea has been transformed from being imitative in character to 
being innovative. In doing so, it has achieved a positive level of industrialised 
growth. Nonetheless, the Korean national innovation system has lost its 
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competitiveness in recent years. Excessive reliance on private industries in relation 
to R&D investment is one of the main weaknesses of the system. The lack of 
distribution of R&D investment across facilities and personnel in Korea constitutes 
another drawback of the system.580 The fundamental problem that lies at the root of 
the Korean NIS is the underdevelopment of the university research capability. 
Furthermore the mechanism required to turn the basic university research into 
commercial activities is not always present. Recent evidence suggests that impact of 
university basic research in driving long-term innovative behaviour remains limited. 
It is contended that the Korean system requires structural changes, which ought to be 
directed towards particular actors and activities. The efficiency of the Korean system 
depends on the linkages and the division of labour between innovation actors. 
Therefore, harnessing the new generation of indigenous knowledge and 
strengthening the university system are of the utmost importance in relation to 
sustainable innovation policies.581  
 
China and other emerging Asian countries – so-called Asian tigers - are strongly 
challenging the Korean economy.  Consequently, the Korean government is 
currently in the process of restructuring the NIS. The government is developing 
innovation-driven polices rather than imitative and catch-up-oriented ones.582 Korea 
still possesses a competitive advantage. Nevertheless, it became evident that an 
upgrade, not only in terms of quantity, but also in quality, is needed in order for the 
Korean innovation system to accumulate knowledge in the area of basic science and 
fundamental technologies.583 It is suggested that Korea should break its old model 
and thus, create a new model. This model must be founded upon notions of 
economic indigenisation. Indigenisation requires the regeneration of the indigenous 
knowledge base as well as a strengthening of university research capabilities. 
Deepening the innovation system depends upon the re-orientation of the state’s 
business strategy, rather than technological progress. Thus, there is a need for basic 
policy review i.e. a move towards a more diffusion-oriented regime. Last, but not 
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least, in relation to high and sustained growth, Korea may be able to take advantage 
of global integration by strengthening both its domestic and international linkages.584 
	  
VI.IV.III. Concluding Remarks 
 
The rapid industrialisation of Korea is usually described as a process of upgrading 
i.e. a progression from imitation to innovation. Over the course of the catch-up 
process, Korea combined Japanese-style creative imitation with American-style 
innovation.585 After the introduction of patents for pharmaceutical products in Korea, 
there were short-term wealth losses. Thus, the transition had an initial adverse effect 
on the pharmaceutical industry. However, although the patent system presented 
serious barriers in relation to catching-up, the IPRs system functioned as a push 
factor for the industry during the catch-up. Apart from importing foreign technology 
and knowledge through joint venture arrangements and costly licence agreements, 
the industry also invested heavily in the area of in house R&D. When compared to 
Japan, the Korean path to growth and competitiveness was tough and filled with 
obstacles. Nevertheless, the Korean pharmaceutical industry did not get stuck in the 
patent trap. Korean companies transformed their reverse-engineering skills and 
activities into in house, R&D-friendly activities. Supported by government 
incentives, Korean companies were able to invent and produce drugs that met both 
local and global needs.  
	  
VI.V. The National Innovation System Of Israel 
 
Over the past decade, Israel has become the pre-eminent technological powerhouse 
in the generic drug industry. The Israeli generic drug industry is geographically 
distinct from many other markets. It is richly endowed with human capital and 
organisational structures. Furthermore, new high-tech ventures are seen to be an 
essential element of the economy. Thus, innovative generic industry-oriented 
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technologies are supported in order to strengthen the country’s technological 
expertise and enhance competitiveness.  
 
The National Innovation System of Israel offers a ‘fascinating illustration of 
extraordinary success in innovation.586’ The development of the system has been a 
high priority of policy due to Israel’s geographical, economic and historical 
conditions. Israel is a very small country with a population of 7 million. It stands at a 
global and historical crossroads. It has very few natural resources and it operates 
under constant security threats. The roots of the government commitment to the 
development of NIS in Israel go back to the 1950s, when Israel was poor, peripheral, 
and highly dependent upon foreign technology.587  
 
The boycott by the Arab League started immediately after Israel was established and 
continued until the mid 1990s. The boycott was essentially divided in three 
components. The primary boycott was prohibiting direct trade between Israel and all 
Arab countries. The target of the secondary boycott was companies who were doing 
business with Israel. Furthermore, the boycott prohibited all Arab countries from 
maintaining commercial ties with those international companies or dealing with their 
subsidiaries. Moreover, thousands of companies from all around the world, which 
either traded with Israel or were owned by Jews, were blacklisted, and Arab states 
were prohibited from doing business with them in the scope of the last and the 
tertiary boycott.588 The boycott started to weaken at the end of the 1970s as a result 
of peace negotiations with Egypt. Eventually, the Oslo peace process in mid-1990s 
put an end to the boycott by Arab countries.  
 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the government of Israel made a strategic decision to 
transfer resources in order to create a science-based sector in Israel. These initiatives 
largely involved making financial support available in relation to commercial R&D, 
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as well as making up for market failures in relation to the promotion of exports. It 
was also necessary for the state to invest in capital-intensive high-tech sectors.589 In 
an effort to provide direct support in relation to innovation, the Office of the Chief 
Scientist (OCS) was created at the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The Law for the 
Encouragement of R&D (1985) reorganised OCS as a quasi-independent agency. 
The agency was formed to provide direct support for R&D, both within firms and 
within public research institutes.590   
 
Israel is a country without water, oil and other natural resources.591 This required a 
rational identification of the national assets and enactment of national policies in line 
with the nation’s needs and future prospects. In terms of goals, the provision of a 
highly skilled labour force, as well as the imposition of strong pro-education cultural 
values within the school system, were vital in the early years of Israel.  As a result, a 
high level of scientific technological power and intellectual capital became the key 
features of the country. Therefore, the government prioritised the creation of 
scientific and technological knowledge. This enhanced the economic vitality and 
sustainability of the nation. Contrary to Japan and South Korea, the incentives for 
innovation in Israel were created for small and medium-sized enterprises rather than 
big corporations. Thus, the innovation policies were generally focused on 
encouraging industrial R&D activities through government grants, in relation to the 
ideas that originated solely in the private sector.592 
 
Israel is a very good example of Lundvall’s hypothesis. The level of innovation that 
is taking place in small and medium enterprises (SMEs), with a low level of R&D, 
generates industrial dynamism and market growth. According to the Lundvall’s 
theory, the success of innovation policies in developing countries lies in the 
increasing importance of industrial dynamism in SMEs. In order to stimulate 
innovation across the country and to encourage research and development, the 
government of Israel directly supported the R&D activities of SMEs. The research 
                                                       
589 ROPER S.: “ Innovation Policy in Israel, Ireland and the UK – An Evolutionary Perspective”, 
Working Paper Series No. 47, NIERC, 1999, pp.6-7 
590 PUGATCH M, TEUBAL M. & ZLOTNICK O.: “ Israel’s High- Tech Catch-Up Process”  in 
ODAGIRI et.al,. supra note 263, p.213 
591“Innovation in Israel – advantages in generating ideas”, available at, 
http://innovation.freedomblogging.com/category/innovation-in-israel/, (25.09.2010) 
592 BREZNITZ, supra note 587, p.7 
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conducted by these companies lead to the establishment of new ideas and 
innovations.  
	  
 VI.V.I. The Patent Regime of Israel 
 
The roots of the Israeli patent regime go back to the British mandate in 1924. The 
patent law, which is in force today, is the Patent Act of 1967. As it originated from 
the British Act, it provided patent protection in all fields of technology, without 
discriminating between product and process.593 It is arguable that the patentability of 
inventions was subject to a narrow interpretation before the amendment of the law in 
2000.594 The law previously defined a patented invention as any invention, which 
could be used in industry or agriculture. In 2000, the definition of patented invention 
was broadened to include any technological field in accordance with the broad 
interpretation of Article 27 of TRIPS.595 
 
Although the 1967 Patent Act provided patentability in relation to pharmaceutical 
products and processes, the law included peculiar provisions, which were justified as 
being for the benefit of local pharmaceutical companies. Particularly in the event of 
lack or insufficient working of a patented invention, it was possible to establish 
compulsory licences in the country. The next chapter will give a detailed account of 
the circumstances under which the local pharmaceutical companies were able to use 
and benefited from these provisions. Nevertheless, it suffices to say that the local 
industry built up its capacities and expertise in relation to drug manufacturing by 
relying on these provisions.  
 
The amendment in 2000 introduced revisions to the statutory provisions regarding 
compulsory licensing. The relevant provisions have been amended in a manner that 
is considerably limiting in relation to the cases where compulsory licences may be 
                                                       
593 “An invention, whether a product or a process, which is new and useful, can be used in industry or 
agriculture, and which involves an inventive step, is a patentable invention.”, Article 3 of 1967 Israeli 
Patent Act 
594 The Israeli patent law was amended in 2000 in order to provide compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement 
595 GILAT D.:”Development in Israeli Patent Law 2000-2002”(report to Institute of Intellectual 
Property in Asia, October 19, 2003),  available at http://www.institute-ip-
asia.org/articles/Israelreport.pdf, (24.09.2010) 
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applied. This puts considerable limitations on the value of the compulsory license for 
the holder. The scope of a compulsory licence is narrowed down in a manner fully 
complying with the requirements of TRIPS.596  
 
Israel is the very first country in the world that has signed a truly reciprocal Free 
Trade Agreement with the US. The United States-Israel FTA was signed in 1985, 
long before the US adopted an aggressive IPRs policy. The Agreement also took 
place long before the IPR discussions regarding TRIPS and TRIPS-plus during the 
mid-1980s.  
  
At that time, the Israeli generic drug industry was not in as strong a position as it is 
today. As a result, the agreed IPRs provisions were general and flexible.597 
Nevertheless, if Israel and the US engaged in FTA negotiations today, the outcome 
would be significantly different. The US would probably have asked for a stricter, 
pro-patent regime. Following the FTA with the US, Israel became a member of the 
WTO. As a result, Israel was obligated to implement TRIPS in 2000. Thus, the 
patent law of Israel (Patent Law 5727-1967) was amended in order to bring the law 
into conformity with the requirements of TRIPS. 
 
Today, the Israeli patent regime fully complies with the provisions of TRIPS. 
Nevertheless, it still provides a pre-grant opposition system for patent applications. 
The pre-grant opposition system prolongs the patent examination period. Unlike the 
post-grant opposition system, patent protection begins from the date of publication of 
the patent application, not from the date of patent application. In practice, after the 
patent application, the initial examination can take 3-5 years. This examination 
determines whether the application is acceptable for publication. According to the 
relevant provision, any person can oppose the application within three months after 
the application.598 The opposition process can continue up until the Supreme Court 
takes the final decision. The patent examination process can take a long time, in a 
scenario where the initial examination can take 3-5 years and the opposition process 
can take up to 5 years. In addition, the patent registrar acts as the first instance 
                                                       
596 Id. 
597 Article 14, Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area between the Government of 
Israel and the Government of the United States of America 
598 Section 30 of the Israeli Patent Act. 
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district court, if parties appeal the case, then the average waiting time for the decision 
is 2 years. In the final stage, the case goes to the Supreme Court, which adds 2-3 
years to the waiting time.  
 
This pre-grant opposition procedure has been subjected to fierce criticism by 
multinational pharmaceutical companies. They argued that long examination process 
causes the loss of a significant part of the period of the patent life and the pre-grant 
opposition system provides a relatively favourable position for the local generic 
industry.599 However, both the Israeli Patent Office and the Israeli local 
pharmaceutical industry reject the accusations. The Patent Office argued that 
although there were cases where the local companies successfully challenged the 
patents, and cases where companies launched products at their own risk before the 
final decision of the court, these cases did not constitute a breach of the 
confidentiality of the Israeli patent application. 
 
The Israeli patent regime has traditionally been subject to considerable criticism 
from the US government due to Israel’s failure to protect undisclosed test data from 
unfair commercial use. According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
Special 301 report of 2004, Israel has consistently failed to provide protection on 
data submitted by US pharmaceutical firms. As a result, the US government urged 
the Israeli government to enact TRIPS-consistent legislation that will provide a 
reasonable period of non-reliance on confidential data.600 Even though Israel 
implemented the data protection provisions that are embodied in Article 39.3 of 
TRIPS into its regime in 2000, the USTR requested that Israel incorporate data 
exclusivity in order to provide exclusive protection of the data. The data exclusivity 
provision was introduced in 2005 following drawn-out negotiations with the US 
Government. The data exclusivity provisions in Israel remain an effective 
compromise between the local industry lobby and the government.  
 
The specific data exclusivity provisions are very peculiar to Israel. First of all, 
Article 47 of the Pharmacist Ordinance regulates the data exclusivity regime in the 
country. The protection is only available for new chemical entities and it does not 
                                                       
599  See, PhRMA, “Special 301 Submission for 2007” 
600 See, USTR Special 301 Report, 2004 
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cover formulations, second medical use claims, processes, paediatric usages etc. The 
protection period is the most controversial part of the regulation. In theory, the Act 
provides either five years of data exclusivity from the registration day of the drug in 
Israel, or 5.5 years of exclusivity from the day of the earliest registration in any of 
the recognised countries - whichever is the shortest period.601 The recognised 
countries are listed in the Pharmacist Ordinance. This list covers the US, all the EU 
countries, Canada, Switzerland, Australia etc. The protection is tied to registration in 
recognised countries. It is not possible to register a drug before it is registered in the 
US and EU. The regulatory process usually takes up to 2-3 years in Israel. Hence, in 
most of the cases, the data exclusivity protection covers the remaining 2-3 years.   
 
This is a critical issue. The USTR wants uninterrupted protection for 5 years. 
PhRMA claims that the regulation provides a favourable position to the generic 
companies by allowing them to rely on registration of the original drugs for export 
purposes. Indeed, this regulation does not apply to applications for export licences 
from Ministry of Health and thereby assists the export-oriented local industry to 
maintain its competitiveness in world generic drug markets. Nevertheless, it was 
recently reported that Israel and the US have somehow resolved the data exclusivity 
dispute. According to the agreement, Israel will prolong the 5.5 years exclusivity to a 
period of 6.5 years, and in exchange the US will move Israel from the Priority Watch 
List.602  
 
As a part of the data exclusivity deal with the local pharmaceutical industry, Israel 
has modified regulation of its patent term extension certificates. This amendment 
was heavily lobbied by the local industry, and it is widely referred to as a Teva 
deal.603 The amendment introduces a new method of calculating the term of 
protection afforded in Israel, and the new method renders the term of protection to be 
as short as possible. According to Section 64J of the Patent Act, the term of 
protection shall not exceed five years beyond the term. First of all, the drug must 
have been granted a patent term extension certificate in any of the recognised 
                                                       
601 See, Article 47 D (b) 2 of Israeli Pharmacist Ordinance 
602 “US, Israel resolve long-standing pharma battle” by Lynne Taylor,  Pharmatimes, 23 February 
2010, available at www.pharmatimes.com/WorldNews/articles.aspx?id=17449, (25.09.2010) 
603 Teva Pharmaceuticals is the largest Israeli pharmaceutical company, which is one of the top 20 
pharmaceutical companies world wide.  
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countries. The extension period counts from the earliest registration in any one of 
those countries. Nevertheless, in any case the accumulative total term of extension 
shall not be longer that 14 years after the day on which the first marketing approval 
was issued in any of those countries.604 
 
It is also argued that the legislation introduced new and burdensome conditions for 
patent term extension certificate applications. With the new regulation, the applicant 
is required to file and obtain a similar kind of application in both the US and in at 
least one EU member country. Thus, the new amendment has been interpreted to 
reduce the effective patent extension term since it requires that the patent term 
extension in Israel will be aligned with the shortest of the extension periods typically 
granted to a patent in any of the Recognised Countries.605 
 
The generic drug industry, particularly Teva, is of utmost importance for Israel. As 
Teva developed and increased its competiveness in the world generic drug market, 
the pressure from the US, and particularly from PhRMA, increased. The patent 
regime in Israel is enacted as a compromise between multinational pharmaceutical 
companies and the local industry. Although, the USTR fiercely criticises the Israeli 
patent regime for the lack of adequate protection, the Israeli regime fully complies 
with the minimum standards of TRIPS. Nevertheless, PhRMA and the US 
consistently push for protection going beyond the minimum standards of TRIPS. The 
Israeli patent regime includes typical TRIPS-plus provisions regarding data 
exclusivity and patent term extension certificates. Nonetheless, the Israeli patent 
regime is constructed in a manner consistent to the needs of the national industry. 
The patent term extensions, for instance, are designed in consideration of the public 
interest and public health issues. Apart from the local pharmaceutical industry, the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Health actively lobbied for the modification 
of patent term extensions. The national health care system has always been the 
primary concern of these government departments and thus, the departments wanted 
generic drug entry into the market at the earliest opportunity.  
 
                                                       
604 See, Section 64I of the Israeli Patent Act 
605Israel, National Trade Estimate Report On Foreign Trade Barriers (NTE) 2007, PHRMA, available 
at www.sidley.com/db30/cgi-bin/pubs/US-Israel_Business_Law_Developments_, (25.09.2010) 
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The next chapter will cover the case of Teva. It will provide real-life analysis of the 
usage of the patent regime in the best interests of the local needs and realities of 
Israel.  However, it suffices to conclude here that the Israeli patent regime is 
carefully formulated according to the level of development of the country and 
industry. 
 
VI.V.II. Overview Of The Innovation Policies, Issues And Concerns 
 
As with the case of Korea, the innovation policy in Israel is government-driven and it 
has a top-down structure in relation to policy making and decision making. Although 
Israel is assumed to be one of the success stories i.e. a case where government has 
been very successful in catalysing the establishment of world-class high-tech 
industries, the policy making and evaluation practices are fairly unsystematic. 
Overall, the policies lack a clear methodology when compared to Korea.  
 
The success of the system, particularly at early stages of innovation, in large part 
depends on the financial incentives granted to SMEs, as well as forward-planning in 
accordance with local realities. Early recognition of the importance of linking 
university research to the industry, and the establishment of research authorities and 
science parks, are the key features that brought success to the Israeli system.606  
 
The innovation system in Israel may be defined as ambiguous and inexplicit. The 
rate of innovation is organised as a by-product of encouraging R&D.607 This R&D 
eventually leads to industrial dynamism and it provides vitality and sustainability to 
the economy. Unlike Japan and Korea, the Israeli government did not select the 
would-be winners or provide an incentive for R&D investment in any favoured 
sector. Israel is acknowledged as being one of the first states to employ both a 
horizontal and a neutral science technology strategy.608 Neutrality, in fact, is a 
                                                       
606TEUBAL M.: “The Innovation System of Israel: Description Performance and Outstanding Issues” 
in NELSON, supra note 387, pp.477-497 
607GETZ D. & SAGAL V.: “The Israeli Innovation System: An Overview of National Policy and 
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608 BREZNITZ D.: “ Industrial R&D as a National Policy: Horizontal Technology Policies and 
Industry-State Co-evolution in the Growth of the Israeli Software Industry”, Research Policy, V.36, 
I.9, p.1465-82; PUGATCH et al, supra note 589, p.213  
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distinctive feature of the innovation system, which is highly regarded as a long time 
success strategy for Israel.  This functions in a manner that considers the market 
demands and signals.  The innovation incentives do not discriminate between the 
different fields of technology.609 The government policies characterised by 
dynamism, which creates new programs in response to changing needs and updates 
existing ones in light of market developments.610  
 
The early recognition of the shortage of natural resources and raw materials in Israel 
led the founders of the state to develop a strategic policy. This policy was aimed at 
creating Israel’s natural intellectual resources. The educational priorities of the 
country were set to encourage the technical education of the people.611 The flow of 
manpower comes from the Israeli university network, and from immigration. There 
is a high level of public commitment to supporting commercial R&D. Hence; 
support for innovative activity is clearly another important component of NIS.612 
 
Israel ranks first in the world in relation to R&D expenditure. Each year academic 
research receives more than a quarter of a million dollars of government funds in 
Israel. This constitutes 4.6% of Israel’s GDP.613 Thus, R&D in Israel generates a 
vast amount of cutting edge innovations.614  Nevertheless, this may also give rise to a 
high level of deadweight, as well as displacement and the undertaking of sub-
marginal projects.615 The high level of public support for R&D in Israel has been 
criticised by Israeli academics. Teubal, for example, argues that ‘there is a feeling 
today that probably too much R&D may have been done, which means that an 
unduly small proportion was effectively applied.616’ 
 
Moreover, multinationals are highly active in the Israeli R&D market. A substantial 
part of the industrial R&D in Israel is done by local labs owned by multinationals. 
The knowledge generated in these labs then flows out to meet the global needs of 
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parent companies. Thus, it may be of little relevance to the future economic vitality 
of Israel. By way off illustration, Centrino chipsets are designed at Intel’s R&D 
centre in Haifa. Generally, most of the laptops in world are powered by Centrino 
chipsets. Nevertheless, the country has not received substantial economic benefits 
from this invention. The reason for this is that the IPRs generated in the Israeli R&D 
labs is owned by Intel and thus, the revenue flows out of the country.  
 
With regard to the economic aspects of innovation, the geographical location of labs 
may is also a feature that potentially stimulates the economy. It does so by creating 
employment, stimulating enterprise development, and increasing productivity etc. 
Nevertheless, for a knowledge-driven economy, the role of innovation as a growth 
catalyst mainly depends on the availability of intellectual capital, the knowledge 
generated, the know-how created, and the ownership of intellectual property. As 
Trajtenberg clearly notes: 
  
‘…the impact of a given innovation on the local economy depends in large 
measure on who owns the intellectual property generated, where does it flow 
to, what sort of lateral connections are there, etc. and not just on the 
geographical location of the R&D lab.617’ 
 
Although the case of Israel illustrates a success story in relation to innovation, the 
globally competitive businesses in Israel are few. According to the Forbes Global 
2000 list, Israel has only one true global giant: Teva. Teva is one of the world leaders 
in generic medicines. Teva’s drugs are estimated to account for one out of every 
fifteen prescriptions in the US.618 The case of Teva reveals guidance for developing 
countries and local pharmaceutical industries. Although it will be examined in detail 
in the forthcoming chapter, it should be noted that the long-term strategy and 
implementation of this strategy, together with the incentives provided by the Israeli 
national innovation policy, have helped to make Teva a world leader in generic 
medicines. 
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VI.V.III. Government’s Role And Outstanding Issues 
 
The government is the financial source of innovation in Israel. It provides financial 
support for all types of R&D, from basic research in universities to all kinds of 
product and process development in firms. This financial support is mainly focused 
on applied R&D with commercial and economic viability. Due to the indistinct 
structure of the Israeli innovation system, Israel does not have a law, or legal 
standards, to accommodate provisions or regulations in relation to grant rates.  
 
The Law for the Promotion of Industrial Research and Development (R&D Law) 
was enacted in 1985 as the principal mechanism aimed at enhancing the 
development of the local science-based industry. It did so by utilising and expanding 
the existing technological and academic infrastructure and by increasing the 
manufacture and export of high-tech products developed within Israel. The OCS 
processes applications by considering a set of criteria. The criteria are as follows: 
technological and commercial feasibility, merits and risks, and the extent to which 
the project can be expected to generate spillovers.619  
 
The standard grants supporting R&D projects in Israel vary from 50% to 60%, 
depending on the area of science. This repayment is done in terms of royalty 
payments as a total of revenues derived from the sale of the developed product. In a 
comparative study of innovation policies in Israel, Ireland, and the UK, Roper 
reported that any individual R&D project up-front grant support is likely to be most 
substantially beneficial in Israel. According to his study, the proportion of 
government funded R&D in all civil R&D by business was 26.1% in Israel in 1994, 
more than two and a half times the proportion in Ireland (10%) and more than four 
times the proportion in the UK (6.3%).620  
	  
 
                                                       
619 Spillovers occur when R&D activity undertaken in one organisation creates benefits or cost 
reductions elsewhere which are not reflected fully in the rewards reaped by the organisation which 
carried out the research in the first place 
620 ROPER, supra note 589, p.29 
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VI.V.III.I. Incubators Program 
 
 
The Incubators Program was created during the 1990s. At this time, post-Soviet 
immigration reached its peak. Most of the post-Soviet immigrants were scientists and 
highly skilled professionals. They possessed innovative ideas and the necessary 
background and enthusiasm to realise those ideas. However, they were lacking in 
virtually all other dimensions required for commercial success.621 In order to give an 
opportunity to develop innovative technological ideas and set up new businesses in 
order to commercialise them, the Incubators Program was put in place.   
 
The program provides incentives to entrepreneurs and start-ups at the earliest stage 
of technological innovation. It equips them with the basic means in order to 
implement their ideas and to turn them into exportable commercial products. It also 
aims to establish a link between the academy and the industry by providing 
infrastructure and managerial support for projects.  
  
Three criteria were considered for acceptance into the program. First of all, the 
potential product must be marketable for export and it must be capable of forming 
the basis of a business. Secondly, the product must be in a high-tech field. Finally, it 
has to be manufactured in Israel. Due to the neutrality principle present in the Israeli 
innovation system, the entrepreneurs in any field of technology are able to benefit 
from the programs.622 However, the inventions that they proposed must fulfil the 
patentability criteria. Thus, all the applications must be accompanied with a proof of 
patent application.  
 
Creating a strong biotechnology industry, consisting of start-up companies, is a valid 
aspiration for Israel. Establishing such infrastructure demands a huge investment in 
time and resources. The biotech start-ups primarily require financial support for 
long-term R&D activities and the subsequent clinical trials. The incubators have 
been created to encourage an environment for scientists, who may lack 
entrepreneurial skills, to interest investors. This makes the incubators program 
                                                       
621 TRATEJENBERG, supra note 17, p.20 
622 There are 24 incubators in Israel, 17 of them are privatised and one is a biotech incubator.  
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increasingly popular among biotechnology start-ups. There are many successful 
biotechnology companies that have grown up as part of the incubators program. 
	  
VI.V.III.II. Magnet Program 
 
The Magnet program brings together industry and academia to work on basic 
research aimed at eventual commercialisation. The program was created as a subsidy 
for innovative, generic, pre-competitive technologies and in order to boost local 
innovation and enhance competitiveness.  
 
The program specifically focuses on basic research for new high-tech products and 
processes. By bringing together inventors and innovators, it aims to promote high-
technology research, development and commercialisation. It also aims to foster long-
term thinking in R&D. The activities are based on collaboration between companies 
and academic research groups organised in consortia with several members or as a 
dual cooperation between one academic group doing research in scientific areas. This 
is potentially relevant to the technological goals of a consortium and one industrial 
company operating in the field, depending on the chosen track.623   
 
All the new knowledge, which was developed under the consortium umbrella, is 
open free of charge, to all other consortium members. However, the exclusivity of 
the know-how stays with the developers. Sharing the intellectual property, and 
giving an upfront licence to use it, is the main justification of the program. 
Eventually, each member acquires more know-how than could be achievable if 
working alone. The synergetic collaboration of knowledge provides the common 
denominator of a win-win proposition for both industry and academia. This way of 
knowledge sharing has proven to be successful in the area of life sciences. The 
consortiums in life sciences focus on the development of process, and tools, but not 
products. Successful co-operation has been achieved in the fields of bioinformatics, 
medical tools and cell therapy.  
                                                       
623 See, GETZ et al., supra note 607, p.18 
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VI.V.III.III. R&D Funds 
 
In life sciences, innovative projects are classified as high-risk projects i.e. projects 
that have a high likelihood of failure. Due to the high risk involved, the venture 
capitalists are very unlikely to invest in these kinds of projects. Hence, government 
support becomes indispensable in order for the pharmaceutical and biotech industry 
to thrive.  
 
R&D funds are offered by the Israeli state in order to serve the aim of encouraging 
innovation. Any company that possesses inventive ideas can apply for these funds. 
Each application is dealt with on its own conditions. Nevertheless, there are three 
general criteria that are used for assessment. These are as follows. Firstly, the type of 
invention, secondly, market potential and thirdly, company eligibility. The 
patentability of the invention is must also be justifiable. Apart from showing the 
market potential in order to justify the investment, companies are required to provide 
evidence regarding the absorptive capacity of the R&D activities as well as an 
overview of the technological and organisational capabilities needed to achieve 
market competitiveness.  
 
An application in the area of life sciences is usually based upon basic research that is 
conducted by the universities. The Israeli pharmaceutical industry has a long 
tradition of cooperating with universities and government laboratories. The most 
prominent successful example of usage of these funds in relation to pharmaceuticals 
is Copaxone. Copaxone is Teva’s first innovative drug. It has been developed for the 
treatment of multiple sclerosis. Copaxone was developed by researchers at the 
Weizmann Research Institute. Teva has only been involved during the third decade 
of the research. Teva has taken advantage of the R&D funds available in Israel for 
conducting clinical trials.  
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VI.V.IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
The Israeli innovation system is founded upon a high-degree of government support 
and entrepreneurship. There are systems of partnership and social networking 
between industry and university organisations. This may suggest that creation of a 
synergy is required in order to assure the optimum use and allocation of resources. 
The accomplishment of these goals entails not only wise planning and strategy 
setting, but also structural and organisational changes aimed at encouraging trust, 
reliance, cooperation, and interdependence in the society. The strong academic 
research base of the country supports institutional cooperation and restructuring of 
R&D activities.  
 
The peculiar conditions that are connected to its political and socio-economic 
structure make Israel a unique example in relation to country case studies. The catch 
up process and its continuing economic development have been influenced by these 
peculiar conditions. The catch-up process in Israel has been characterised by the 
presence of a strong human capital base and an aggressive commitment to science 
and technology and entrepreneurship. The existence of a strong patent regime, and 
IPRs protection more broadly, has played an essential role throughout the catch-up 
process.  
 
Establishing a domestic self-sufficiency in pharmaceuticals was one of the catch-up 
goals of the country. Thus, the pharmaceutical catch-up process in Israel was 
structured around a properly tailored patent regime. Due to the different patterns of 
pharmaceutical innovation, a different route has generally been taken in order to 
develop local capacities, skills and expertise. The modification of strong patent 
regime as a response to local settings and priorities has accelerated the process of 
scientific and technological catching up. It has turned the country into an innovation 
hub.  
 
The conflicting interests of the local industry and multinationals require maintaining 
balance between local needs and international commitments. This setting may 
provide a further reference for other developing countries. Many developing 
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countries are in ongoing process of strengthening their patent regime. In an effort to 
provide an informative framework, the next chapter accommodates a case study of 
Teva as representative example of the Israeli pharmaceutical industry. It aims to 
provide a clear insight in relation to facts and circumstances associated with the 
company’s business strategy. It does this in order to determine the optimal strategic 
choices that can be made in order to boost pharmaceutical innovation. A number of 
distinctive patterns will also be identified in order provide guidance to governments 
in developing countries.  
	  
VI.VI. Conclusion 
 
With the exception of Israel, the countries subjected to the case study examination 
herein are the most commonly surveyed countries. The case of the US is enormously 
scaled. It is particularly noteworthy for the legal framework within which the 
innovation system is embedded. It is also notable for the high level of interaction 
between the key sectors – industry, university and government. Another 
distinguishing characteristic of the US system is the strength of the IPRs in general, 
and the patent regime in particular. The case of Japan represents a very good 
example of a strong determination to catch up with more technologically advanced 
nations. Japanese success in this area is relatively attributed to the latecomer 
advantage and to government policies. The patent regime was revised several times 
in order to accommodate the changing needs of the national industry. Nonetheless, 
the Japanese national innovation system has been strongly challenged in recent years 
for becoming rigid in the context of technological and organisational change. South 
Korea has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in the region. This has 
transformed Korea into a newly industrialised country in Asia, as one of the so-
called Asian tigers. The Korean experience is often referred to as Japan 2.0. In fact, 
the Korean system developed in parallel fashion to the Japanese system. 
Nevertheless, the Korean pharmaceutical industry was not so fortunate. In Korea, the 
pharmaceutical product patents were introduced much earlier than Japan, at a time 
when Korean firms were still in process of capacity building. Nevertheless, the 
Korean vaccine story provides evidence that capacity building in pharmaceuticals is 
possible through various channels other than mere imitation. 
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On the other hand, the Israeli case study is of crucial importance, both for guidance 
for other national innovation systems and for local pharmaceutical industries in 
developing countries. Over the past decade, Israel has become the preeminent 
technological powerhouse in the ICT and life sciences. So far, there has been little 
literature on the Israeli national innovation system. Teva is the biggest generic 
multinational pharmaceutical company in the world. Although the Israeli innovation 
experience is completely different to the other countries, in terms of unique 
characteristics of the country, there are still several valuable lessons that can be 
drawn. These lessons involve the importance of strategic protection of IPRs, 
prioritising local capacity building, facilitating an innovation culture and providing 
financial support for innovation in the country. Above all, the case study of the 
Israeli national innovation system revealed that the Israeli local pharmaceutical 
industry requires close examination in order to determine the process through which 
technical advance proceeds. This includes analysis of the key policies, regulative 
laws and the institutional actors. Hence, in order to generate a global approach that is 
potentially applicable to the whole of the extended industry, the next chapter follows 
a case-study design, with in depth-analysis of Teva.   
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VII. A REAL LIFE COMPANY CASE STUDY;                                               
TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS LTD. & ITS DISTINCTIVE TRAJECTORIES 
 
VII.I. Introduction 
 
Following the enactment of TRIPS, the evidence presented from the experiences of 
local pharmaceutical industries in developing countries (hereinafter referred as local 
pharmaceutical industry) strongly suggests that there has been a dramatic change in 
the business climate. Historically, the traditional business model of the local 
pharmaceutical industry was based on reverse engineering. The process of 
globalisation and the emergence of a rules-based multilateral trading system, 
however, require a new, feasible model, which takes account of the particular 
circumstances of the global marketplace. As the current patent regime brings new 
challenges for developing countries, this raises a need for the local pharmaceutical 
industries to reappraise their traditional business strategy. Moreover, a move towards 
a new business strategy, one that includes the built in elements of R&D and drug 
development, is widely seen as necessary. However, the lack of (or very limited) 
expertise, in managing innovation and in driving and sustaining market growth, 
poses a major challenge for the local pharmaceutical industry in the post-TRIPS era. 
Specifically, in the light of previous discussions, the question arises whether the local 
pharmaceutical industry should be acting as collaborative partners for multinationals, 
or whether these local industries should create their own competitive market? This 
question has yet to be resolved. 
 
Hence, there is currently a great deal of uncertainly regarding the current and future 
business prospects of the local pharmaceutical industry. The local pharmaceutical 
industry in developing countries now face a strategic choice of to compete or to co-
operate.624 The future of pharmaceutical innovation in these countries will  depend 
upon the choice of path they take.  Both of the strategies outlined here bring potential 
                                                       
624 GRACE C.: “ The Effect of Changing Intellectual Property on Pharmaceutical Industry Prospects 
in India and China; Considerations for Access to Medicines”, DFID Health Systems Resource Centre, 
2004, p.19 
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challenges and opportunities for the industry. However, the growth of the industry in 
the years to come depends upon the investment made now by the companies. The 
presence of government policies supporting innovation and funding R&D could also 
prove to be crucial. 
	  
One strategy has the goal of building technological capabilities, in order to compete 
with multinational drug companies. This strategy is strikingly different from a 
business as usual mindset. There are several important aspects of this strategy, which 
are outlined here. As part of this strategy, it would be necessary to adjust the scope of 
business diversification, to evaluate company goals, as furthermore, to provide a 
strategy for developing lower risk in new drug applications and follow-on biologics. 
It would also be necessary to invest in R&D for drug development, to develop 
strategies for patent challenges and to strengthen legal expertise on patented 
molecules.  
 
On the other hand, a successful strategy, aimed at the goal of co-operation with 
multinationals, would entail different elements. This strategy would require the 
establishment of partnerships with multinationals for their sale channels. It would 
also be necessary to provide contract manufacturing and clinical outsourcing for 
multinationals, and to supply the relevant active pharmaceutical ingredients625 
(API).626 
 
For instance, in another piece of research, investigating the encouragement of 
pharmaceutical R&D in developing countries, prepared for the International 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), it was stated that 
the development of an R&D based industry in developing countries is structured 
around three types of company; a company with a research based multinational 
                                                       
625 Active pharmaceutical ingredients are also known in regulatory pharmacopeial parlance as “ Drug 
Substance”. The use of the API is to produce a drug product, which is the final form of the drug 
substance administered to patients. The ultimate safety & efficacy of the finally administered drug 
product are dependent on assurance of the consistency of the physical and chemical properties of the 
API. See, SHARGEL L & KANFER I.: Generic drug product development: solid oral dosage forms, 
Dekker, New York, 2005, pp.17- 30 
626 See, GRACE, supra note 623 
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approach, a company with biotech approach and a generic company with a R&D 
approach.627  
 
The first type of company fits the description of a co-operating company, for which 
FDI plays an important role as it relies heavily on technology transfer capacities 
from multinationals. In this scenario, the local companies are generally expected to 
team up with multinationals to develop local R&D facilities.  
 
The second group targets biotech start-ups. These companies require considerable 
investment in biotechnological R&D through the provision of government funds for 
academic research programs etc. Investing in biotechnology is traditionally regarded 
as a high-risk business and the biotech companies are usually considered as ‘high 
risk high-reward type’ companies. Nevertheless, the evidence from the earlier 
chapters clearly suggests that investing in biotechnology is most likely to prove to be 
highly beneficial for developing countries as biotechnology is widely hailed as the 
future direction of pharmaceutical innovation628. It is highly probable that the 
countries and companies that invest in biotechnology today will be the successful 
gamblers of the future.  
 
The last type of the company embodies generic companies in developing countries. 
These companies are gradually initiating and extending R&D activities and pouring 
an increasing proportion of their overall turnover into the discovery of new 
therapeutic options. This type fits very well with the concept of a competing business 
strategy developed for generic companies. 
 
In the light of the observations made above, it might be assumed that the particular 
case of Teva presents very good example of a competing business strategy 
combining the second and third type of business models developed in the IFPMA 
research.  
 
                                                       
627 IFPMA, “Encouraging Pharmaceutical R&D in Developing Countries” IFPMA Publication, 
February 2003 
628 For more information, GASSMAN, supra note 104. 
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Teva achieved a milestone in the history of the generic drug industry, when in 2005 
it moved in to the top 20 pharmaceutical companies in the world, with revenues of 
more than $5 billion.629 Although Teva’s business strategy generally focuses on 
manufacture of generic drugs, the company has also managed to develop 
breakthrough ethical drugs. For example, Teva’s first innovative drug Copaxone, 
which brings in nearly 30% of the company’s revenues, is the fruit of ten years’ 
intensive research and tremendous investment. It was developed for the treatment of 
multiple sclerosis, and was launched in the late 1990s.  Apart from being the first 
generic company to develop an innovative drug, Teva represents an example of good 
practice for the local pharmaceutical industry in developing countries. As such, a 
number of subtle lessons can be drawn from Teva’s competing business strategy.  
 
Thus, this chapter throws a spotlight on Teva630 and its successful business strategies. 
The following section carefully analyses the facts and circumstances associated with 
Teva’s business strategy in order to determine how a particular strategic choice i.e. 
competing, could be realised effectively. In the context of the success of Teva, the 
following section further examines in detail: i) developing understanding and 
technical expertise in patents and patent regime, ii) establishing an R&D strategy, iii) 
developing sustainable business strategy for biotechnology. 
	  
VII.II.  A Spotlight On Teva Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
 
To find out what lies beneath Teva’s success, it is necessary to go back to the early 
20th century. At a time when drugs were loaded onto the backs of camels and 
donkeys for delivery to customers throughout the land, a small wholesale drug 
business was founded in Jerusalem to distribute imported drugs. Furthermore, the 
late 1930s witnessed Jewish immigration from Central Europe. Some of the 
immigrants were scientists, chemists and technicians. In particular, the immigrants 
from Germany, which dominated the pharmaceutical industry in those years, brought 
with them the know-how and expertise that would prove to be crucial for the 
building up of local capacities and technologies necessary for the success of the 
                                                       
629 Biotechnology Israel, Special Report, Nature Biotechnology, V.24, N.4, 2006, p.4 
630 See, www.tevapharm.com 
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Israeli drug industry. Recognising the value of the knowledge brought from Germany 
as well as the future potential of the drug industry in Israel, Teva quickly established 
its first local pharmaceutical plants in Israel.  
 
During the years of the WWI, Teva emerged as the only drug supplier in the region. 
In the years following the Second World War, the Israeli state was established and 
this attracted highly qualified immigrants from all around the world. Taking into 
account the growing local market and the presence of highly qualified human capital 
in the country, it is relatively easy to see the reasons why Teva has grown into an 
industry leader. The presence of both highly qualified human capital and a leadership 
position in the market allowed the company to grow and expand into export markets. 
Moreover, Teva forged ahead with its business model, which included undertaking 
mergers and acquisitions in the local market to boost its production capacity.  
 
It is well known that a strong API backbone constitutes one of the key elements of a 
successful generic business model. Most of the API suppliers are based at low cost 
manufacturing locations and usually they are not involved in the drug production 
business. Nevertheless, Teva presents a good example of a company that has 
successfully built up a strong API backbone through acquisitions and backward 
vertical integrations.631 The acquisition of two big competitors in Israel, Ikapharm 
and Plantex, enabled the company to strengthen its position in the market. In this 
way, Teva began to vertically integrate into the API production business. In the 
meantime, the company started to export drugs to a number of African countries like 
Nigeria and Uganda.  
 
 During the 1980s, Teva began to expand its business further. As noted here, this led 
the company to grow outside the borders of Israel and become a generic drug name 
across the world. In 1984, the US Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act, which 
facilitated and accelerated the entry of generic drugs into the US market. The 
intention of the law was to actively promote generic competition in the US market by 
allowing generic companies to submit an application for a generic version of a drug 
                                                       
631 See,” Increasing M&A Activity in the Generics Industry: What happens next?”, Sci. Tech.Trade 
Newsletters, June 26, 2008, available at http://scicasts.com/analysis/1826-bio-it-a-
biotechnology/1960-increasing-maa-activity-in-the-generics-industry-what-happens-next, 
(21.12.2009) 
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that demonstrates bioequivalence. The Hatch Waxman Act therefore created a huge 
market for generic medicines. The management of Teva was quick to attempt to take 
advantage of this, and Teva entered the US pharmaceutical market at this time.  
 
Taking into account the risks of entry into a new market, Teva adopted a business 
strategy based on a ‘think global-act local’ philosophy. In order to provide a smooth 
entry into the US market, and to gain awareness of what was happening on the other 
side of the Atlantic i.e. which skills, services and expertise were in demand in the 
highly competitive and demanding US pharmaceutical market, it matched up with a 
US chemical conglomerate - W.R. Grace. A joint company was set up between Teva 
and W.R. Grace; Teva brought its know-how and expertise, and W.R. Grace 
contributed almost 90% of the capital.  The joint venture company acquired 
Lemmon, a small generic manufacturer in Pennsylvania, which sold and distributed 
generic drugs manufactured in Israel. This proved to be a sound business decision 
and Teva did not have to wait long to collect the fruits of its investment.632 
Regardless of the fact that Lemmon had just started marketing a mere seven generic 
medicines of branded drugs, the sales went up to $ 40 million in 1987 from $ 17 
million at the time of its acquisition.633 
 
Furthermore, the 1990s witnessed Teva’s continued rise in the global generic market. 
At this time, Teva continued to make aggressive investments in both the areas of 
merger and acquisitions and R&D, as well as increasing its own production capacity. 
The acquisition of pharmaceutical companies in the US, followed by the acquisitions 
in Europe, subsequently, the company’s business further expanded to France, Italy, 
United Kingdom and Hungary. 
 
Thus, the 1990s proved to be a crucial decade for Teva. The incomes from the US 
market reached triple figures [in millions], which enabled Teva to pour millions into 
research and development initiatives.  
 
                                                       
632 Teva bought out of W.R. Grace's interest in the joint venture following by the acquisition of 
Biocraft in 1990s. 
633 See, A Report on Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Funding Universe, available at 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Teva-Pharmaceutical-Industries-Ltd-Company-
History.html, (21.12.2009) 
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The following case studies of two successfully launched propriety drugs of Teva 
reveal Teva’s innovative approach to drug discovery. Furthermore, it is important to 
note some of the successful business practices that Teva followed during the course 
of drug development over the past 20 years. This is because the leap from copy to 
innovate  requires a deep understanding of key aspects of the drug development 
process, and this process is outlined here. Furthermore, it is suggested here that the 
exploration of the development history of both Copaxone and Azilect, as described 
below, illustrates a number of principles of good practices. These good practices may 
provide inspiration and motivation for local pharmaceutical industries in the 
developing world. 
	  
VII.II.I. Copaxone : Innovation Made In Rehovot 
 
Teva’s first innovative drug was launched in April 1997 as the first drug developed 
specifically to treat multiple sclerosis. Given the fact that multiple sclerosis has not 
been the focus of significant R&D, as there were too few patients to amortise the 
development costs, the development of Copaxone has been an important 
breakthrough for multiple sclerosis sufferers.  
 
Copaxone became the flagship drug for Teva. Even today, Copaxone is one of the 
key revenue drivers in Teva’s product profitability; it has close to a 30% global 
marketshare. Furthermore, according to the statistics from the third quarter of 2009, 
in-market sales continue to increase year-after-year and are now at approximately 
53% - sales now amount to $540 million in the US market.634 Copaxone accounted 
for 17% of Teva's total 2006 sales of $8.41 billion.635 
 
Historically, Teva’s R&D initiatives for drug development were concentrated in the 
therapeutic areas of neurological disorder. Nevertheless, the drug development story 
of Copaxone starts long before Teva’s involvement; After 15 years of isolation and 
                                                       
634 See, Teva, In Turnabout, Sues to Protect Its Multiple Sclerosis Drug Copaxone, available at 
http://industry.bnet.com/pharma/10005164/teva-in-turnabout-sues-to-protect-its-multiple-sclerosis-
drug-copaxone/, (22.12.2009) 
635See, Teva may face generic rival to Copaxone, available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/teva-may-face-generic-rival-to-ms-drug-copaxone, (22.12.2009) 
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research, researchers at the Weizmann Research Institute realised that they had 
produced a drug candidate that reduced the relapse rate for people in the early stages 
of multiple sclerosis 25% to 30% in clinical trials.636  
 
Following this discovery, the existence of strong, established links with university 
research institutions enabled Teva to team up with the Weizmann Institute and turn 
the academic research into a blockbuster drug. Although Teva was involved the drug 
development process only in the last decade of the research after ensuring necessary 
funds from the Israeli State, it committed a substantial amount of the funds and staff 
in order to take the development of Copolymer 1 further and to perform the Phase III 
clinical trials. Hence, it can be said that Teva provided the necessary resources that 
were required to complete both the chemical manufacturing process as well as the 
clinical trial process. The story of Copaxone illustrates a successful example of 
university-industry collaboration. Thus, it is can be suggested that Teva’s strategic 
utilisation of academic research provides an important example for the local 
pharmaceutical industry to follow. 
 
As the first Copaxone patent637 had expired during the three decades of its long 
development process, Teva made an application for orphan designation to adopt 
‘orphan drug638’ for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. It was granted seven years of 
market exclusivity639, which expired in 2003. Nonetheless, the other patents on the 
drug, which are exceptionally similar to the initial patent and mainly included 
improved compositions of Copolymer-1640, were due to expire by 2014 and 2015.641 
                                                       
636See, SCHEINDLIN S.: “COPOLYMER 1: An Off-Beat Drug Development Story”, Reflections; 
Science in the cultural context, V.4, I.1, 2004 
637 The first Copaxone patent (U.S. Pat. No. 3,849,550) which is filed in 1974, relates to component of 
Copolymer-1 637 as a potential therapeutic agent for MS.  
638 A drug designed to treat or prevent a disease, which has not been "adopted" by the pharmaceutical 
industry because it provides little financial incentive for the private sector to make and market new 
medications to treat or prevent it. See, Medical dictionary,available at www.medicinenet.com, 
(22.12.2009) 
639 After obtaining marketing approval by the FDA for a designated orphan drug, a sponsor has seven 
years of marketing exclusivity for that product. Marketing exclusivity may be the most motivating 
incentive provided by the Act. The FDA cannot approve the same drug made by another manufacturer 
for the same indication during the marketing exclusivity period unless it has the consent of the 
sponsor or the sponsor is unable to provide sufficient quantities. See, VILLAREAL M.A.: “Orphan 
Drug Act: Background and Proposed Legislation in the 107th Congress”, CRS Report, 2001 
640 US Patent No.5981589, US Patent No.6054430 , US Patent No. 6342476, US Patent No. 
63632161, US Patent No. 6620847, US Patent No. 6939539, US Patent No. 7199098 
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When these patents expire, Copaxone is very likely to face serious generic 
competition. As a matter of fact, in October 2009, Teva filed a lawsuit against Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Natco Pharma Ltd. for patent infringement in the US 
District Court for the abbreviated new drug application.642 
 
As noted above, following the launch of Copaxone, a new era started for Teva and it 
became a rising star in the dynamic world medical drug market.643 The company 
took an inorganic route towards expansion in the global market. However, the 
company has continued to expand rapidly, primarily through mergers and 
acquisitions. Hence, the first decade of the 21st century has seen a variety of 
acquisitions and strategic alliances. The existence of these alliances has undoubtedly 
been a characteristic of Teva’s business strategy. These alliances furnished Teva with 
bio-generic capabilities and the alliances further provided Teva with access to 
important drug delivery technologies. This in turn, strengthened its position in API 
manufacturing. Among all Teva’s acquisitions in the last ten years, the acquisition of 
Barr Pharmaceuticals644, one of the world’s largest generic companies, was 
undoubtedly the most significant. It enhanced Teva's leadership position in the US 
and significantly consolidated its position in key European markets. Eventually, Teva 
became the world’s largest generic company and ranked among the top 20 
pharmaceutical companies in the world. 
	  
                                                                                                                                                           
641 See, “Teva Increases Generics Leadership Worldwide with Unexpected Acquisition of Barr 
Pharmaceuticals”, IHS Global Insight, 21. 07.08, available at 
http://www.ihsglobalinsight.com/SDA/SDADetail13398.htm, (23.12.2009) 
642 Teva is committed to vigorously defending its COPAXONE® intellectual property rights against 
infringement wherever they are challenged and intends to pursue all relevant regulatory avenues via 
the FDA. See, Press Release from Teva Pharmaceuticals dated 16 October 2009, (available at 
http://www.tevapharm.com/pr/2009/pr_876.asp) 
643 In 1997, US. brokerage organization, Gronthal, has published a strong buy rating for the Teva 
Pharmaceuticals share saying; “We believe that, currently, Teva should be seen as a rising star in the 
dynamic world medical drug market,",available at http://www.allbusiness.com/medicine-
health/diseases-disorders-neurological/7478008-1.html, (23.12.2009) 
644 Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., was a global specialty pharmaceutical company that operated in more 
than 30 countries worldwide. Barr was engaged in the development, manufacture and marketing of 
generic and proprietary pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients. 
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VII.II.II. Azilect – Like Moses In Desert645 
 
It widely acknowledged that there is a lack of R&D in relation to addressing the 
diseases of the aged, such as Alzheimer and Parkinson’s.646 The number of adequate 
medicines that are developed to fight such diseases is miniscule.647 Hence it can be 
said that the pharmaceutical industry is facing serious limitations as regards to 
efficiency, dosage or presentation form, as well as side effects. For these reasons, the 
discovery of the active ingredient rasagiline mesilate brought new hope to people 
living with Parkinson’s disease.   
 
Azilect’s history, from initial discovery to pharmacy shelves, goes back thirty years. 
As is the case in most of the drug development stories, Prof Youdim- the inventor- 
encountered an effective drug with serious side effects while he was investigating 
existing drugs against depression. The drug candidate, then, proved to have positive 
effects against Parkinson’s.  When he moved to Israel to found the pharmacology 
department at the Technion, he thought he was on a real adventure because he was 
‘creating a pharmacology department in a country with no real pharmaceutical 
companies.648’  He first approached Teva in 1979 in order to transform his initial 
discovery to a drug for Parkinson’s treatment. Given Teva’s particular financial 
circumstances, and its strategic goals as a generic company up to that time, getting 
into the drug development business did not seem like a realistic option. Thus, they 
turned down to him.649  
 
However, not long after Prof Youdim had been turned down, Teva’s business started 
to grow rapidly in the US market and revenues from generic sales were going up 
year-after-year. Hence, the company’s business strategy began to change. Teva was 
now willing to invest in drug development. Thus, Teva approached the Technion 
                                                       
645“I really believed in Azilect, I was like Moses in the desert - everyone had given up on these type of 
drugs, I kept at it and we did a lot of work on it.” Professor Moussa Youdim, Technion See. “Azilect - 
the one-a-day Parkinson's pill”, June 04, 2006, Israel21c: Innovation News Service, available at 
http://www.israel21c.org/health/azilect-the-one-a-day-parkinson-s-pill 
646 See, IFPMA report, supra note 626, p.8 ; 
647See, Ibid, Love J.: “An Agenda for Research and Development”, Meeting on The Role of Generics 
and Local Industry in Attaining the Millennium Development Goals in Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines, 
The World Bank, Washington DC. June 24-25, 2003, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rndtf/ (25.12.2009) 
648 Supra note 646 
649 Id. 
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with the aim of co-operating in order to create a drug for the treatment of 
Parkinson’s. At this time, Rasagiline was a mere compound and hence it can be said 
that this ‘was the earliest stage that Teva has ever begun a collaboration to develop a 
drug from an existing compound’.650  
 
The hard work and dedication by Teva and Techion gave its fruits after 20 years 
when Azilect was released onto the market. It represents a milestone in the treatment 
of Parkinson’s disease as it can be used both in the early stage of the disease and in 
moderate-to-advanced stages of the disease. Furthermore, the clinical studies 
demonstrated that it has positive effects on slowing the clinical progression of 
Parkinson’s. 
 
Teva has great expectations that Azilect will continue to be a success. In the wake of 
sales in last couple of years, the current success of the drug suggests that Azilect will 
become as essential for the treatment of Parkinson's as Copaxone has become for the 
treatment of multiple sclerosis.651 
VII.II.III. Future Prospects 
 
The future plans and goals of Teva are ambitious, but not unachievable. For instance, 
the growth strategy for the years 2008-2012 aims to double the business, reach 
revenues of $20 billion and exceed net income margins of 20% by 2012. Indeed, the 
analysts presume that branded-product sales will account for 35% of Teva’s revenue 
by 2013, more than double the 16% in 2007.652 The key pillars of the strategy 
include investment in the next wave of technology and generics, creating affordable 
biogenerics at a lower cost - greater value base, focusing on niche specialty areas, 
leveraging unique sourcing, as well as development and go-to-market approaches.  
The company’s balanced business model is fully committed to global generics 
                                                       
650” Technion Research Helps Those With Neurodegenerative Diseases”, American Technion Society, 
available at http://www.ats.org/site/PageServer?pagename=about_parkinsons, (25.12.2009) 
651 See, Azilect- Innovative Drug; Teva Pharmaceuticals, available at 
http://www.tevapharm.com/Azilect/ 
652 See, “Teva Seeks Deals to Deepen Branded Business in ‘Niche’ Diseases”, 23 February 2009, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601202&sid=aQhXH2ygDnlk, 
(26.12.2009) 
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leadership653 and there is no prospect of adopting a business model solely focusing 
on proprietary drugs in the future.  
	  
VII.III. Distinctive Trajectories In The Teva’s Case Study 
 
Recalling the concept of the competing business strategy referred to above, a 
company pursuing an innovation strategy for R&D should take into account 
particular issues. Within the context of this thesis, these issues could be identified as 
1) developing technical expertise in patent law and patented molecules 2) investing 
in R&D 3) establishing strong links with academia and managing complex cross-
disciplinary research projects 4) developing sustainable business strategies for 
biotechnology.  
 
For a comprehensive understanding of those strategies, one has to present real-life 
observations in order to illustrate considerations and policy implications for local 
pharmaceutical companies in the developing world. For instance, in order to outline 
the paradigm case of a generic company, which aims to move upstream and invest in 
R&D, one needs look no further than Teva Pharmaceuticals. Indeed, taking a close 
look at Teva’s case reveals the business model that embodies the strategies that will 
enhance competitivity in the global pharmaceutical market. Thus, the following 
study aims to explore each of those issues in the context of Teva’s innovation 
strategy.  
	  
VII.III.I. Developing Understanding And Technical Expertise In Patents And 
The Patent Regime 
 
There is no doubt that one of the key factors behind Teva’s success is its technical 
expertise in patents and the patent regime. A careful analysis of the company’s 
                                                       
653 “Teva’s Growth Strategy 2008-2012”, Sholomo Yanai, President and CEO, Teva Pharmaceutical 
Industries Ltd., 21 February 2008, available at 
www.tevapharm.com/pdf/Presentation21.02.08.pdf, (26.12.2009) 
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growth route and its development throughout the years reveals that the company has 
always taken advantage of the patent regime in place at the time. 
 
The transformation of Teva from small wholesale drug company to Israel’s biggest 
generic company took place during the second half of 20th century, in between the 
last two quarters. Under the current Israeli Patent Act enacted in 1967, patents are 
granted for any invention, whether product or processes, in any technological field 
which are new, non-obvious and susceptible of industrial use. The Israeli patent 
regime does not discriminate against fields of technology. Nor does the patent 
regime specifically forbid issuance of patents on the basis of product or process 
inventions. Put differently, patents have been available for pharmaceutical products 
and processes in Israel since 1967.  This is a significant point to consider because the 
lack of patentability or flexible application of patentability criteria is often regarded 
as the most important factor underlying the substantial growth of the pharmaceutical 
industry, and particularly the generic industry, in the developing world. As you 
would recall, earlier chapters ascertained that the pharmaceutical companies in 
certain countries like India, China, Brazil, Turkey etc. became strong competitors in 
the international pharmaceutical market as a result of domestic patent policies. Thus, 
the patent regime of TRIPS, and the non-discrimination clause in particular, received 
considerable critical attention from those countries. Eventually, the pharmaceutical 
industry in those countries started to face the consequences of the dramatic post-
TRIPS era.  
 
So the question arises; how did a company such as Teva manage to expand and grow 
as a business in a legal environment where patents were available for 
pharmaceuticals? The answer largely depends on a discussion of how the patent 
regime should be employed so that it can best serve the interest of the local industry. 
 
VII.III.I.I. Compulsory Licences  
 
Even though Teva’s development into a big pharmaceutical giant is frequently 
referred to solely in relation to the Arab boycott, it should be noted that Teva owes 
only a small part of its existence to the Arab boycott of companies doing business 
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with Israel. As a matter of fact, a large part of Teva’s success depends upon the 
compulsory licensing provisions of Israeli Patent Act.  
 
The Arab boycott between 1948 and 1990 cut Israelis from many Western products, 
especially from pharmaceuticals. Nevertheless, Israel fought back to the Arab league 
boycott by patent law654 in order to fill the shortage of the medicines.  In fact, the 
Israeli Patent Act was enacted in 1967 during the Arab boycott. The 1967 Act 
included highly controversial and flexible provisions, especially on compulsory 
licensing. For instance, it was possible to establish compulsory licences in Israel on 
the basis of lack or insufficient working of a patented invention. In the case of non-
working patented medical invention655, compulsory licences could be granted at any 
time after the patent is granted.  
 
Indeed, the compulsory licencing provisions in the Paris Convention stem from the 
obligation to work a patent in the country; hence the legal institution of ‘compulsory 
licences was adopted as to ensure the exploitation of a patent. As such, compulsory 
licences were established for lack of or insufficient working in a large number of 
countries following the Paris Convention.656 
 
In this context, compulsory licences were considered to be a strategic weapon for 
local generic companies in Israel. Due to the flexible provisions in Israeli Patent Act 
at that time, the proceedings were regarded as little more than a mere formality by 
the patent office. In the event where there was no massive local manufacturing of the 
patent, local generic companies were granted licence in all cases.657  
 
                                                       
654 “ An Israeli Giant In Generic Drugs Faces New Rivals, Arab Boycott Gave Teva Edge; Now It's 
No. 1 in Industry, But U.S. Market Toughens An Army Colonel and CEO”, The Wall Street Journal, 
28 October 2004, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB109890935431257528.html#articleTabs%3Darticle, 
(25.12.2009) 
655 “1. A substance capable of being used as a medicine or in the production thereof; 2. a process for 
producing the substance set forth in (1) supra; and 3. any device usable for medical purposes”: 
JULIAN-ARNOLD G.: “International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales And The Reality” , 
JLAT, V.33, I.2, 1993; COHN C.: “Compulsory licensing in Israel under pharmaceutical patents--a 
political issue?”, Patent World, 1990, V.27, I.22 
656 See, CORREA C. M.: “Intellectual Property Rights And The Use Of Compulsory Licences: 
Options For Developing Countries”, Geneva, South Centre, 1999 
657 LUZZATTO K.: “ Pharmaceutical Patents in Israel’, available at 
www.luzzatto.com/articles/11.12.08(7).pdf , (25.09.2010) 
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Nevertheless, contrary to general belief, the number of compulsory licences granted 
in Israel at that time remained low. However, the generic companies were able to use 
the Act’s provisions on compulsory licences as a threat to obtain voluntary licences 
in order to manufacture generic versions of patented drugs.  
 
As Ladas puts it, the practical value of the existence of compulsory licence 
provisions in the patent law is that the threat of it usually induces the grant of 
contractual licences on reasonable terms, and thus the objective of actually working 
the invention is accomplished.658 In fact, as in the case of Israel, the threat thereof 
increased the willingness of patent owners to grant a contractual licence on 
reasonable terms to local generic companies.  
	  
According to Cohn, the importance of compulsory licences from the point of view of 
the Israel pharmaceutical industry considerably exceeds the results achieved in a 
restricted number of decided cases, important, as they may have been. He notes that 
it is extremely difficult to arrive at the relevant facts, but nevertheless it could be safe 
to say that the very existence of compulsory licence provisions as statutory 
provisions, and the demonstration by a relatively small number of decided cases that 
under the right circumstances those provisions were applied, induced foreign patent 
owners to find ways for granting licences without the need for a compulsory 
licence.659  
 
Teva, as a still-young company solely focused on building technological capabilities 
and expertise for drug development took full advantage of the vitality of the system 
to get exclusive licences from multinational pharmaceuticals companies. Eventually, 
Teva started to manufacture and market ethical drugs for companies like Pfzer, 
Merck and Novartis. More importantly, Teva benefited from voluntary licences in 
the sense of exploitation of pharmaceutical products, technology transfer and 
building domestic technological capabilities in drug development. Unlike other 
generic companies in developing countries, in a legal environment where 
pharmaceuticals were susceptible of patent protection, voluntary licences were 
                                                       
658 LADAS S: Patents, trademarks and related rights - National and International protection, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1975, p.427 
659 COHN, supra note 655, p.25 
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Teva’s only option to learn by imitating and building up capabilities for generic drug 
manufacturing. Moreover, the relevant profit margins of the multinationals were 
arguably at a reasonable level due to the fact that Teva paid significant royalties. 
Hence, it can be said that it was a win-win situation for both of the parties. 
 
Nevertheless, the Israeli approach to compulsory licences had been subject to 
considerable criticism from multinational pharmaceutical companies for creating a 
bias in favour of the local industry. In line with this criticism, in 1995, the District 
Court of Tel Aviv reinterpreted the application process for compulsory licences, and 
took a more restrictive approach. The court held that evidence showing the existence 
of an actual shortage of the drug should be included as part of the application 
process.660 Not long after this decision, in 2000, TRIPS was implemented in Israel 
and the TRIPS-compliant compulsory licence provisions were adopted. 
	  
In reality, neither the holding of the District Court nor the coming into force of the 
TRIPS-compliant compulsory licence regime affected Teva’s business substantially. 
By then, Teva had already become competitive in the production of generic drugs at 
global level. Furthermore, by this time Teva had already built up excellent facilities 
and it had also established strong alliances in the areas of drug development and 
manufacturing.  Nonetheless, the existence of the compulsory licence system allowed 
Teva to build up its expertise in drug manufacturing and development. This in turn 
helped Teva to transform into an international pharmaceutical giant, which competes 
globally both in generic and proprietary drug markets. The case of Teva, described 
above, is broadly comparable with the case of a number of companies, which 
operated within the German dye industry during the early 1900s.  Despite the late 
start, the German companies quickly developed the institutions and techniques 
essential for global competitiveness in the dye sector. The principle reason for the 
success of the German dye industry at this time provides for an interesting 
comparison with the case of Teva. Within Germany, dye companies took advantage 
of the lack of patentability for chemical products. In a similar vein, many of the 
German companies built up their own capabilities by free riding on foreign 
                                                       
660 PROZAC case, See, LUZZATTO, supra note 657 
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technologies.661 As the industry matured and built its technological capabilities, 
patents were introduced to the industry.   
 
The vital role the existence of compulsory licences played in Teva’s development 
supports the argument that compulsory licences should be adopted as ‘a tool that 
may be useful in a variety of circumstances in order to mitigate the restrictive effect 
of exclusive rights and strike a balance between the title-holders' interests and those 
of the public in the diffusion of knowledge and the access to, and affordability of the 
outcomes of, innovation and creativity.662’ Furthermore, it illustrates that the legal 
institution of compulsory licences may also serve as an effective tool for technology 
transfer, growth of the local industry and the promotion of innovation in there.  
	  
VII.III.I.II. Active Involvement In Judicial Process  
 
Patent disputes between ethical and generic companies are frequent in Israel. As a 
result, the generic companies often retaliate by challenging patents, with some 
success. 
 
In line with this, Drahos stresses the importance of patent litigation as a regulatory 
tool for pharmaceutical patents. Nonetheless, it is regarded as a viable option only in 
very few countries. The viability of litigation depends upon essential factors such as 
the existence of lucrative pharmaceutical product markets i.e. markets worth 
contesting, Further to this the existence of a strong generic sector and the presence of 
a cultural disposition towards litigation are required. Finally, it is also usually 
necessary that there exist both a profession capable of servicing the litigation and of 
course, litigants with deep pockets. For Drahos, only the US scores well on all of 
these factors and even then, the costs of patent litigation in the US are increasingly 
seen as a problem.663 Indeed, the Orange Book system under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
provides incentives to generic companies to challenge drug patents in the midst of 
                                                       
661 For more information See, BEER J.J.:  The Emergence of German Dye Industry, Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press, 1959   
662 CORREA, supra note 656, p.24 
663 DRAHOS P: “Trust Me: Patent Offices in Developing Countries”, 2007,available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1028676, (23.12.2009) 
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their terms. The generic companies are given the opportunity to challenge a patent 
when they create a generic version of the patented drug that does not infringe, or 
when they establish the patent’s invalidity. The generic company that is first in time 
to challenge the patent, stating either that the patent is invalid, or the generic drug in 
the ANDA does not infringe the patent, is awarded exclusivity, during which no 
other generic company may enter the market, regardless of whether litigation ensues 
thereafter or not.664  It has been noted that the award of a 180-day period of market 
exclusivity was designed to maintain a balance by rewarding generic firms for their 
willingness to challenge unenforceable and invalid innovator patents, or design non-
infringing drug products.665 
 
Subsequently, generic companies have challenged numerous patents over the past 20 
years and these companies have managed to prevail 73% of the time in patent 
suits.666 It is worth noting that without this incentive, some brand companies would 
have engaged in the practice of evergreening patents that would result in lack of 
access to affordable generic medicines for consumers for many years to come.667  
 
Stiglitz approaches the issue from an economic angle, and according to him, the 
asymmetry between granting of a patent and challenging a patent gives rise to a bias 
towards excessive patenting, especially in granting and enforcing patents in the US. 
He ascertains that when a patent is granted, a firm is encroaching upon the commons 
and making private what would otherwise be public. In other words, the firm is 
receiving private return, irrespective of whether the invention in question deserves 
patent recognition or not. On the other hand, when a patent is successfully 
challenged, a public good is created as that piece of knowledge enters the public 
domain, which is universally accessible. For this reason, he considers patent 
challenging to be a public good. He further elaborates that this will lead to an 
                                                       
664 MEHL, supra note 496, pp. 651- 652 
665 64 Fed. Reg. at 42882. The FDA's notice explains that "[t]he Hatch-Waxman Amendments benefit 
consumers by bringing lower priced generic versions of previously approved drugs to market, while 
simultaneously promoting new drug innovation through the restoration of patent life lost during 
regulatory proceedings”, available at  
666 DRAHOS, supra note 662 
667 JAEGER K.: “America's generic pharmaceutical industry: Opportunities and challenges in 2006 
and beyond”, JGE, V.4, 2006, p.18 
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underinvestment in relation to fighting low quality patents, and an overinvestment in 
relation to attaining this kind of patent.668  
 
Stiglitz’s theory appears to accord well with the relevant evidence from recent US 
patent litigation statistics.669 Specifically, the last decade witnessed fierce patent 
battles being fought between multinationals and generic companies in the US; in a 
large part these disputes were driven by the fact of low patent quality. In fact, the 
innovativeness of the industry is highly questionable due to the fact that 
pharmaceutical patent quality has been substantially decreasing in recent years. 
 
According to the National Institutes of Health Care Management, 54% of FDA- 
approved drug applications filed between the period of 1989-2000 were structurally 
very similar to already known drugs, with only minor differences; these are often 
classified as me-too drugs. Further to this, only 238 out of 1035 drugs contained new 
active ingredients and were given priority ratings on the base of their clinical 
performances. Hence, it can be said that from a strictly medical point of view, 77% 
of the new drugs are that the FDA approves can be described as redundant.670 
 
In the research-based pharmaceutical business model noted in previous chapters, 
each additional year of market exclusivity can lead to billions in extra revenue for a 
big pharmaceutical company with a blockbuster drug. Moreover, it is often the case 
that each successive patent application, related to the original invention, aims to 
extend the patent term and thus, market exclusivity. It is therefore becoming a 
common practice within the pharmaceutical industry to file a patent application that 
covers everything from manufacturing processes to new coatings for the drug.671   
 
                                                       
668 STIGLITZ, supra note 329, p.1715 
669 Over the last 20 years, the number of disposed cases more than doubled, from 1,013 in 1986 to 
2,362 in 2004. The rates of adjudication dipped a bit during this time, going from 19% to 14% during 
the same period (settlements went from 81% to 86%). See, JANICKE, P. M & REN L.: “Who Wins 
Patent Infringement Cases?” American Intellectual Property Law Association Quarterly Journal, Vol. 
34, 2006, pp.1-37 
670 BOLDRIN M. & LEVINE D.:  Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2008, p.222 
671 GAWLICKI S.: “IP Litigation Is Virtually Assured For Generic Drug Makers” Intellectual 
Property – a special report from Corporate Legal Times, available at 
www.sutherland.com/files/Publication/.../GenericDrugMakersIP.pdf, (23.12.2009) 
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In this context, patent challenging lies at the core of Teva’s business strategy both for 
the US and Israeli market. It is widely known that Teva has been pursuing an 
aggressive patent litigation strategy in the US in order to take full advantage of the 
180 days exclusivity incentive. Nevertheless, this situation is not unique to the US. 
Patent litigation also acts as a significant regulatory tool for pharmaceutical patents 
in Israel. The generic companies challenge almost every patent application in order 
to prevent the issuance of low quality pharmaceutical patents.  
 
Arguably, the business strategy of the local industry largely depends upon patent 
challenging. Over the years, the local industry has developed advanced knowledge 
about existing patents. This provides the local industry with the skills to challenge 
patents successfully. Furthermore, the local industry possesses technical expertise 
regarding important patent law issues, such as the loopholes in the patent regime, the 
scope of patentability requirements, and the patent claim and continuation limits.672 
This technical expertise in patent law, coupled with market knowledge, provides the 
local industry with a sustainable competitive advantage. 
 
The assessment process for Teva starts when the optimal entry to the market is likely 
to occur. Initially, the patent department assume that all the product’s patents are 
valid. Therefore, they first try to bypass the patent. According to Livneh- head of 
patent counsel-, in order to bypass the patent instead of getting the entire patent 
disqualified, a substitute can be used, for instance, magnesium rather than calcium. 
Nevertheless, he accepts that it is not always possible to bypass the patent, as there 
are different kinds of patents.673 In theory, the generic drugs are considered to be the 
therapeutic equivalent to the proprietary drugs, which have the same amount of 
active ingredient or ingredients, same dosage form as the original formulation and 
same effects with regards to efficiency and safety.674 For Livneh, it is important to 
understand where the patent lies, i.e. is the patent on the active ingredient or the 
formula? This is the point where the patent department comes into play, on the front 
                                                       
672 To file a continuation with new claims on the invention is a common mean to extend the life of an 
existing patent. See, Chapter 2 for the ‘evergreening’ efforts of the pharmaceutical companies. 
673 “Teva’s Patent Marathon Runner”, Globes, 24.04.2008, available at http://www.ivc-
online.com/ivcWeeklyItem.asp?articleID=6969, (24.12.2009) 
674  MARZO A. & BALANT L.P.: “Bioequivalence; An updated reappraisal addressed to applications 
of interchangeable multi-source pharmaceutical products.” Arzneim-Forsch/Drug Res, V.45, 1995, 
pp.109–115. 
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line between science and law. Indeed, in the event that the patent is on the active 
ingredient, he notes that it is very difficult to bypass it; thus challenging patent is 
often seen as the only option. On the other hand, in the case of patents covering the 
formula, involving both an active ingredient and secondary ingredients, they usually 
choose to attack the patent with other secondary ingredients.675 
 
Nonetheless, the patent department at Teva has a twofold role676, firstly, it must aim 
to protect their patents and secondly, it should look for loopholes in other patents, as 
the company has both proprietary and generic products. In fact, Teva must now 
vigorously defend its patents against challenges by other generic companies seeking 
to sell generic versions of Teva’s innovative drugs. It is important to note that Teva’s 
first innovative drug is soon coming off patent and Teva’s fellow generic companies, 
Mylan Inc, the US based generic company, and Natco Pharma Limited, one of the 
leading generic drug companies in India, filed an application to challenge the 
Copaxone patents and make and sell their own version. The FDA has accepted their 
filing for an abbreviated new-drug application for a generic version of Teva’s 
flagship drug.677 Teva remains committed to vigorously defending its IPRs; it has 
already filed a patent infringement suit against Mylan and Natco to stop sales of a 
proposed generic version of the drug.678 There is no doubt that this could prove to be 
an interesting case since it would demonstrate how well Teva can defend its 
proprietary patents before the court.  
                                                       
675 Id. 
676 Indeed, in the annual report of 2000’s fiscal year submitted to the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission reports that the success of Teva’s innovative products depends on the 
effectiveness of the patents owned: 
“Our success with our innovative products depends, in part, on our ability to protect our current and 
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challenged, invalidated or circumvented by competitors. In addition, such patent rights may not 
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functionally equivalent to our products.” 
677 See, “Teva shares off; Mylan files for generic Copaxone”, Marketwatch, 14 September 2009 
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/teva-shares-off-mylan-files-for-generic-
copaxone-2009-09-14, (23.12.2009) 
678 “The other side of the molecule: Teva seeks to protect its patch”, Patlit, 19 October 2009, available 
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It should be noted that Teva is not the only one battling against the multinational 
pharmaceutical companies in Israel. Unipharm679, another local generic company 
from Israel, has also taken many high-profile cases against multinational 
pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, in most of the cases the relevant patents 
were declared void.680 Thus, it may be concluded that the Israeli patent regime 
provides an effective pre-grant avenue for patent oppositions. Yet, it is clear that the 
industry in Israel has been proactive in this area. 
	  
VII.III.I.III. Developing Technical Expertise In Patent Law And Strong 
Lobbying Power 
 
It is important to note that a further reason for the success of Teva is arguably its 
strong lobbying power in Israel. The Israeli patent law is relatively constructed 
according to the interest of the local pharmaceutical industry, which is mainly 
represented by Teva. Considering the fact that the roots of today’s international 
patent regime spring from initiatives created by the so-called Big Pharma in the US, 
it is highly contentious to criticise the Israeli regime for explicitly favouring its local 
industry. Given the fact that Teva is the only company from Israel that currently is on 
the Forbes 100 list, and in light of the fact that Teva has plants and facilities in Israel, 
providing jobs for thousands of people, its contribution to the Israeli economy cannot 
be ignored. Under these conditions, Teva’s local lobbying power, coupled with 
Teva’s advanced knowledge of patent law (including its loopholes), led to the 
creation of a patent regime in Israel that is explicitly favourable to the local industry. 
Recalling the relevant TRIPS-plus provisions of the Israeli Patent Act on data 
                                                       
679 Unipharm Ltd, a generic drug manufacturer based in Tel Aviv, Israel. For more information, 
http://www.unipharm.co.il/page.aspx?PageID=1, (24.12.2009) 
680 Rosiglitazone case illustrates the effective patent litigation strategy adopted by Unipharm. 
Rossiglitazone is active ingredient of an anti-diabetic drug in the thiazolidinedione class of drugs, 
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the relatively gentle borohydride reducing agent on the thiazolidinedione- was inventive step and 
ruled that the correct standard was obvious to try, not obvious to succeed. Thus, the application lacks 
inventive step.  
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exclusivity and patent term extensions, there is still a room for the local industry to 
take advantage of the law.  
	  
In this respect, it is submitted that the Israeli regime can provide an example for 
other developing countries. For instance, the Israeli patent regime has provided for 
patentability of pharmaceuticals from the earliest stages, and it now embodies 
TRIPS-plus standards including data exclusivity and patent term extensions. One 
may argue that it therefore represents a good illustration of a strong patent regime. 
Nevertheless, a close look at provisions of the Patent Act reveals another side to the 
law. As noted above, the patent term extension provision which exists in Israeli law, 
includes certain caps and limitations; it is in principle designed to provide the 
shortest term of protection as possible and this is also the case in relation to the data 
exclusivity provision; what results is a piece of legislation that is potentially 
inefficient.  
 
The provisions in question were drafted in close consultation, and with the active 
involvement of, the local industry. The legislature engaged in intensive interaction 
with all stakeholders, and this dynamic led to a situation where a number of options 
were being explored including economic and social trade-offs for the country and 
local industry. The critical importance of Teva’s contribution in the drafting process 
should not be overlooked or underestimated. No one can ignore the strong lobbying 
power of Teva in Israel, as the country’s flagship company, and this power is 
coupled with an advanced knowledge of patent law and international patent 
standards. Thus, Teva gave a voice to the concerns of the local industry, and the 
latter provisions were established with relatively high input from the company.  
Thus, the outcome operates to the maximum benefit of the country, by providing 
appropriate balance between the right holders and local industry.  
 
It can be noted that Teva’s crucial role in Israeli IP policymaking, in relation to 
pharmaceuticals in particular, presents similarities to the role of Big Pharma in the 
US. Big Pharma is one of the key collaborators in relation to the enactment of IPRs 
strategy in the US, and each year it issues submissions about the IPRs practices in 
countries all around the world, which provides the basis for the Special 301 reports. 
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Teva’s strong lobbying power in Israel, leads to an interesting reversal of roles 
i.e.Teva as acts as PhRMA in Israel. 
 
Israel remains on the Priority Watch List of the USTR Special 301 Report each year, 
since the US often persuasively requests Israel to provide a higher level of protection 
i.e. a level that reflects its status as a partner in the US- Israel FTA and its objective 
of becoming a member of the OECD.681 Specifically, the criticism focuses on the 
claim that Israel does not facilitate sufficient protection as regards patent term 
extensions and data exclusivity. Each year, PhRMA, submits country comparisons 
that ultimately determine the levels of IPRs protection accorded to pharmaceuticals 
in each country. By comparison, each year, Teva is actively involved in the process 
of submissions to the USTR thorough manufacturing associations or the government, 
explaining why Israel should be removed from USTR’s list.  
 
In fact, Teva’s consultative involvement682 in policymaking encourages the patent 
regime to be more industry-centred and economically sustainable, in relation to the 
wider policy framework for innovation and growth. It may present an ideal model for 
the local pharmaceutical industries in countries that are close to completing the 
TRIPS implementation process.  
 
One may conclude that the case of Israel and Teva emerges as a model of good 
practice for developing countries. Such an assumption seems to accord well with the 
evidence from comprehensive studies on the experiences of developing countries683 
regarding the patent regime and local capacity building. This argument is based upon 
the idea that consultative involvement of the local pharmaceutical industry to the 
IPRs policy making is of crucial importance for economic and social development. 
The national IPRs initiatives include new policy rules and instruments establishing a 
framework that is novel to all actors in developing countries including governments, 
industries, academia and the general public. Hence, it can be concluded that an 
                                                       
681 USTR Special 301 Report, 2007 
682 In consultative Involvement, the government and institutions are the decision makers but 
stakeholders have a degree of influence over the process and outcomes 
683 By examining the experiences of India, Cuba, Iran, Taiwan, Egypt and Nigeria, the Mytelka 
concluded that the opening policy space for local firms and creating incentives for local innovation 
might be one of the important triggers that was perceived in driving to subsequent innovation process. 
See, MYTELKA, supra note 380, pp.415-435 
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improved participatory policy regime facilitates a wider policy framework that aligns 
innovation policy actions and prioritises local capacity building. 
	  
VII.III.II. Establishing An R&D Strategy  
 
VII.III.II.I. University- Industry Collaboration 
 
It is widely acknowledged that universities play a major role in the innovation 
process i.e. universities substantially contribute to scientific progress and the 
development of human capital. Hence, collaboration between university and industry 
has become one of the key issues in national innovation policies. In line with this, 
academic research is regarded as an endogenised and integrated part of the economic 
cycle of innovation and growth.684 For developing countries, in relation to the 
building up of capabilities and the development of manufacturing capacity in specific 
areas, the presence of government manufacturing, or public-private partnerships, 
perhaps between some combination of universities, governments, foundations and 
generics manufacturers, are widely regarded as necessary.685 
 
Indeed, university collaboration is a prerequisite for the pharmaceutical industry to 
boost innovation in the area of drug development. The evidence demonstrates that 
much of the basic research for new drugs is being conducted in universities.686 
According to an industry survey conducted in life sciences industry in the year 1994, 
90% of the 210 companies involved in the survey developed relations with one or 
more academic institutions. Furthermore, 59% supported academic research and 
almost 11,7% of the industry’s budget, an estimated amount of $1.5 billion, was 
allocated as R&D funding. In that year, more than 60% of the companies that were 
                                                       
684 DEBACKERE, K.: “Managing academic R&D as a business at KU Leuven: context, structure and 
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685 MAYBARDUK P. & RIMMINGTON S.: “Compulsory Licences: A Tool to Improve Global 
Access to the HPV Vaccine? , American Journal of Law & Medicine, V.5, 2009, p.334 
686 Maxwell and Eckhardt found that out of the 32 most “innovative” drugs almost half were directly 
derived from non-industry sources (that is, universities, government labs and research hospitals). See, 
MAXWELL, R. & ECKHARDT, S. Drug Discovery: a Casebook and Analysis, Totowa, Humana, 
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investing in academic research enjoyed reaped the rewards of the research e.g. 
patents, products, and sales thereof.687  
 
The university-industry research partnerships usually include the exchange of 
knowledge and resources in a very specific area of science e.g. biotechnology and 
enabling capabilities for research advancement resulting in a more iterative process 
where discoveries are taken from laboratory to land and developed by industry.688 In 
this context, the emergence and success of the local pharmaceutical industry in Israel 
might be attributed in part to Israel’s policies in stimulating collaboration between 
university and industry. In fact, as noted above, Teva has a long history of university 
collaboration; the development of Teva’s two innovative drugs both followed the 
common path in which the basic research was conducted in university research 
centres. Teva then transformed this research into drugs. In fact, neither Copaxone nor 
Azilect would have been developed if Teva been reluctant to invest in academic 
research in Israel. Hence it can be concluded that Teva’s success in the creation of 
these proprietary drugs to some extent depended upon the quality of Israel’s 
university689 research.  
	  
VII.III.II.II. Addressing Target Diseases 
 
Israeli research institutions have technical capabilities and expertise in a broad range 
of medical fields. The current research in the country focuses specifically on 
cardiology, oncology and the central nervous system.690 Interestingly, Israel is 
becoming an R&D centre for the treatment of multiple sclerosis; two out of the top 
three medications to treat multiple sclerosis were developed in the Weizmann 
Institute of Science, in Rehovot. Apart from Teva’s Copaxone, Rebif, the 
commercial name for interferon-beta-1a, - was developed at the Weizmann Institute 
and it is used by 70% of multiple sclerosis patients worldwide. It is branded under 
                                                       
687BLUMENTHAL D.,CAUSINO N., CAMPBELL E., , SEASHORE K.: “Relationships Between 
Academic Institutions And Industry In The Life Sciences — An Industry Survey” The New England 
Journal Of Medicine, V.334. N.6, 1996, pp.368-374 
688 DOOLEY, supra note 684, pp.319-320 
689 Israel has world-class research institutions: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Technion-Israel 
Institute of Technology and the Weizmann Institute of Sciences.  
690 About 50% of university research projects in therapeutic and 2/3 of biotech drugs in the pipeline 
are in these therapeutic areas. 
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Serono691 and it has worldwide sales of up to $ 1.3 bn in 2005.692 Furthermore, 
another Israeli biotech company Glycominds is currently working on a predictor test 
for multiple sclerosis.693  
 
The Israeli expertise in pharmaceutical research is not limited to the treatment of 
multiple sclerosis. It has also led to other blockbuster drugs such as Novartis’s 
Exelon, which is principally used for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease, and 
which originated from research conducted at the Hebrew University. Another 
example is Johnson & Johnson’s Doxil, a chemotherapy drug, which was developed 
at the Hadassah Medical Center694.  
 
 In the developed world, and particularly in Europe695, it is possible to observe an 
aging population. People are living longer lives and hence, the diseases of the aged 
are becoming more prevalent. Hence, the medical and social needs of older people in 
the developed world now provide huge markets for drugs to treat the diseases of the 
aged. Thus, there are wide ranges of opportunities for pharmaceutical companies to 
enter these markets. It is widely acknowledged that for many of these diseases, such 
as Alzheimer’s disease or Parkinson’s disease, there are very few options for 
treatment696. Nonetheless, the lack of adequate medicines for such diseases presents 
a major opportunity for the development of innovative medicines in Israel. It is 
arguable that the existence of academic research, which was undertaken in relation to 
these diseases in Israel over the past two decades, was a factor in the development of 
successful drugs. Furthermore, this created a competitive advantage for Israeli 
pharmaceutical companies, such as Teva.  However, Israel is not the only country 
that is building up a portfolio of novel medicines for Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s 
                                                       
691 Rebif  was produced by Interpharm in Rehovot. But Serono almost completely closed down 
Interpharm and moved production to Europe. 
692 See, “Life Sciences in Israel”, Isreal Ministry of Industry Trade and Labor Foreign Trade 
Administration, available at 
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693 The simple blood test addresses the problem of doctors being unable to tell if a patient who has 
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www.sciencebusiness.net/documents/demandside.pdf, (23.12.2009) 
696 IFMPA Report, supra note 628, p.8 
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disease; drugs for the treatment of these diseases and neural disorders are high on the 
list of targets for Indian pharmaceutical companies.697 
 
Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the main focus of the research undertaken as 
part of the collaborative process is an area in which the university possesses a high 
degree of competence. For instance, it is important that the university is recognised 
as competent in this area by other universities.698 Indeed, the particular focus of the 
research is highly crucial in the pharmaceutical R&D strategy; the focus of the 
research that the company wishes to undertake must match the research base of the 
university. A well-defined strategy that concentrates on pharmaceutical R&D along 
the lines outlined above is quite likely to provide a return over the long term and 
bring economic growth to the industry.  
 
As stated above, the current product portfolio and innovation pipeline of Teva 
largely depends on the existence of relevant university research in Israel i.e. research 
in the areas of oncology, immunology and the central nervous system. Furthermore, 
Teva’s internal research pipeline generally focuses on niche specialty disease 
categories such as multiple sclerosis and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Nonetheless, 
Teva is seeking to expand its innovation horizon by buying the rights to treatments 
for cancers and neurological and autoimmune disorders699 and Teva also wants to 
gain access to innovative, pre-clinical programs from all around the world through 
research collaboration. In this vein, a unit of Teva pharmaceuticals, Teva Innovative 
Ventures is providing funding for projects from beginning to end that would fit the 
specialty pharmaceutical profile, where Teva is undertaking 100% of development 
costs. 
 
The process that has been proposed includes a fairly rapid and collaborative 
evaluation process, which aims to develop collaboration from day one. In the event 
that the compound is found to be interesting, a finding based on non-confidential 
information shared between the parties, a confidential disclosure agreement would 
usually be signed by both parties. Henceforth, an internal evaluation committee 
                                                       
697 SHARMA N. L & GOSWAMI S.: “The nuances of knowledge creation and development in Indian 
pharmaceutical industry”, JKM, V.13 N.5, 2009, p.320 
698 DOOLEY, supra note 684, p.330 
699 See, supra note 648 
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would assess the compound within 14 days of receipt of the full confidential 
package. If the compound passes the internal evaluation, a material transfer 
agreement is usually concluded. In most cases, according to the agreement, all rights 
to the compound remain with the innovator until business terms are negotiated and 
agreed.700  
	  
VII.III.II.III. Under The Spotlight; Teva’s R&D Strategy 
 
Casting a spotlight on Teva’s R&D strategy provides an innovative and sustainable 
business model for generic companies investing in innovative R&D. It is, thus of 
crucial importance to extend the analysis to Teva’s R&D strategy. Yet, perhaps the 
most salient aspect of Teva’s R&D strategy for drug development is its collaboration 
with external innovators, particularly with universities. In other words, Teva 
outsources the elements of basic research to external innovators. 
 
Indeed, outsourcing is a common inorganic growth701 strategy in the innovative drug 
industry, and one that has long provided fundamental research knowledge for new 
product streams. Pharmaceutical companies routinely outsource the basic research to 
external innovators like universities, institutes and government laboratories. For 
instance, Hoffman La Roche is a case in point. Hoffman was among the first to 
formalise such collaborative relationships, in other words, to develop drugs using 
knowledge discovered by external innovators. In the 1950s, through the La Roche 
Institute, it provided researchers with support, independence and facilities that few 
universities or independent laboratories could equal.702 Further to this, at least one 
third of the blockbuster drugs marketed in the US, are initially developed either in 
universities or small biotech companies.703 To optimise resources and cut R&D 
                                                       
700 See, www.tevapartners.com 
701 Companies focus on external (inorganic) growth when they decide to expand outside of their 
current operations and buy access to new products or markets. Apart from mergers and acquisitions, 
the companies may grow externally by entering into Strategic Alliances, which are agreements 
between firms in which each commits resources to achieve a common set of objectives. The familiar 
examples of strategic alliances in pharmaceutical industry are university-industry collaboration or 
outsourcing of R&D. See, DHAR, Dhar S.: Case Studies on Growth Strategies - Volume II, 
Hyderabad, ICFAI Books, 2006. 
702 QUINN J. B.: “Outsourcing the Innovation: The New Engine of Growth”, MIT SLOAN 
Management Review, V. 41, N. 4, 2000, pp.14-15 
703 ANGELL, supra note 514, p.67 
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costs, the companies may also consider collaborating with universities and research 
institutes as this offers increased opportunities for building cost effective and 
innovative drug development chain.  
 
The second point that is worth noting here is that it is necessary to target specialty 
disease categories for innovative R&D. The target-based drug development 
initiatives of Teva are very much along the lines of diseases in which the country has 
built up research capabilities and competences. Given that Teva relies heavily on 
academic research in Israel for proprietary drug development, the drug targets are 
identified accordingly. It is, therefore, critical for the companies to understand the 
foundational elements and capabilities of the university research conducted in the 
country and then to tailor their particular strategy within the context of their future 
prospects.  
 
The study of previous successful university-industry collaborations provides 
empirical evidence that the specific cultural needs, existing in both the industrial and 
academic environments, should be accommodated in collaboration initiatives. On 
one side, the industry needs to make concessions on receiving the unexpected from 
academia and the industry should develop mechanisms to identify and further 
develop discoveries accordingly. On the other side, academia might consider 
responding to industry’s priorities, and to commercialise any IP resulting from the 
academic research. It is suggested that in order to have a successful collaboration, it 
is necessary to develop mutual understanding and ensure respect for priorities. 
Within both relevant institutions i.e. the company and the university, mutual 
understanding and respect would usually be a prerequisite for any well-defined and 
transparent research collaboration. Once these conditions are in place, it should be 
possible to further transform the investments in basic sciences into discoveries for 
more and better public health goods.704  
	  
 
	  
                                                       
704 GRAY N.: “Drug discovery through industry-academic partnerships”, Nature Chemical Biology, 
V.2, N.12, 2006, p.652 
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VII.III.III. Developing A Sustainable Business Strategy For Biotechnology 
 
Following the convention established in previous chapters, the received wisdom is 
that investing in biotechnology is very likely to prove to be highly beneficial for the 
pharmaceutical industry. As a matter of fact, biotechnology is widely regarded as the 
new wave for pharmaceutical innovation and one that will shape the future of the 
industry. It is suggested that over the next decade more than half of all new active 
substances will be the result of antibody research and biotechnology products such as 
monoclonal antibodies.705 
 
According to World Bank's Global Forum on Science, Technology, and Innovation, 
there is a constant need for developing countries to build up skills and research 
capacity in biotechnology. In particular, from the standpoint of innovation, the World 
Bank persuasively argues that discussion should not concentrate on whether 
developing countries need to build science and technology capacities that promote 
biotechnology innovation, rather, the focus should be on, what type of capacity to 
build given the economic realities of developing countries, and how best to 
implement these capacity building action plans therein.706 
 
It is crucial for developing countries to invest in biotechnology - regarded as the 
most powerful investment sector of 21st century. It is also necessary for developing 
countries to establish a wide range of networks between university and industry.  
This would require strong commitment from all stakeholders involved i.e. the triple 
helix of university, industry and government. At present it appears that this 
commitment is not present in many developing countries. Hence, in developing 
countries, investing in biotechnology has rarely been considered as a viable strategy.  
 
Nonetheless, development economists have long recognised that investing in R&D is 
a step that developing countries must take, in order to be successful in the area of 
biotechnology.707 Indeed, it is arguable that the area of biotechnology presents great 
opportunities for the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries, not only in the 
                                                       
705 IFPMA report, supra note 627, p.25 
706 Global Forum: Building Science, Technology, and Innovation, Capacity for Sustainable Growth 
and Poverty Reduction. Washington DC, 2007  
707 IFMPA report, supra note 627, p.25 
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development of new drugs and vaccines but also in relation to the development of 
generic medicines.  
 
The area of biogenerics i.e the development of cost-effective generic forms of 
biopharmaceuticals,708 is an emerging area. The area of biopharmaceuticals offers 
significantly improved outcomes in difficult-to-treat diseases such as cancer and 
autoimmune disorders. As a result, these are the most expensive drugs available in 
pharmacies today and sales of these drugs account for 10-15% of the developed 
world’s pharmaceutical market. Furthermore, it is anticipated that the market share 
could increase significantly, to 30-40 %, by 2012.709 The recent report of the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission reveals that biotech drugs achieve sales of 
$13 billion a year, in the US alone.710  
 
Thus, it can be said that the market for biopharmaceuticals market is a substantial 
one. The biotechnology companies, along with the multinationals, do not want to 
miss any opportunities to gain an advantage within this market. Hence, these 
companies tend to resist opening the doors to lower cost generics or follow-on 
protein products.711 The possible introduction of biogenerics, as the generic 
alternative to biopharmaceuticals, has been subject to fierce debate, both in Europe 
and the US. This debate is controversial because of the complex nature of the 
inventions involved as well as concerns regarding equivalence.  
 
In fact, it is arguable that biopharmaceuticals are highly complex and these drugs 
‘have a number of characteristics that set them aside from low-molecular-weight 
                                                       
708 It is pharmaceutical, inherently biological in nature and manufactured using biotechnology. 
Compared with drugs, biopharmaceuticals are composed of many more atoms—with molecular 
masses usually two or three orders of magnitude greater—and involve many additional levels of 
structural complexity (e.g., forming polymeric chains with varying and diverse structures and 
chemical modifications). See, RADER R.: “(Re)defining biopharmaceutical”, Nature Biotechnology, 
V.26, N.7, 2008, pp.743-751 
709 URLEP M.: “Biosimilars; Succeeding in the market of the future”, Pharma Focus Asia, available at 
http://www.pharmafocusasia.com/research_development/biosimilars.htm, (27.12.2009) 
710 “Generic Biotech Drugs: Cure or Quagmire?” , Businessweek, June 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jun2009/tc20090615_361364.htm, (25.12.2009) 
711 Follow-on protein products generally refers to protein and peptide products that are intended to be 
sufficiently similar to a product already approved or licensed to permit the applicant to rely for 
approval on certain existing scientific knowledge about the safety and effectiveness of the approved 
protein product. Follow- on protein products may be produced through biotechnology or derived from 
natural sources. See, RADER R.: “What Is a Generic Biopharmaceutical? Biogeneric? Follow-On 
Protein? Biosimilar? Follow-On Biologic?”, Bioprocess International, V.5, 2007, pp.28-38 
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drugs; their activity depends on their conformation, which is based on secondary, 
tertiary and sometimes even quaternary structures. If conformation is altered, activity 
can also be altered. As the conditions in which biologics are produced largely define 
the final product, any alteration to the manufacturing process could result in a 
completely different product’.712  
 
This issue is part of a much wider discourse; the bioequivalence tests conducted by 
generic companies for the traditional therapeutic medicines are not functional for 
biopharmaceuticals. In order to prove the safety and efficiency of biogenerics, some 
additional test data, and in some cases, clinical trial data, is required. Proponents of 
biogenerics are also required to demonstrate that the chemical identity of the active 
substance is therapeutically equivalent. Aside from the issue of proof of essential 
similarity, a lack of technical infrastructure, the existence of weak academic network 
ties and the high cost of production pose serious challenges for the generic 
companies in developing countries. 
 
Relying on the complex nature of biopharmaceuticals, biotechnology companies, 
partnered with multinationals, often claim that it is nearly impossible to prove that 
any two-protein cultures are identical. Furthermore, these companies often highlight 
the potential, and very serious, safety and efficiency problems that may arise due to 
the slight differences among drugs.  
 
In line with this, Griffiths reports evidence that even when a company is able to use 
the same manufacturing process, there may still be serious difficulties in producing 
the same drug.  By a way of illustration, Johnson & Johnson recently commissioned 
a new manufacturing facility to produce commercial quantities of epoetin alfa 
(Procrit/Eprex). Even though the manufacturing processes were the same, certain 
batches of the product were withdrawn due to safety concerns. For Griffiths, due to 
the fact that even an experienced manufacturer is unable to consistently reproduce its 
own manufacturing process, there will be significant obstacles on the path to generic 
                                                       
712 GRIFFITHS S.: “From the Analyst’s Couch; Betting on biogenerics”, Nature Reviews, Drug 
Discovery, V.3, 2004, p.197 
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biopharmaceutical drugs. Furthermore, regulatory bodies are likely to treat the 
manufacture of biogeneric products with a measure of caution.713  
 
Indeed, the introduction of a regulatory approval process system of biogenerics has 
proceeded at a slow pace. Taking into account the challenges thereof, legislatures 
both in Europe and the US have, thus far, preferred to be cautious, while clearing up 
the uncertainties surrounding regulation of the biogenerics. Further to this, the 
legislation regulating the biogenerics regulatory system was introduced in Europe 
only in 2003.714 In addition, the situation in the US is still ambiguous; the discussions 
are on going as regards to conditions such as the data exclusivity period.  
 
Thus it can be said that the regulatory system of biogenerics is multi-faceted. It both 
poses challenges and offers opportunities for generic companies. As described above, 
the challenges mainly revolve around the requirements that a great deal of 
independent data,715 proving safety and efficiency, be shown by generic companies, 
as well as the potentially long term of market exclusivity periods; it is already 10 
years in Europe and it would probably be 12 years in the US.  
 
Nonetheless, some of the generic companies are expanding their horizons into the 
area of biogenerics. In order to develop a set of competences, they are aiming to 
transform their existing capabilities into biotechnology. Furthermore, it is not only 
the propriety drug companies that are linking up with biotechnology companies to 
acquire expertise; the generic companies are also taking advantage of biotechnology 
research and start-ups.  
 
                                                       
713 GRIFFITHS, supra note 711, p.197 
714 Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 amending 
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. The 
European Medicines Agency (EMEA) is the main regulatory body that grants ‘marketing 
authorization’ on the basis of a scientific evaluation of the product. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 136, 30/4/2004 P.0034 - 0057 
715EMEA, requires extensive testing demonstrating the same quality, safety and effectiveness as the 
reference product before approval. EMEA takes a case-by-case approach requiring “differences 
between the similar biological medicinal product and the reference medicinal product will have to be 
justified by appropriate studies.” Such studies will typically include clinical trials. Bio-similars are 
required to undergo post-marketing monitoring just like new innovative biologies. In the US, FDA 
requires expensive immunogenicity studies and clinical trials for biosimiliars. 
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In this context, Teva is putting science and technological systems in place in order to 
manufacture safe and effective biologics.716 Indeed, Teva can easily be regarded as 
one of the important components of the life sciences industry in Israel. Every sector 
of Israeli’s life sciences industry is, to some extent, affected by Teva and Teva has 
exclusive access to every kind of biotechnological research. Further to this, Teva has 
shares in the ownership of investment funds for biotechnology and biotech 
incubators and it possesses a long list of start-ups. Hence, it is possible to observe a 
number of small, but strong, start-up companies, particularly in the area of 
biotechnology. This can be said to be a characteristic of the Israeli life sciences 
industry.717 The Teva example serves as a model of ideal investment in the life 
sciences area. In this context, the start-up companies generate an internal innovation 
pipeline for Teva, and the companies have a substantial R&D budget e.g. around 
$383 million in 2005.718  
 
Moreover, apart from its work with Israeli universities and biotechnology start-up 
companies, Teva also links up with biotechnological and biopharmaceutical 
companies in other countries, and particularly companies in the US. By a way of 
illustration, Teva has established a partnership with a Canadian company, 
Oncogenex719, which is a biopharmaceutical company committed to the development 
and commercialisation of new cancer therapies. Oncogenex also aims to develop and 
commercialise OGX-011- a phase III cancer therapy designed to inhibit cancer 
treatment resistance-.720 
 
                                                       
716"I feel very strongly that we have the science and systems in place to manufacture safe and effective 
biologics," said Marvin Samson, a vice president of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. “Teva 
already produces biologics in Eastern Europe for countries where patent protection is not enforced and 
he adds "The situation is like in the 1980s with Hatch-Waxman, where the brand-name industry said 
we didn't have the science and capabilities to analyze their products and reproduce them. We did have 
the ability then, and we do now." See, “Biotech Drugs' Generic Future Debated; Medications Are 
Hard to Afford”, The Washington Post, 10 February 2005, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A12377-2005Feb9.html, (29.12.2009) 
717 The research in field of therapeutics including drug discovery, cell therapy and genetics constitutes 
almost 60% of the biotechnology activity in the country.  
718 See, Biotechnology Israel, supra note 629, p.5  
719 http://www.oncogenex.ca/ 
720 “Teva signs drug development deal with OncoGenex”, 29 December 2009, Silico Research, 
available at http://silico.wordpress.com/2009/12/29/teva-and-oncogenex-sign-global-
licence-and-collaboration-agreement/, (02.01.2010) 
 258 
Biotechnology, biopharmaceuticals, biogenerics and biosimiliars are the latest R&D 
concepts that are likely to underlie the future of the pharmaceutical industry. 
Furthermore, these areas will be at the forefront of public health discussions, both in 
the developed and developing world. Therefore, in terms of access to affordable 
medicines in future, it is critical that generic companies develop innovation strategies 
that prioritise the building up of capabilities in specific biotech areas as well as 
initiating the transfer of technology from laboratory to land.  
	  
VII.IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
It can be suggested that Teva’s steady growth, from a company that manufactures 
generic drugs, to a company developing innovative drugs, was achieved through a 
mix of organic and inorganic growth strategies. The organic growth strategies721 
were focusing on existing conditions; these were then combined with the local 
realities in order to provide better prospects for success. The distinctive trajectories 
of Teva have included using local institutions to positive effect, as well as focusing 
on local realities. These can be assessed as a part of an organic growth strategy, 
which has led the company’s growth in the pharmaceutical market. On the other 
hand, Teva has also adopted an inorganic growth route. The company’s inorganic 
growth722 was largely achieved through mergers, acquisitions and strategic 
partnerships. In line with this, recent mergers and acquisitions have increased Teva’s 
market share, particularly in the US market.723 Furthermore, the success of these 
mergers has reduced competition and it has added new brands and products to Teva’s 
                                                       
721 Organic growth is the most reliable and sustainable way for a company’s growth. It tends to rely on 
factors such as hiring more employees, growing the customer base, opening new company-owned 
locations or developing new products through internal research and development. The implementation 
of an organic growth strategy is going to vary with the individual characteristics of each firm, its 
culture, and its position in the market place. An ability to innovate is considered as one of the drivers 
of organic growth in the company. See, DHAR, supra note 700. 
722 Mergers are one common form of inorganic growth. Mergers occur when two or more firms 
combine operations to form one corporation, perhaps with a new name. One goal of a merger is to 
achieve management synergy by creating a stronger management team. Acquisitions, a second form 
of external growth, occur when the purchased corporation loses its identity. The acquiring company 
absorbs it. The acquired company and its assets may be absorbed into an existing business unit or 
remain intact as an independent subsidiary within the parent company. Acquisitions usually occur 
when a larger firm purchases a smaller company. See, DHAR, supra note 700. 
723 The acquisition of Barr Pharmaceuticals in the US pushed market share of Teva to 24% from 18%, 
It further rose Teva’s market share to 16% in global market. See, “Two Marriages and A Funeral” 
Outlook Profit, V.1, N.12, August 2008, p.50 
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portfolio.  In this context, as outlined above, both the nurturing of university-industry 
collaboration, and the provision of R&D outsourcing, can be seen as examples of 
good practice strategies for achieving effective inorganic growth. Moreover, Teva’s 
aggressive patent challenging strategy is seen vital to the company ’s inorganic 
expansion activity in the US market.  
 
Hence, the strategies adopted by Teva reveal a business model that embodies targets 
to achieve inorganic growth through mergers and acquisitions; these mergers help to 
enhance competitivity in the global pharmaceutical market. Within the context of this 
thesis, it is sufficient to note that merger and acquisition strategies, or the expansion 
strategies more broadly, may be suggested as valid aspirations for companies that are 
considering methods of penetrating new markets overseas. In fact, a growing number 
of pharmaceutical companies from developing countries appear to be considering 
such strategies as a part of a successful expansion policy.  For instance, the Indian 
pharmaceutical companies can provide a good illustration of such efforts. They have 
successfully adapted to the realties of globalisation and these companies have been 
able to penetrate western markets, in part through the use of mergers and 
acquisitions. Thus, the overseas expansion of Indian pharmaceutical companies has 
focused on the European market, as well as the US market. In line with this, a 
leading Indian pharmaceutical company, Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (DLR), recently 
acquired a German generic company, Betapharm724, in order to strengthen its 
position in the European market. DLR has also used a patent challenging strategy725 
as part of its inorganic growth strategy in the US pharmaceutical market.  
 
                                                       
724 Betapharm is the fourth biggest generic drug manufacturer in Germany. The $572 million 
Betapharm acquisition was a key strategic move in the Dr. Reddy’s expansion plans in terms of 
boosting its presence in Europe. See, BBC News, 16 February 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4718692.stm, (03.01.2010) 
725 Dr. Reddy's Laboratories recently filed ANDAs to make copycat versions of the Mega-blockbuster 
cholesterol drug Lipitor, claiming the patents that expire between 2013 and 2017 are 
invalid. Although, Although, Pfizer has already concluded a deal with Ranbaxy –other Indian generic 
drug company- in which the Indian generics company can start selling its version in November 2011, 
it has not stopped Dr. Reddy’s to challenge the patent. See, FiercePharma, 10th February 2010, 
available at http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/lipitor, (04.01.2010) 
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Hence, there are a number of competitive business strategies that could prove useful 
to the local pharmaceutical industries in developing countries. Furthermore, the 
findings herein indicate that in most of the cases, the pharmaceutical companies are 
very likely to adopt the same known growth route for innovation driven businesses. 
Indeed, the analysis of Teva’s business model, which evolved from developing 
generics to developing innovative drugs as well, shows one strategy. Further to this, 
analysis of the recent efforts of the Indian pharmaceutical companies, which have 
attempted to exploit opportunities in the global market, and achieve growth through 
innovation, reveals that the emerging pathways to innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry often follow the same routes.  
 
Over the course of this chapter, it is has been argued that the trajectories examined 
herein present a number of distinctive patterns that could provide guidance to 
governments and local industries in developing countries. Teva’s case study reveals 
mechanisms that might be put in place in order to drive long-term global growth and 
to develop wide-ranging capabilities for R&D success.  
These thematic mechanisms that had been used by Teva includes:   
• Developing technical expertise in patent law (including compulsory 
licensing and patent challenging and active involvement in judicial 
process)  
• Strong lobbying power  (intervention into lawmaking and the Special 301 
submission process) 
• Sustainable R&D Strategy (Addressing target diseases, Biotechnology) 
• R&D partnerships (University-industry collaboration) 
• Mergers and Acquisitions 
The overall aim of this chapter has been to present real-life observations, shown with 
the example of a generic company, which has travelled up the innovation ladder and 
has grown into a pharmaceutical giant, so that the evolution of Teva can provide an 
example for other companies in the developing world. 
 
However, the wider debate on these issues continues. Thus, the question must be 
posed as to whether similar success could be achieved by other pharmaceutical 
companies. Unfortunately, there is no clear answer to this question as the countries in 
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question have differences i.e. the company structures can vary significantly between 
different developing countries and even the market conditions can be different from 
one country to another. Nevertheless, the growth route and strategies adopted by the 
Indian pharmaceutical companies do appear to have strong similarities to those 
adopted by Teva. Hence, such cases may present a compelling rationale in favour of 
the practicality of Teva’s business strategy as a model of good practice.  
 
It may therefore be concluded that the trajectories examined herein are the most 
distinctive ones within the framework of research in this area, and these trajectories 
gave Teva its current high profile in pharmaceutical market. Even though the 
potential applicability of these trajectories to the actions of other companies remains 
questionable, there are some important lessons to be drawn. More importantly, the 
success of Teva has the potential to inspire the growth aspirations for other 
companies in the developing world. 
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VIII. THE REAL LIFE LESSONS FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD  
 
 
VIII.I. Introduction 
 
The emergence of TRIPS has long been a subject of controversy. Much attention has 
been devoted to the implementation of TRIPS and the alleged destructive 
consequences of this implementation in developing countries. The global 
implementation process has raised important issues in relation to patent barriers, and 
access to medicines. More importantly, it has added a layer of additional complexity 
for local generic drug companies in relation to local technical expertise and scientific 
infrastructure.  
 
It is widely accepted that TRIPS, and the global patent regime that it has introduced, 
potentially affects the ability of developing countries to catch up. This is particularly 
clear in the area of pharmaceuticals, where patents are strongly and positively 
correlated with R&D activity.726 Given the fact that local pharmaceutical production 
in developing countries has traditionally concentrated on the area of generic drugs, 
boosting local pharmaceutical innovation is not an easy task for developing 
countries. However, as shown over the course of this thesis, it is not an impossible 
task. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no ideal recipe for developing a strategic plan, nor is there a 
best model that each country may adopt.  Nevertheless, there are certain ingredients, 
which are common to innovation and R&D policies.  The previous chapters 
attempted to identify these ingredients i.e. the provision of a fine-tuned IPRs system, 
which incorporates TRIPS flexibilities and the enabling of a reliable innovation 
system, which is tailored to the local realities and needs of the country. This policy 
will include, but is not limited to, policies complementing the IPRs regime.  
 
                                                       
726 ODAGIRI H., GOTO A., SUNAMI A. & NELSON R.: “Conclusions” in ODAGIRI et al., supra 
note 263, p.427 
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Moreover, it is arguable that extremely valuable lessons can be learnt from the 
different cases.  To this end, the previous chapters gave account of the real-life 
lessons arising from the four country and one company case studies, notably in terms 
of the factors that are common to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
Finally, and consequently, this chapter serves to identify the main components of a 
policy aimed at restructuring and developing local pharmaceutical innovation in 
developing countries. The chapter reviews the lessons that can be drawn from the 
previous chapters, while exploring their potential applicability in relation to 
developing nations.  
	  
VIII.II. A Finely-Tuned Intellectual Property Regime  
 
TRIPS has been promoted as a necessary component of the innovation/development 
process.  Developing countries were assured that by enacting the Agreement, they 
would receive a jump-start in relation to economic growth.727 Today, almost fifteen 
years after the emergence of TRIPS, it is still unclear whether patents, or IPRs more 
broadly, are necessary or desirable for promoting innovation in developing countries. 
Furthermore, there is limited evidence that TRIPS has positively affected the 
development process within catching-up or low-income countries.  
 
Nevertheless, the experience of the developing countries over the last fifteen years 
shows that the mere protection of IPRs is not sufficient to achieve developmental 
objectives. As noted in previous chapters, the optimal level and impact of IPRs in the 
innovation process can vary. The size of the market and the nature of local R&D 
capabilities in a country largely determine the potential effect of IPRs in relation to 
innovation and development. Governments are more likely to strengthen their IPRs 
regimes when IPRs are more likely to maximise national wealth. It is usually the 
case that governments postpone the enactment of a strong national IPRs regime until 
some domestic firms are able to develop creative works that can be traded 
                                                       
727 GERVAIS D.: “ Policy Calibration and Innovation Displacement” in NETANEL N.: The 
Development Agenda, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, p.52 
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internationally.728  Hence, it is concluded that it is necessary that IPRs regimes co-
evolve in conjunction with the development of innovative capacities within a 
country.  
 
The IPRs regime, in many cases, may be characterised as necessary to effectively 
facilitate successful innovation strategies. Nevertheless, the relationship between 
IPRs and innovation is at least as complex as the innovation profile of each industry. 
The research findings indicate that industries differ greatly in terms of R&D 
propensity. Furthermore, these differences greatly influence the industrial attitude 
towards IPRs protection. Clearly, there are a number of conditions under which each 
industry determines its attitude towards patents. The structural characteristics of the 
industry and the nature of its field of activity significantly shape the innovation 
process. In turn, this shapes the role of patents as an appropriability mechanism. 
Consequently, each industry treats patents differently. The previous chapters 
established that among all the industries examined, patents are most crucially 
conducive to innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.   
 
The pharmaceutical industry attributes a great deal of significance to patents. Patents 
are unusually strong in pharmaceuticals. For instance, a slight change in the 
molecular compound could radically influence the efficiency of the drug. Thus, 
patents in pharmaceuticals have clear boundaries. Nonetheless, ease of imitation is 
an issue of great concern. In essence, ease of imitation determines the power of 
patents within the industry. For instance, the success of the aircraft industry does not 
depend on patents. The reason for this is that inventions are difficult to reverse-
engineer. On the other hand, patents have long been recognised as a crucial element 
of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. This is because drugs are easy to 
reverse-engineer and disclosure is imminent. In line with this equation, innovation 
patterns significantly vary across industries.  
 
All segments of the aerospace industry are highly capital-intensive. Given the huge 
investment of time and money associated with building up capabilities, companies 
start inventing and innovating right from the very beginning in order to capture a 
                                                       
728 LA CROIX et al., supra note 573, p.110 
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competitive position in both the national and international market. However, 
imitation may well be an option. Still, an imitator will not be in a favourable 
position, because it is too costly to acquire resources and capabilities for reverse 
engineering. Hence, when latecomers have acquired all the resources and capabilities 
necessary to copy an aircraft, they have typically already begun to innovate. The 
structure of the industry, and the innovation patterns therein, justifies why the patent 
regime is relatively unimportant in these types of industries. This also clarifies why 
there is little or no discussion about the patent regime, or the TRIPS regime more 
broadly, in relation to possible impacts on the aerospace industry.  
 
Going back to the main topic of interest, the pharmaceutical industry, it is clear that 
the innovation patterns differ significantly from the aerospace industry. A great deal 
of importance is attached to the patent regime in a country with a pharmaceutical 
industry. Recalling the traditional innovation sequence, where innovation starts with 
imitation and then proceeds through to innovation, a great deal of importance is 
attached to the imitation phase in terms of capacity building and assimilating 
knowledge. The historical analysis of pharmaceutical innovation in previous chapters 
has shown that imitation, or reverse engineering, has been consistently part of the 
behaviour of pharmaceutical companies. The foundations of today’s pharmaceutical 
market were established on the imitation practices of companies in relation to each 
other’s inventions. Given the ease of imitation and the availability of complementary 
assets, it has become relatively difficult for the pharmaceutical companies to protect 
their competitive advantage in the market. In an effort to protect structural market 
advantages, IPRs assets have become essential for the continuum of pharmaceutical 
innovation, particularly in developed countries. IPRs are assets that contribute to the 
harvesting of benefits in terms of structural market advantages in pharmaceuticals.  
 
Clearly, one industry that has been significantly affected by the global patent regime 
is the pharmaceutical industry. As latecomers, pharmaceutical companies from 
developing countries now face enormous initial disadvantages when compared to the 
position of their Western rivals. This raises a serious question as regards whether it is 
possible to develop a strong local pharmaceutical industry under a TRIPS-compliant 
regime. Nevertheless, there is no clear answer for this question.  
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A fine-tuned IPRs system appears to be a prerequisite for successfully building up 
domestic capabilities in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. The 
historical evidence reveals that in the past countries have derived great benefits from 
freely designing their own IPRs system. By providing limited scope and reflecting 
development needs, they were able to capture comparative advantages and maximise 
their levels of skill and knowledge. The success story of the German dye industry 
represents compelling evidence to support the validation of this argument. The 
specifically tailored patent regime in Germany helped to facilitate the successful 
absorption of foreign technology through reverse engineering. In Japan, it is clear 
that the Japanese patent regime has strengthened only when Japanese companies 
have been able to market innovative and globally competitive drugs. In a similar 
pattern, Korea has carefully pursued a development strategy aimed at promoting its 
ability to ‘imitate, absorb, assimilate, replicate or duplicative imitation of foreign 
inventions’.729 The IPRs system has also been constructed in a manner consistent 
with the economic and social policy goals of Korea. However, Korean 
pharmaceuticals were not in as fortunate a position as their Japanese rivals. The 
reason for this was the existence of strong patent provisions, which were introduced 
long before the companies were able to truly compete globally. Thus, companies 
utilised other sources for technology transfer and full capacity building. The Korean 
vaccine story in Chapter 5 is evidence for the fact that joint ventures and 
international collaborations can lead to success.  
 
Notwithstanding this fact, in the post-TRIPS era, countries appear to have very little 
flexibility in designing their national IPRs systems. Furthermore, innovation without 
patents, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, seems to be exceptionally 
difficult. Today, pharmaceutical innovation is associated with TRIPS.  Hence, the 
local patent regime has great impact on the innovation process. Nevertheless, 
pharmaceutical innovation is a long-term process. It requires not only a well-
designed patent regime, but also a huge investment of time and money. The 
existence of a patent regime is important, but it is not the only component of the 
pharmaceutical innovation process. As it turns out, the patent regime may well 
contribute to innovation process, but only in cases where certain conditions are put in 
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place. These conditions depend upon the technological capabilities that a given 
country actually possesses. The extent of the government’s dedication is also 
important.  
 
It is therefore important to distinguish between developing countries at different 
stages of development. It is necessary to bear in mind that developing countries do 
not form a homogenous group. For the purposes of this thesis, the term refers broadly 
to countries that already have a certain level of technological and scientific capability 
and an internationally renowned local generic drug industry. The research findings 
here are aimed at contributing to the body regarding new policies that aim to boost 
levels of pharmaceutical innovation in these countries. Given the terms of the global 
patent regime, the development of a strong pharmaceutical industry in a country with 
limited, or no, technological capabilities is increasingly implausible. The latecomers’ 
R&D prospects largely depend upon the existence of access to the external 
knowledge base. In other words, technology transfer is crucial.730 
 
Nevertheless, there are certain initiatives that could prove useful in relation to 
establishing alternative programs for pharmaceutical capacity building in countries 
that possess limited or no technological capacities. An example is the public 
pharmaceutical compounding program for African countries. As in the Korean 
example, joint ventures or international collaborations may also be an option for 
countries with no or limited technological capacities.  
 
Still an important question remains to be answered - how can a TRIPS-complaint 
patent regime be utilised for boosting pharmaceutical innovation in the developing 
world?  
 
TRIPS is widely accepted as a general framework that sets general and minimum 
standards of protection for IPRs. A large portion of the discussion in the previous 
chapters has centred on the suggestion that the Agreement allows some margin of 
appreciation in relation to the devising of a patent system. There is considerable 
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Building Product Innovation Capability in Biotechnology: The Case of Hepatitis B Vaccine in 
Korea”, Innovation Strategy Today, V.1, N.2, 2005, available at 
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room for manoeuvre in relation to different interpretations of the words. While 
designing the patent regime, the country’s local needs and technological capabilities 
must be taken into account. In this fashion of thinking, countries with a standard 
level of technological and scientific capacity are in better position to pursue their 
own policy objectives for the local pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Developing countries, have traditionally, been regarded as importers of technology 
developed abroad. During the pre-TRIPS era, taking the full advantage of the 
absence of patent protection for pharmaceuticals, these countries developed their 
own skills and capabilities in drug manufacturing by imitating foreign technology. 
Most of these countries had already completed the imitation phase at the time of the 
emergence of TRIPS. Although the implementation of the TRIPS regime had 
substantial impacts on prices, the destructive effect of TRIPS was not as notable as it 
was the developing countries that possess limited or no technological capacities. 
Nevertheless, due to the changing structures of global market, the focus of 
investment shifted from companies that manufacture imitative generic drugs to 
companies that created innovative products. The possibility of taking a leap from 
imitate to innovate became great of interest for these countries. Confirming this, 
India adopted a new vision  ‘to use the industrial base built up mainly for domestic 
market over the preceding 30 years, to move out into world markets.731’ 
 
The share of local pharmaceutical company’s investments in R&D of new chemical 
entities has arisen significantly in recent years. In an effort to realise this vision, 
countries started to implement TRIPS in their best interest. India, for instance, is the 
fourth largest producer of prescription drugs in the world. With 22% of the market 
share in generics, India appears to be a prominent example of a developing country 
that has successfully implemented TRIPS.732 The balanced approach taken by the 
Indian Government in terms of policy implementation aimed at decreasing the social 
costs associated with patents. The Indian government has also tried to provide the 
necessary incentives for local pharmaceutical industry. In stark contrast to western 
                                                       
731 ‘Inaugural Address by Shri Bhuvnesh Chaturvedi, Minister of State, Prime Minister’s Office and 
Science & Technology, See, DRAHOS P.: “The Jewel In The Crown: India’s Patent Office and 
Patent-Based Innovation”, in ARUP, supra note 10, 
732 See, Indusview  “Special Report: Opportunities For India In Generic Drug Space”, V.2, I.8, 
(available at www.theindusview.com/.../pdf/Vol2Issue8Special_report_NA.pdf) 
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patent regimes, the new Indian patent law does not consider 2nd or 3rd use for a 
known substance to be patentable. In so doing, the Indian patent regime aims to 
block monopoly extensions through follow-on process patents.733 The Act considers 
derivate forms of known substances i.e salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, to be the 
same substance, unless it is proved that the new derivative has a more substantial 
effect than the known substance.734 Given the fact that evergreening has become a 
widely used practice among multinational pharmaceutical companies in recent 
years735, this provision may provide moderate benefits to the local industry. 
Notwithstanding the local characteristics of innovation in the country, it is also very 
likely to hurt the local industry, and thus, the rate of indigenous innovation in the 
country. On the other hand, the critics argue that this kind of assumption can often be 
misleading given if it stands upon weak data and fails to account for the dynamic 
character of the local industry736.  
 
Taking action to preserve and enhance the competitiveness of the local industry, 
India has also adopted a higher standard of inventive step.737 To be patentable in 
India, an invention has to be not only non-obvious to a person skilled in the art but it 
must also involve a technical advance when compared to the existing knowledge, or 
have economic significance. Some scholars interpret this as a non-obviousness-plus 
standard, which grants explicit discretion to patent office officials and courts when 
determining a claimed invention’s economic significance.738   
 
                                                       
733 Section 3(d), Patent (Amendment) Bill, 2005  
734 “For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle 
size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other derivatives of known 
substance shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly in properties 
with regard to efficacy.” 
735 In last decade, significant proportion of pharmaceutical patents claimed various forms of existing 
products.  
736 KRISHNASWAMY S.: “ Mashelkar Report on IP Rights Version II: Wrong Again”, 
Economic & Political Weekly, V. XLIV. N.52, 2009, p.32 
737“ Inventive step is a feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to existing 
knowledge or having economic significance or both, making the invention non obvious to a person 
skilled in art.”, Section 2 (ja), Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005 
738 MUELLER J. M.: “The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System 
and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation” , University of Pittsburgh Law Review, V.68, N.3, 
2007, p.564 
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These, and other examples of prominent provisions on oppositions such as 
compulsory licensing, experimental exception and technology transfer,739 indicate 
the possible consideration of national interests within TRIPS. Nevertheless, the 
enforcement of the patent regime in India still remains surrounded by uncertainties 
and continues to generate immense concern across the industry. It has been argued 
that Indian Patent regime has been constructed in a more restrictive manner than is 
required by TRIPS. For instance, the compulsory licensing system has been subject 
to substantive criticism arguing that it is not simple and easy-to-use740. Moreover, the 
critics of the patent regime assert that the procedure for challenging patents needs to 
be strengthened in order to maintain high standards of patentability in India741.     
 
It seems that India has long way to go on patent reform that would satisfy the 
majority of expectations. Still, the Indian Patent Act appears to be a successful 
attempt at striking a balance between protecting IPRs and promoting local innovation 
sustainability. More importantly, the Indian Patent Act is ‘neither the fully-
Westernised panacea hoped for by its pro-TRIPS advocates nor the unmitigated 
disaster for the Indian public predicted by its fiercest critics’.742  
 
Moreover, India is not the only notorious example of a country taking advantage of 
the flexibilities within TRIPS. The Brazilian approach to the patent regime is 
regarded as neo-developmental due to the fact that it explores and broadly utilises the 
available options for gearing IPRs management towards the attainment of national 
development objectives.743 For Shadlen, while neo-developmental patent regimes 
supplement the traditional focus on knowledge-use, they also put a clear focus on 
knowledge generation in order to encourage incremental innovation. This is of 
particular importance for middle-income countries, which are in between the 
imitation and innovation phase. Typically, these countries have already acquired the 
                                                       
739 See, VIJAYARAGHAVAN B. & RAGHUVANSHI P.: “ Impact of the Amended Indian Patent 
Act on the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”, Journal of Generic Medicines, V.5, 2009, pp.111-119 
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Developing World: Insights from Latin America”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
International Studies Association, Canada, 2004, available at 
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necessary imitative capabilities, but they still do not possess sufficient innovative 
abilities. Neo-developmental patent regimes, therefore, appear to provide the best 
option.744 Brazilian policy, for instance, is strictly based on the consideration that 
incremental innovation is an essential step towards the goal of moving up the ladder 
of global innovation. The Brazilian patent regime does not limit patents to radical 
inventions. By regulating patentability for incremental inventions, the regime 
facilitates local industry participation in the patent system. This has been confirmed 
in the statement of the President of the Brazilian National Authority of Industrial 
Property. It was stated: 
 
 ‘The [Brazilian] firms that have developed innovative capacities demonstrate 
the need to retain the patentability of incremental innovations, because it is 
not possible for a new actor in the scenario of innovation to immediately 
become a radical innovator. The entryway to the system of innovation is 
incremental innovation.745’  
 
In contrast to Indian practice, Brazilian patent law encourages incremental 
innovations, particularly in pharmaceuticals. It does this in order to incentivise local 
R&D in terms of secondary uses or new drug delivery methods. Nevertheless, in 
order to provide balance between incremental and radical innovation and more 
importantly, to prevent the attempts of evergreening by Big Pharma, Brazil has 
developed a health-oriented patent examination system. Although there are still 
ongoing discussions as regards to Brazilian prior consent system, it suffices to say 
that the Brazilian system appears to be progressing well, and the system is operating 
in a manner conducive to improving the capacities and competitiveness of local 
firms.746 
 
Speaking of Brazil, particular attention must be paid to the provisions concerning 
compulsory licenses. Over the last fifteen years following TRIPS, Brazil has been 
one of the few countries that have exploited compulsory licence arrangements. In 
                                                       
744 SHADLEN K.: “The Political Contradictions of Incremental Innovation in Late Development: 
Lessons from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination in Brazil”, APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 
August 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1449086 (05.02.2011), p.2 
745 President Jorge Avila’s testimony to the Brazilian Congress (3JUL08 hearings, p4), See, Ibid, p.13 
746 For more detailed discussion in this subject, please see seminal work of SHADLEN, supra note 
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2007, Brazil issued a compulsory license, in order to allow the import of a generic 
version of a patented anti-HIV drug. Moreover, Brazil has also used the threat of 
compulsory licenses in the past to reduce the price of patented medicines. This 
provides evidence to show that even the capacity to manufacture generic drugs 
potentially increases the bargaining power of the developing countries. In this vein, it 
provides flexibility when addressing public health crises. 
 
Likewise, Israel is another prominent example of a country that has taken full 
advantage of compulsory licences provisions. Even the mere threat of compulsory 
licences promoted the voluntary licensing of patented inventions. This laid the 
foundations of Teva, which is now a giant in the world pharmaceutical market. 
Compulsory licenses have proven to be of great potential, not only as bargaining 
mechanisms for lower drug prices, but also as effective tools for technology transfer. 
This encourages the growth of the local industry and the promotion of innovation 
therein. Although the post-TRIPS compulsory licenses provisions are not as flexible 
as the past regimes, they still offer some room for manoeuvre in this area for 
developing countries.  
 
A well functioning of the IPRs system also depends on the local industries’ levels of 
technical expertise in relation to the patent regime. Previously in this thesis, country 
and company case studies revealed that the local industries acted as a regulatory tool 
for pharmaceutical patents. The very existence of a strong local industry, and the 
presence of a cultural disposition towards litigation, helped to improve the legal and 
institutional environment to foster local innovation. It is important that the local 
industry possesses technical expertise regarding important patent law issues, such as 
the loopholes in the patent regime, the scope of patentability requirements and the 
range of patent claims. Teva, for instance, possesses a high level of expertise in 
patent law, and the company is equipped with a capacity and dedication towards 
innovation and learning. This enhances the synergy between the local industry and 
the IPRs system. Furthermore, industry participation may contribute to the 
improvement of the wider policy framework i.e. in order to anticipate and respond to 
local social and economic conditions and priorities.  
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To sum up, it is clear that tailor-made solutions, particularly in the field of IPRs, are 
necessary to encourage economic and social development. Nevertheless, providing 
these solutions is not easy to do. In the past, countries were able to design structures 
and institutions in order to promote and foster technological and scientific 
development. In the past, the technological gap between countries was much smaller 
than it is today. More importantly, in the past the global economic structure was 
increasingly diversified. There was no unified global attempt to dictate a 
globalisation policy.   
 
Nevertheless, TRIPS is a package deal. Aside from the challenges it has posed for 
developing countries, the Agreement also offers opportunities for innovation and 
development. Once again, it is necessary to note that TRIPS only draws the general 
framework of the global IPRs regime. It sets the minimum levels of protection. 
Furthermore, there is still room for developing countries to recalibrate their own 
patent policy in a manner compliant with the Agreement.  
	  
VIII.III.  A National Innovation System  
 
Notwithstanding the increased awareness of IPRs within developing countries, there 
is a lack of research at the interface between national innovation systems and the 
IPRs regime on one side and policy development on the other side. Greater 
integration of economic, legal and technological considerations into each country’s 
national innovation system is the way forward. The national innovation system is 
necessary in order to build a sustainable pharmaceutical industry in a country. 
Arguably, it is a well-established fact that a fine-tuned IPRs regime is a prerequisite 
for creating an innovative and sustainable local pharmaceutical industry. However, 
IPRs alone do not suffice to determine the local extent of technological innovation, 
access and productivity.  
 
Over the last decade, there has been a dramatic change in the IP landscape.  In fact, 
developing countries now have a better understanding of IPRs. It has become evident 
that IPRs must be complemented by other economic, social, institutional and 
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political elements. This is necessary to contribute to promoting an effective and 
sustainable national innovation system.  
 
Given the major challenges created by the globalisation process, a question arises 
regarding how to design a national strategy of innovation within the framework of 
TRIPS. In this context, the rationale and the priorities behind the policy design are 
vitally important. It is widely recognised that promoting innovation is an imperative 
for developing countries. For innovation to be successful, it is necessary to enable 
technology transfer. Hence, the national innovation strategy should be driven by the 
social dynamics of a country. This essentially requires an overall institutional design 
aimed at enhancing local capacities to assimilate, develop and apply new knowledge.  
 
In this context, the concept of NIS involves the set of organisations, institutions, and 
policies, linkages that affects creation, development, commercialisation and diffusion 
of new technology within a national economy.747 It requires a particular approach to 
adjust policies and instruments to the new paradigm for technological innovation. 
This involves a systematic and intensive exploitation of the available knowledge 
bases and a focus upon the strategies of recombination within the context of specific 
realities and needs of within a country.748  
 
It is necessary to establish a dynamic network encompassing policies, institutions 
and people. This can facilitate knowledge flows across national borders and within 
local industries, helping to shape the innovation system in a country. In an attempt to 
catch up, and fill existing technological gaps, NIS serves as an efficient socio-
economic platform for developing countries. Developing countries usually invest in 
physical assets, R&D and human capital in order to accelerate catching up. However, 
given the global economic conditions of today, these initiatives alone will not be 
sufficient to capture the benefits of local economies. The countries that are willing 
and able to take advantage of the knowledge economy, must engage in a 
technological learning process. This process must be centred on the accumulation 
and creation of knowledge.  
                                                       
747 See, NELSON & ROSENBERG, supra note 387, pp.4-5. 
748 OECD, Accessing and Expanding the Science and Technology Knowledge Base, 1994, 
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M000014000/M00014640.pdf. 
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The nature of an innovation system is dynamic. The institutional components of the 
system i.e. the laws, social rules, cultural rules, routines and habits, govern the social 
interactions between the innovation actors. The flow of information, resources and 
regulations occurs between innovation stakeholders, generating dynamism within the 
system itself. In other words, the actors and their linkages i.e. their interaction with 
each other, are vital to the system. In general, the actors are usually considered to be 
an integral part of the system. Hence, paying attention to merely one component or a 
single issue, such as the enactment of a strong IPRs regime, or an investment in 
physical assets is very unlikely to produce significant results in terms of economic 
growth and prosperity.  
 
In designing the necessary policy mechanisms and support schemes it is necessary to 
determine the structures and institutions that are typically involved in the innovation 
process. It is widely recognised that IPRs are a necessary, but not sufficient, 
requirement of a system. IPRs help to generate benefits, either as a direct or 
complementary asset, in relation to innovation and development. However, drawing 
from the previous discussions in chapter 4, it is arguable that the effect of IPRs 
appears to be destructive, unless certain social and economic thresholds have been 
reached. Thus, it is clear that the impact of IPRs on innovation can vary. Economists 
have long theorised that socio-economic factors are related to a country’s ability to 
adapt, assimilate, and develop new knowledge and technologies plays a major role in 
this process.749  Chapter 4 gave a detailed analysis of contemporary economic 
research. This research has established the links between innovation, development 
and IPRs. In an effort to integrate an IPRs regime into a broader view of a national 
innovation system, complementary socio-economic measures are also drawn from 
the standpoint of innovation. These complementary measures are as follows. It is 
necessary to set priorities and enhance domestic innovation capabilities, serve local 
needs and demands, set up organisational innovation, encourage linkage of the 
university system to local industry, restructure public sector institutions and 
organisations, establish policies for the funding of R&D, and encourage foreign 
direct investment.  
                                                       
749 See, UNIDO, supra note 81 
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Drawing from the country and company case studies, the analysis herein seeks to 
build upon these previous complementary measures. The main aim of this section is 
to highlight the examples of horizontal measures. These measures serve not only as 
powerful inducers for IPRs policy, but also as contributors to efforts to maximise 
global competitiveness.  
	  
VIII.III.I. Fostering Local Innovation Capabilities  
 
While developing and sustaining national innovation strategies, the focus for 
developing countries should on the country’s local realities, i.e. the economic and 
social circumstances, technological capabilities, and industry profile present in the 
country. Countries, particularly developing countries, have encountered serious 
difficulties in their attempts to conceptualise their own national systems. Simply 
replicating a system that has been successfully applied in other countries is a 
common failure of policy makers in developing countries. There is no one size fits 
all method for a designing national innovation system. A country’s specific 
advantages and disadvantages must be examined by policy makers. Countries may 
aim to encourage would-be-winner industries, as demonstrated by the cases of Japan 
and Korea. Alternatively, the priorities may be determined based on number of other 
factors, such as the market demand, system linkages, and the current technology 
base. As in the case of Israel, the government may adopt a neutral approach towards 
technologies and innovative activities.   
	  
Nonetheless, government support and planning is a prerequisite for the building up 
of a strong pharmaceutical industry in a country. The presence of incentives 
facilitating the use of existing knowledge, and the dissemination of this knowledge 
through a variety of mechanisms is important. This will help to create new 
knowledge in relation to pharmaceutical innovation. This process of technology 
adaptation is a collective effort between the government and the pharmaceutical 
industry. In other words, the adaption of foreign technology must be on a country’s 
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own terms. This requires the long lasting co-operation and commitment of 
government and industry.  
 
Advancements in existing technology provide new avenues for future research and 
development. As a result, a great deal of attention must be paid to designing 
industrial policies that reflect the nature of the industry. This requires in-depth 
analysis of the domestic innovation system and a detailed identification of the core 
competences required for technological knowledge production. In an effort to 
enhance local innovation capabilities, government and industry must work together 
throughout all the phases of policy development, implementation and evaluation.  
 
The scope of government intervention in the field of pharmaceuticals potentially 
covers a wide spectrum of areas including technology, industrial policy, IPRs, and 
financial support. Beyond the economic consequences, the national policies are 
usually focused on the major strategic imperatives regarding maximising 
competitiveness and increasing productivity. By way of illustration, the Brazilian 
patent regime is constructed so as to accommodate incremental learning and 
innovation. The pharmaceutical industry is one of the main industries that is subject 
to government intervention in Brazil.750 In order to encourage industry and enhance 
R&D local capabilities, the patent regime, seeks to provide an environment that 
encourages local industry’s participation in the patent system. This incentivizes local 
R&D in terms of secondary uses and new drug delivery methods.  
 
Nevertheless, the adoption of a successful policy approach necessarily requires the 
active involvement of the local industry. The vast lobbying power of the industry, 
coupled with the industry’s legal and technical expertise, must be taken into account 
in relation to institutional capacity building. The most prominent example of this 
kind of industry intervention in institutional policy making can be seen with the 
example of Teva in Israel. Recalling the previous chapter on the company case study 
of Teva, and its distinctive trajectories, it may be concluded that consultative 
                                                       
750 Four industries identified as strategic to Brazil’s economic development: semiconductors, software, 
capital goods, pharmaceutical products and medications. See, Industrial, Technological and Foreign 
Trade Policy (PITCE) of 2003 
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involvement of the company in policy making process has the potential to improve 
the patent regime, ensuring that it is industry-centred and economically sustainable.  
 
Throughout the history of pharmaceutical innovation, the active participation and 
intervention of the pharmaceutical industry in the policy making process has been 
key to the development of strong pharmaceutical industry in a country. For instance, 
the German dye industry intervened to influence patent regulation in Germany. In 
Great Britain, the chemical industry pressurised the government to set priorities for 
the local production and take measures against unfair trade practices of German dye 
companies. Since the antibiotic revolution, the American pharmaceutical companies 
have been actively involved in the policy-making processes, both at a national and an 
international level. Before the Japanese patent law was enacted, the Japanese 
government conducted an industry survey in order to determine whether a strong 
patent regime was in the interest of the pharmaceutical industry. The Japanese patent 
law was amended only when the industry supported the introduction of product 
patents for pharmaceuticals.  
 
New policy rules and instruments on innovation and sustainability, particularly on 
IPRs, usually establish a framework that is potentially conducive to development. 
Thus, any engagement effort that seeks to establish intensive interaction with all 
stakeholders, either industry or university, is very likely to lead to an increased focus 
on priority setting for local innovation. An extensive institutional interaction between 
the local industry and the government appears to be essential for enhancing local 
capabilities and encouraging the support of local innovation.  
VIII.III.II. Responding To Local Needs And Demands  
 
The innovation policy in a country must be linked with the economic realities and 
local R&D capabilities of the country. Additionally, local needs and demands must 
be considered when formulating strategies aimed at driving innovation in the 
country. These innovation initiatives, distributed widely across the whole spectrum 
of R&D activities among public and private agencies, ought to be consistent with 
local market characteristics.  
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The success of the German dyestuff industry has already been explained in the 
previous chapters. There are many lessons that could be drawn from the German dye 
industry. The German companies were the first companies to respond to customer 
demand. German companies carefully studied the market conditions and established 
close relationships with their customers in order to learn about new market 
opportunities.751  
 
Innovation in developing countries usually describes the reverse-engineering 
process. This involves the transfer, usage and adaption of technology developed 
abroad. Therefore, developing countries are frequently associated with imitative, 
adaptive technology. Nevertheless, the adaptive nature of technology in these 
countries gives rise to a greater degree of invent-around technology. Rather than 
inventing through new inventive technologies, and producing cutting-edge products, 
inventors in developing countries tend to pursue a customer-pull approach to product 
development. This kind of approach reacts to the voice of the customer. It tries to 
solve customer dilemmas i.e. without relying on novel science the innovation process 
is designed around customer needs and demands.752 
 
The whole process of pharmaceutical manufacturing in developing countries is based 
on the generic drug business model. The absence of patent protection in developing 
countries for a substantial period of time has facilitated the transfer and usage of 
technology developed abroad. These countries were able to built up excellent 
facilities and establish strong alliances in the drug manufacturing industry. These 
countries developed their skills in relation to reverse engineering. The generic 
companies in India, Brazil, and China had already become regionally, and even 
globally, competitive in the area of generic drug production. Most of these countries 
have now completed the imitation phase.  
 
The capabilities and skills developed in the area of reverse engineering, coupled with 
the adaptive nature of technology, have led to the implementation of local solutions 
to local customer needs. The generic drug companies have started to modify and 
                                                       
751 MOWERY, supra note 481, p.47 
752 SULL D., GOSSI-R A. & ESCOBARI M.: “ What Developing- World Companies Teach Us 
About Innovation” , Harvard Business School, Working Knowledge, 2004, available at 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/3866.html, (26.07.2010) 
 280 
improve technologies in order to suit domestic demands. Rather than simply 
manufacturing copycat drugs, companies have started to consider cost-effective 
alternative treatments. Indian generic companies, for instance, having achieving self-
sufficiency in drug production, engaged in R&D activities in order to respond to 
local market needs. Cipla, an Indian generic company, released its own triple 
combination AIDS drug in 2001. It contained the separate antiretroviral drugs 
Stavudine753, Lamivudine754 and Nevirapine.755 Cipla’s radically lower-priced and 
lower dosed product Triomune was launched as a cocktail tablet to be taken twice a 
day. While the alternative AIDS cocktails i.e. combinations of drugs, were costing 
around $10.000-$15.000 a year per patient in the US or Europe, Triomune was 
selling only at $600 per year.756 Cipla strategically and successfully exploited the 
national circumstances in order to respond to the demand of local users in the 
healthcare system. At that time, pharmaceutical products were exempted from patent 
protection in India. Thus, Cipla was able to work on and re-engineer three separately 
patented drugs. The very existence of Triomune is jointly due to the flexible patent 
regime in the country and the reverse-engineering skill base that existed within the 
company. Nevertheless, the success of Triomune should not be degraded as a mere 
case of reverse engineering. Its innovative potential cannot be ignored. This proves 
that Cipla, and Indian generic companies more generally, are capable of producing 
drugs for local users within the healthcare system. Their efforts at inducing research 
focused on domestic healthcare problems, coupled with the enactment of sound R&D 
policies and incentives, are having a significant impact on the future of 
pharmaceutical innovation in India. This kind of strategy can also be illustrated by 
the Korean case of the Hepatitis B vaccine. In the 1980s, Hepatitis B became a major 
health problem in Korea. This generated a great deal of interest in developing a 
Hepatis B vaccine. Thus, the Korean government assured companies that there was 
an initial market for the vaccine. Hence, Korean companies engaged in higher 
                                                       
753 The fourth antiretroviral drug (d4T) on the market, originally patented to Bristol-Myers Squibb, the 
US patent expired in 2008 
754 The fifth antiretroviral drug on the market, originally patented to GSK, the US patent is due to 
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and Drug Administration, originally patented to Boerhinger Ingelheim 
756 See, RAMANI S. & MUKHERJEE V.: “ CSR and Market Changing Product Innovations: Indian 
Case Studies” ,UNU- MERIT WP, 2010-026, pp.13-14 
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domestic R&D activates in response to local demand. Less than a decade later, 
companies were able to launch their own vaccines.  
 
Focusing on domestic healthcare needs is a R&D strategy that has proven to be 
highly effective for developing countries. In fact, today domestic represents a large 
fraction of the world population.  For instance, 85% world’s population live in 
emerging markets. This makes emerging markets and specific medical needs of 
patients living in these regions quite attractive for multinational pharmaceutical 
companies. Lately, pharmaceutical companies have been investing in local R&D to 
discover and develop medicines specifically to treat local diseases in these regions. 
AstraZeneca, for instance, launched the Asia Oncology Strategic Alliance aimed at 
evaluating novel treatments for stomach and liver cancers. As a part of local regional 
development program, GlaxoSmithKline is seeking R&D partnership opportunities 
to develop a product specifically for the medical needs of emerging markets.757 
 
There is also a lack of effective treatments and drugs for any disease that 
disproportionately affects the poor. Supporting this view, a study in 2002 found that 
over the period between 1975 and 1999, out of 1393 new chemical entities marketed, 
only 16 were for tropical diseases and tuberculosis.758 Thus, developing and 
sustaining R&D strategies for the treatments of the diseases that particularly affect 
the developing world is likely to provide a return over the long term, regardless of 
market conditions.  
 
It is also vital for countries to address target diseases. This strategy has proven to be 
successful in creating a competitive advantage for Israeli pharmaceutical companies, 
and Teva in particular. The case study of Teva and its distinctive trajectories reveals 
that there is a lack of adequate medicines for certain diseases i.e Alzheimer or 
Parkinson’s. This presents a major opportunity for upcoming companies to develop 
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758 TROUILLER P.,OLLIARO P., TORREELE E., ORBINSKI J., LAING R., FORD N.: “Drug 
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innovative medicines. Apart from Israel and Teva, Indian generic companies are also 
building up a portfolio of novel medicines for target diseases.759 
 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the concept of innovation is based upon 
a complex structure of interactions between various organisations and institutions. A 
strategic planning system that anticipates and responds to the changing needs of the 
market must combine different elements. Furthermore, pharmaceutical companies 
constitute only one element of the pharmaceutical innovation process. A well-
functioning system depends on interaction between actors. Hence, university-
industry linkages are critically important. Furthermore, the particular focus of the 
research that the companies wish to undertake must match the research base of the 
university system in the country.  
	  
VIII.III.III. University – Industry Collaboration  
 
A growing body of empirical research appears to support the view that innovation 
increasingly stems from institutional spheres outside of corporate firms. Innovation 
today largely stems from research at universities. Thus, lateral relationships across 
boundaries become crucial.760 
 
In the early part of the last century, the success of German dye industry was partly 
due to the strong collaboration that had established with major German research 
institutes.  The German universities helped the German companies to develop a 
better understanding of the formation of dye molecules. Moreover, the university 
system in Germany had a scientific focus. This provided essential training for 
chemists who populated the German firms’ R&D labs.   
 
Taking inspiration from the German university structure, John Hopkins University, 
the first US research university, was founded in 1876. In a very short period of time, 
it began to show success in collaborating with industry.761 In the period following 
                                                       
759 See, SHARMA et al., supra note 697, p.320 
760 ETZKOWITZ, supra note 441, p.1 
761 MOWERY, supra note 481, p.35 
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WWII, the US Government extensively funded scientific research at universities. 
The antibiotic revolution, which changed the course of medicine, began with the 
discovery of penicillin. However, an expanding body of scientific knowledge on 
antibiotics was developed later through the collaboration of university, industry and 
government. Thus, the American pharmaceutical industry emerged as the world 
leader in the pharmaceutical market partly because of the excellence in in-house 
R&D, but mainly because of the strong linkages established with the university 
sector.  
 
On the other hand, although British scientists had invented penicillin, the reluctance 
of British pharmaceutical companies to collaborate with British universities was the 
main reason why the penicillin was taken to the US. Long after the discovery of 
penicillin, Ernst Chain, who shared the Nobel Prize in 1945 with Fleming and 
Florey, detailed the painful story of penicillin. He focused particularly on the fact 
that British industry missed a golden opportunity. He stated that British industry 
could only survive in future through closer collaboration between academic and 
industrial research laboratories.762 After missing the opportunity to commercialise 
penicillin, it took a while for the British industry to realise the importance of 
university-industry collaboration. As a slow starter, the British industry became 
competitive in the international pharmaceutical market only in the late 1980s.763  
 
Hence, universities played an increasingly important role in innovation and socio-
economic development. In general, some conclusions and key practices can be drawn 
from the case studies given in this thesis. First of all, it is evident that 
university/public research advances industrial innovation significantly and directly in 
the area of pharmaceuticals. This results in an increasing level of R&D intensity and 
productivity.  
 
Basic university research is a necessary precondition for the development of a 
country’s ability to absorb and assess scientific knowledge and to apply it to 
advanced technology. Scientific knowledge is a basic part of technologic 
                                                       
762 PALOMBI, supra note 192, p.115 
763 By only the late 1980s, British pharmaceutical sector managed to increase their share of the world 
market to level behind the US. See, DUTFIELD, supra note 137, p.105 
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development in the life sciences. This involves a ‘trial and error and experimentation 
without a clear priori understanding of how and why the drugs should work’.764 By 
way of illustration, in 1997, Cockburn and Henderson investigated the development 
history of 21 drugs with the greatest therapeutic impact over the period between 
1965 and 1992. The study revealed that only 5, i.e. 24% of the drugs were essentially 
developed without any input from the public sector. The findings led the authors to 
the conjecture that over time public sector research has become more important than 
private sector research.765 In fact, available evidence collected from the case studies 
supports the view that most drugs are discovered, and the best research results are 
obtained, in a collaborative environment.  
 
Knowledge flows and technological diffusion within the pharmaceutical industry 
strongly suggests that the financial support of basic scientific research should remain 
under the government responsibility. Encouraging university research through public 
policies aimed at fostering university-industry linkages is an ambitious, but realistic, 
innovation policy initiative for developing countries. 
 
On the other hand, taking university research out of the lab and turning the basic 
research into a drug is a more complex exercise. This typically entails a mechanism 
that diffuses basic university research into commercial activities. From the earlier 
discussions, it is clear that invention typically refers to a technical idea that can lead 
to new products or that can be used to solve an industrial problem. Notwithstanding 
this, innovation refers to a distinct economic process. This process of innovation 
describes the journey of a mere invention to a commercialised product. This sharp 
distinction between invention and innovation can also be applied to university 
research. Research conducted by universities largely represents the concept of 
invention. Nevertheless, not all inventions can be turned into an innovative product. 
The notion of innovation is clearly much broader than participation in basic research. 
In this context, innovation can be described as act of transferring this technology 
from the laboratory to land. The story of penicillin presents anecdotal evidence in 
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support of this argument. Penicillin, which was discovered by Fleming, is widely 
regarded one of the greatest inventions of the last century. However, it later became 
an innovation that changed the course of medicine. This occurred partly because of 
the actions of the US government and the US pharmaceutical companies, but it 
occurred mainly because of the actions of Florey. Florey’s enthusiasm transformed 
the speculative experiment of penicillin into a research programme. The majority of 
the drugs marketed today are invented in university labs. Nevertheless, these drugs 
reached their therapeutic potential because the technology was successfully 
transferred from the laboratory to land. At present, it is not possible to observe 
comparable individual innovators like Florey. Instead, it is the pharmaceutical 
industry that facilitates the commercialisation of university research.  
 
In this equation, where the university is the inventor and the industry is the 
innovator, it is the government that ultimately takes the responsibility regarding 
policy making. This is necessary in order to establish interactive linkages, knowledge 
flows and technological diffusion among public and private sectors. This so-called 
triple helix model of innovation aims to enhance the synergy between university and 
industry, to diffuse basic university research into a commercial activity and thus, to 
stimulate knowledge-base economic development.766  
	  
The introduction of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, provided incentives for universities, 
faculty investors, and private industry in order to engage in the commercialisation 
process. This Act is widely regarded as an example of good practice. It ensures 
cooperation between government, industry, and academia. Although the Act had a 
significant and beneficial impact the encouragement of innovative behaviour, it has 
serious deficiencies in a sense that it promoted closeness in the sharing of scientific 
discovery. Furthermore it places a greater emphasis on applied research rather than 
basic research. Nevertheless, the Bayh Dole Act is a strong societal statement in 
favour of university-industry collaboration.  
 
It is a well-established fact that the future of the pharmaceutical industry lies in the 
area of biotechnology. The biotechnological revolution in drug development 
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empowered university research via the innovation process. This led to emergence of 
a dense network of collaborative relationships between university start-up companies 
and the multinational pharmaceutical companies. It is evident that a process of 
innovation in drug development does not follow a linear path. Hence, a single firm is 
not able to develop all the requisite ingredients in order to bring a biotech product to 
the marketplace. A higher-degree of government involvement is required in order to 
develop and sustain innovation strategies based on biotechnology. Consequently, a 
triple helix nexus becomes a strong basis for policy initiatives building 
biotechnology clusters.  
 
In an effort to promote university-industry linkage, a growing number of policy 
initiatives are being undertaken by developing countries. In reality, research has 
always been an integral part of university activities. Not only European or American 
universities, but universities all around the world are currently conducting scientific 
research that focuses on the most important frontiers of biotechnology. No matter 
whether it is Boston, Accra, Istanbul or Delhi, universities everywhere are capable of 
creating, discovering and inventing. Invention can be achieved in any university 
research lab. Nevertheless, taking this research out of lab and putting the scientific 
findings to practical use in the form of the provision of a commercially viable drug is 
a real challenge, particularly for developing countries. University policies and 
practices in such countries do not necessarily encourage such acts of collaboration. 
The organisational structure of universities in developing countries is typically 
cumbersome. This must be changed in order for developing countries to respond 
effectively to the needs of the industry.  In most cases, industry is not fully aware of 
academic research i.e. new inventions emerging from university labs. Moreover, 
most of the industries are still skeptical about the benefits of academic research. 
Companies tend to see the potential of expanding academic scientific research in 
their home countries as an unrealistic and utopian goal. The reluctance of industry 
leads to a lack of technological diffusion between university and industry. This 
creates circumstances where inventions stay in research labs and innovation 
opportunities are completely missed.  
 
Thus, the governments of developing countries must enact creative policies aimed at 
enhancing the synergy between university and industry. Indeed, a well functioning 
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system largely depends on the existence of a balanced legal and institutional 
framework, which is accompanied by certain safeguards. This entails priority setting 
and careful assessment of the university system. It also requires an in-depth analysis 
of academic culture and structures, including the encouragement of entrepreneurial 
attitudes. Despite all the difficulties in developing countries, the opportunity still 
exists to create a collaborative environment that can foster and enrich links and 
resources.  
 
VII.III.IV. Reforming Public Sector Organisations And Institutions  
 
A knowledge-based innovation system involves complex interaction between various 
stakeholders. The high level of interaction between these stakeholders is usually 
enhanced by the use of intermediating institutions. These institutional and policy 
contexts determine how actors and organisations behave throughout the innovation 
process. The public actors involved in research and innovation activities take on a 
role, which is particularly important for knowledge generation, local capacity 
building and the absorption and efficient use of technology. Thus, the systematic 
differences, the habits, the practices and the mindsets of the public actors can often 
play a central role in the overall innovation process. 
 
The public sector organisations in developing countries are usually characterised by 
political weaknesses, systematic differences and long running bureaucratic disputes. 
The vast number of public organisations, coupled with the lack of communication 
between these organisations, usually erodes effective implementation of innovation 
strategies. Hence, successful innovation systems must give priority to the reform of 
the public sector.  
 
Conceptually, these reforms involve the establishment of independent organisations 
with an innovation remit. However, it is very difficult to provide an optimal set of 
measures for restructuring the public sector. Once again, it must be stated that there 
is no one-fits-all approach. A practice that has proven to be successful in one country 
may not necessarily be optimal for another country.  
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Hence, first and foremost country variables must be identified in order to encourage 
sustainable reforms in public sector. Country variables include priorities, local 
realities, cultural attitudes, habits, and mindsets. The next step is to replace a 
planning approach with a learning approach. Knowledge-based innovation systems 
typically involve a complex learning process from top to bottom. In an effort to 
recalibrate the habits, practices and cultural attitudes, the learning process must be 
enhanced in each stage of the innovation cycle. By way of illustration, a fine tuned 
IPRs system, which takes account of TRIPS flexibilities, is a prerequisite for 
pharmaceutical innovation in a country. It is a widely known fact that most 
developing countries lack the legal and technical competencies to take full benefit of 
these flexibilities. TRIPS put developed countries under an obligation to provide 
technical assistance to both developing and least-developed country members of the 
WTO. Nevertheless, the current experience proves that such kinds of assistance have 
only been provided in a partial way. Most assistance has been aimed at promoting 
strong IPRs regimes and the surpassing of TRIPS flexibilities. While the 
implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities has started to receive increasing attention 
from NGOs and international organisations, developing countries are still unable to 
establish the correct balance between public interest and innovation. To this end, the 
conventional wisdom suggests that avoiding general myths about IPRS, recalibrating 
the mindsets of the public sector towards IPRs, and adopting an approach based on 
learning are the three most effective strategies for improving the understanding of the 
global IPRs regime within developing countries. This reforming approach is likely to 
speed up the pace of the innovation process in the country. This approach has also be 
adopted while reformulating university-industry relationships, setting priorities or 
goals, and enhancing local innovation capabilities.  
 
The existing public sector structures present in developing countries involve the 
interaction of numerous organisations. These organisations deal with various aspects 
of industrial policy and innovation. However, they lack the institutional capacity to 
undertake effective innovation functions. The lack of technical and managerial 
competencies, coupled with the absence of system linkages between these 
institutions and private agencies, has become a major impediment to innovation 
reforms. A well-functioning system depends on institutional and organisational 
flexibility. Hence, independent organisations must anticipate and respond to the 
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needs of all stakeholders. This becomes vital for developing and sustaining 
innovation strategies. In Israel, for instance, the Office of Chief Scientist executes 
government policies for supporting industrial R&D. In Korea, in an effort to 
restructure the public sector, the Office of Science and Technology Innovation was 
established to build momentum in innovation.  
 
Once again, the notion of innovation is much broader than mere R&D. Innovation 
involves a complex and dynamic interplay between stakeholders, institutions and 
policies. The complexity of the system requires the increased competency of the 
public sector. Hence, the adoption of a more strategic approach is a prerequisite for 
the reformed public sector.  
	  
VIII.III.V. The Government Funding Of Innovation  
 
The existence of global patent standards and the introduction of product patent 
regimes are very likely to cause short-term wealth losses for the local pharmaceutical 
industry. The impact of strong IPRs standards on wealth and industrial growth in a 
large part depends upon the industry structures, technological capabilities and the 
intensity of R&D rates. In the short term, the industry faces losses. Losses usually 
occur in terms of price increases, loss of revenues decreases in profits etc. The use of 
extensive government intervention becomes crucial at this stage in order for the 
financial recovery of the industry.  
 
It must be noted that the local pharmaceutical industries in developing countries are 
still incapable of developing globally competitive drugs. Making the leap from the 
generic area to the innovative area clearly requires a clear strategy. It also requires 
the financial and economic resources necessary to put the strategy into practice. The 
encouragement of drug development requires a long-term strategy. It also usually 
requires better utilisation of financial mechanisms. Hence, market intervention 
becomes evident in order to improve an industry’s access to financial resources.  
This can be achieved through direct or indirect funding of the industry or through the 
provision of credit enhancements and tax incentives. The Korean government, for 
instance, played a critical role in the development of the Hepatitis B vaccine in 
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Korea. Initially, the government created an attractive domestic market for the 
industry. Moreover, the government provided funds to Korean companies to build 
their own factories. Similarly, the Israeli government provided tax exemptions to 
Teva in exchange for investment in the less developed areas in Israel.  
 
Alternatively, governments can adopt mechanisms for funding research. The range of 
funding instruments capable of supporting the R&D and innovation process can be 
incorporated within the national innovation policies. These can exist in the form of 
R&D programs, such as incubation programs or R&D funds. The development of 
such programs may significantly impact the efficiency and effectiveness of 
innovation rates. These programs also contribute to the technological infrastructure 
of the country. In Israel, for example, a well-functioning innovation system 
increasingly depends upon the existence of an R&D support system. This can be 
applied to all phases of innovation, from R&D planning to the commercialisation of 
the product.  
 
The Chinese government has launched a new program ‘New Drug Creation and 
Development Program’ in 2008 within the framework of China’s 11th 5-year plan for 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry767, to promote local R&D to own the 
IPRs of newly developed drugs. The initiative provides funding for collaborative 
research between academia and local pharmaceutical industry. Several strategic 
alliances established between Shanghai Institute of Materia Medica and Chinese 
pharmaceutical companies, i.e. Jiangsu Hengrui Medicine Company and Shiyao 
Pharmaceutical Group for innovative drug discovery.768  
 
Due to the changing nature of pharmaceutical innovation, SMEs have become 
increasingly critical for the innovation process, particularly in relation to 
pharmaceuticals. In the past, the whole process of innovation was conducted by big 
multinational companies. Nevertheless, the biotechnological revolution in drug 
development has changed the patterns of innovation. Now, SMEs contribute greatly 
and actively to the innovation process. Today, most inventions, particularly in the 
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biotechnology area, come from SMEs. Thus, R&D support mechanisms must be 
primarily tailored towards SMEs or start-ups i.e. business incubators. This is critical 
for fostering linkages and enhancing knowledge diffusion between public and private 
sectors. 
 
Public investment aimed towards developing and sustaining innovation strategies 
must be centred on the establishment of an environment favourable to business 
creativity and private sector R&D. This support comes in the form of integrated 
packages that apply to all levels. This potentially involves a wide range of 
investments, not only in R&D. 
 
VIII.III.VI. Foreign Direct Investment  
 
In the previous chapters, it was stated that FDI and innovation are positively 
correlated. FDI may contribute to the innovation process in developing countries in 
several ways. FDI can create more sophisticated technology generation, it can lead to 
increases innovation outputs, it can facilitate knowledge transfer, it can increase local 
innovation capacity, and it can provide greater efficiency in the innovation process.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry is an R&D intensive industry. It involves several stages 
of basic, applied and clinical research. The innovation process is usually described as 
a complex, costly and time-consuming activity. Given the tremendous costs and the 
long time scale associated with bringing a new product to market, a peculiar 
importance is attributed to IPRs rights. Patents are unusually strong in relation to 
pharmaceuticals in comparison with other industries. Hence, IPRs protection has 
strong a deterring effect on the FDI decisions of pharmaceutical companies. 
 
The range of FDI activities of multinational companies differs from country to 
country. The FDI flows within the pharmaceutical industry are usually focused on 
cross border merger and acquisition activities. In fact several studies have revealed 
that merger and acquisition activity has dominated the FDI flows in recent years.769 
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The main motivations of the FDI activities of multinational companies concern sales, 
distribution and manufacturing. The multinationals invest in developing countries in 
order to utilise the market and trading potential of the country, and to open up new 
distribution channels. The geo-political situation of the country is taken into account 
i.e. its trade and investment policies, its currency advantages and the availability of 
cheap infrastructure.  
 
Baskaran and Muchie, identified ten major components within the concept of a well-
positioned national innovation system that influence the nature and shape of 
investment decisions in R&D. These components are as follows: the presence of a 
stable investment climate, the presence of a stable economic structure, the 
availability of scientific and engineering skills, the presence of a good education 
system, the presence of R&D performing institutions, the presence of institutions 
doing a high level of basic research and publications, the presence of strong links 
between knowledge institutions and production enterprises, the presence of a strong 
IPRs regime, the presence of dynamic science parks, the presence of a diverse range 
of firms and institutions, and the presence of a diversified industrial structure.770 
 
In theory, the presence of all these components, or most of them, in a country’s 
national innovation system suffices to make the country attractive for FDI in R&D. It 
is argued that such a country is likely to enjoy a high level of FDI at both the 
medium and higher level of technological and innovation complexity.771  
 
Recent evidence suggests that the foreign R&D investments of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies is limited to 35-40% of their R&D activities.772 A large 
proportion of R&D activities in the pharmaceutical are still taking place in developed 
countries. Nevertheless, China and India are also receiving a significant proportion 
of investment in this area.  
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771 Ibid, p.7 
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Interestingly, China, India and Brazil are the countries that currently have the highest 
proportion of overall annual FDI inflow in R&D. Nevertheless, when it comes to 
pharmaceuticals, the level of FDI in Brazil is significantly lower than in China and 
India. This is despite the fact that Brazil possesses a high level of local capabilities in 
the pharmaceutical industry.773 
 
This is an interesting finding in terms of pharmaceutical innovation, IPRs and 
developing countries. During the TRIPS negotiations, the developing countries were 
promised an increased level of FDI in high-tech areas like pharmaceuticals. Brazil 
implemented TRIPS in 1999, long before China and India did so. Moreover, most of 
the FDI determinants are present in Brazil, in addition to the high-level of local 
capabilities present in the country. Nevertheless, the level of FDI in pharmaceutical 
R&D is much lower than in China and India.  
	  
Thus, the previous findings indicate that the FDI decisions of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies increasingly depend upon other factors than the presence 
of an IPRs regime or the level of local capabilities. Clearly, China and India have 
been major recipients of global FDI. Certain factors associated with location, cost, 
specialised resources and skills may have contributed to make these countries the 
winners of the game.  
 
Notwithstanding the high level of FDI for pharmaceutical R&D in these countries, 
China and India were successful in developing wide-ranging capabilities in the 
complex field of drug development. For instance, Roche established a research 
centre in China in 2004 to improve global research prospects on medicinal 
chemistry. Another multinational pharmaceutical company Sanofi–Aventis has also 
established a strategic research agreement with the Shanghai Institutes for Biological 
Sciences. Chinese government increased the amount of funds transferred to public 
research in order to attract multinational pharmaceutical companies to participate in 
collaborations with Chinese academic institutions.774 On the other hand, India is one 
of the few countries which has achieved self-sufficiency in relation to drugs 
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manufacture, with production capacity covering over 70% of the bulk drugs and 80% 
of the formulations. Moreover, some Indian pharmaceutical companies have 
established partnerships, or have been co-operating, with large pharmaceutical 
companies in terms of providing API, contract manufacturing for already existing 
drugs or research candidates, clinical out-sourcing and research partnerships.775 By 
way of illustration, an alliance has been established between Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories and GSK to develop generic drugs. According to the deal, Dr.Reddy’s 
undertakes the pharmaceutical development of the drug until the last phase, the 
human equivalence studies and GSK does the clinical studies. In other words, each 
part of the deal does what they do best.776  
 
Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence highlights the fact that there is an 
ambiguous relationship between FDI and pharmaceutical innovation in developing 
countries. Even for countries like Brazil, which have more to offer rather than a 
relatively strong IPRs regime, the FDI flow in relation to R&D has been a trickle 
rather than a stream. Nevertheless, there is a multiplicity of possibilities ahead for 
boosting local innovation capacity in the country. More importantly, under certain 
circumstances, a lack of FDI increases the bargaining power of the country in terms 
of IPRs protection and the use of TRIPS flexibilities. Brazil issued compulsory 
licences in 2007 against Merck. Since this time Brazil has been using compulsory 
licences as part of a hard-line negotiation strategy with Big Pharma. The local 
capabilities in the area of generic drugs manufacturing and the domestic market 
power has provided Brazil with a greater flexibility in addressing public health 
problems. As it turns out, the lack of substantial pharmaceutical FDI in the country 
prevents any sanctions that pharmaceutical companies may invoke i.e. reduced FDI, 
reduced technology transfer and local R&D, from being applied.777 
 
Even though a significant share of FDI, particularly in pharmaceutical R&D, has 
been channelled to China and India, developing countries may still be able take 
advantage of future FDI. Contractual mechanisms can be established between local 
                                                       
775 GRACE, supra note 624, pp.23-24 
776 See, supra note 756 
777 For more information, BENOLIEL D. & SALAMA B.: “ Towards an Intellectual Property 
Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era” available at 
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4c03k7v7, (03.08.2010) 
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industry and multinational pharmaceutical companies to enable technology transfer. 
These mechanisms include, but are not limited to, licensing, joint and cooperative 
R&D agreements, and joint ventures and research consortiums. These initiatives 
could put developing countries in an advantageous position in terms of acquiring 
frontier technologies. Thus, this will enable a stage-skipping catch-up process for the 
local industry, rather than a path-following one. Instead of reinventing the wheel and 
going through the conventional path, they may jump directly to latest technology in 
order to keep up with developments. 
 
The case of the Korean innovative vaccines illustrates this kind of collaboration very 
clearly. Like the Korean pharmaceutical companies, local companies in developing 
countries may collaborate with innovative pharmaceutical companies on projects 
dealing with local health problems. This may improve their ability to combine local 
knowledge with global knowledge and frontier technology.  
 
The quality of international collaborations and partnerships between companies is 
crucial in order to determine the extent that FDI actually contributes to local 
innovation. Greater international collaboration may well reduce the technology and 
capacity gap between local and foreign industries. To this end, governments may 
consider creating attractive domestic markets for foreign companies. This requires a 
number of structural policy changes in many areas, from improving the research 
capacities of a country, to ensuring that NIS is attractive to foreign investors. 
	  
VIII.IV. Conclusion  
 
The country and company case studies of this thesis have provided a number of 
insights regarding patent regimes, or IPRs more broadly, in relation to local 
pharmaceutical industries and innovation strategies. This chapter has identified the 
common threads that exist across these country studies. These are categorized as 
real-life lessons. The real-life lessons are presented as observations from different 
countries, illustrated considerations and policy implications. The overall aim is not to 
reproduce a best model or a recipe but rather to identify the main determinants of a 
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policy aimed at restructuring and boosting the local pharmaceutical innovation 
capacities of developing countries.  
 
To this end, a finely tuned IPRs system must match the development needs of the 
country. It must establish a balance between patent protection and local innovation. 
This is the first and foremost lesson that can be drawn from the experiences of other 
countries. The findings herein strongly suggest that there is a non-linear relationship 
between IPRs and economic development. As a country moves away from a position 
of borrower to a position of innovator, the IPRs regime becomes significant. 
Although the global patent regime today does not provide the necessary flexibility to 
modify the IPRs regime, it is arguable that with the appropriate and right policies in 
place, developing countries will be able to succeed in bringing about economic 
growth and development.  
 
Nevertheless, the IPRs system alone is nothing more than a set of rules unless it is 
embedded in a setting. This setting must integrate social, legal, economic, political, 
and technological considerations into a national system of innovation. NIS 
effectively determines the local extent of technological innovation. The concept of 
national innovation describes a dynamic network of organisations, institutions, and 
policies. These linkages affect the creation, development, commercialisation and 
diffusion of new technology within a national economy and facilitate technology 
diffusion and knowledge flows across national borders as well as within local 
industries. More importantly, NIS serves as an efficient socio-economic platform for 
catching up, because the system fills the existing technological gaps and thus, it 
enhances the local innovation capacities. 
 
The integration of the IPRs regime into a broader view of a national innovation 
system entails the enactment of complementary socio-economic measures. These 
measures are identified in Chapter 4. In this chapter, these measures were combined 
with country and company case studies in an effort to assess their impact on the 
pharmaceutical innovation process. Nevertheless, what is provided herein are some, 
but not all, of the pieces of the innovation puzzle. The degree to which each piece is 
applicable in a particular developing country strictly depends upon the particular 
social, economic, technological, and institutional variables of that country. Of 
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course, it also depends upon the willingness of policy makers to take the appropriate 
steps towards developing a sound innovation system. 
 
The research findings herein illustrate the fact that the innovation system potentially 
creates an intriguing puzzle for developing countries. Within this puzzle, some 
pieces are harder to put together. The sizes of the different institutions, policies, 
relationships and potential synergies that exist between all the stakeholders 
necessarily vary across countries. Thus, some pieces may not initially fit easily into 
the overall picture. Certainly, there is still much to learn about the missing pieces of 
the innovation puzzle in developing countries.   
 
Fortunately, public awareness of the importance of NIS continues to increase within 
developing countries. This will potentially lead to further recognition of the IPRs 
systems as a vital, but merely one, component of this innovation system.  
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XI. CONCLUSION: MOMENT OF TRUTH 
 
 
The literature on the global IPRs regime is wide and various, and steadily growing. 
Over the years, there has been significant number of books and articles devoted to 
TRIPS, its origin, background, content as well as its implementation process. Much 
has been written and discussed about the impact of TRIPS on developing countries, 
particularly on local pharmaceutical industry. Policy options and best models of 
practices have been presented for the developing countries.  Consequently, 
developing countries are well advised to implement TRIPS in an effort to promote 
innovation and technological development in the country.  
 
In recent years, innovation, development and sustainability became central in wider 
attempts to conceptualize and analyze the patent system.  Although the patents 
system has primarily developed to promote economic ends, economists have long 
relinquished the field. For a while, patent lawyers were glad to see them go, 
nevertheless, the post-TRIPS experiences of the developing countries showed that 
strengthened patent rights, or IPRs more broadly, does not bring 
economic development and innovation on its own. Their impact in large part depends 
on the competitive nature of the economy. They do, however, support the flow of 
knowledge and innovation in the country and contribute to the national innovation 
system.  
 
As it turns out, economists are coming back into the picture. Since then economic 
arguments have been relatively dominating the IPRs discussions. Recent 
developments in the field of IPRs have led to a renewed interest in law, economics 
and innovation.  The conventional wisdom suggests that IPRs regime is but one 
component of the national innovation system. Moreover, the evidence is emerging 
that unless it is well supported by appropriate complementary socio-economic 
essentials IPRs regime is very unlikely to support innovation and development in a 
country.  
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On the other hand, legal scholars still tend to ignore economic and social aspects of 
the issue and usually focus on legal issues surrounding the IPRs. Alas there is a lack 
of reception of IPRs rights and their relation to innovation theory. Nevertheless, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to ignore these economic and social structures that 
shape the innovation process. The current state of the discussion on the topic proves 
that legal scholars have (still) much to learn from economists.  
 
In an effort to incorporate economics and social policy into IPRs law, this thesis 
combined socio-cultural, legal, economic, political and technological factor analysis. 
The primary aim was to improve holistic understanding of the concept of innovation 
and assess IPRs as a part of national innovation system.  Building upon the previous 
findings and discussions, it, then, highlighted examples of innovation strategies and 
policies in terms of patents, innovation and local pharmaceutical industry. The case 
studies of the countries and companies throughout the thesis presented real-life 
observations how the respective structural and institutional characteristics of the 
countries affected the process and outcome of pharmaceutical innovation practices.  
 
The thesis concluded with discussion of some practical considerations and policy 
implications for developing countries in an effort to boost local pharmaceutical 
innovation. It should be noted that the real life lessons learned from the country and 
company case studies provide no indication of a one size fits all model to follow or a 
magical recipe for boosting innovation in local industry. Nevertheless, they present 
valid aspirations for countries and they may eventually be incorporated into the 
country models of innovation. 
 
Subsequently, one of the more significant findings to emerge from this study is that 
there is a constant need for new models or recipes that are locally created. Although 
very important principles and implications emerge from the research findings, the 
application of the former in developing countries strictly depends on legal, political, 
economic, socio-cultural, technological conditions of the each country.  
 
Thomas Edison, has once defined innovation as ‘one percent inspiration and ninety-
nine percent perspiration’. Considerably more work still needs to be done to 
determine the country recipes for boosting local pharmaceutical innovation. 
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Nonetheless, the power of that one percent should not be underestimated in efforts to 
move forward. 
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ANNEX 
 
Annex I: List of Interviewees (Non-Attributable Basis)
 
1. Top Officer, Israeli Patent Office, Jerusalem, Israel 
2. Top Officer, Life Science Sector, Chief Scientist Office, Israel Ministry of 
Industry, Trade & Labour, Tel Aviv, Israel 
3. Top Officer, Magnet Program, Chief Scientist Office, Israel Ministry of Industry, 
Trade & Labour, Tel Aviv, Israel 
4. Top Officer, Israeli Ministry of Justice, Intellectual Property Law Division, 
Jerusalem, Israel 
5. President, Sameul Neaman Institute, Haifa, Israel 
6. Senior Researcher, Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel 
7. Head Patent Counsel, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., Petah Tikva, Israel 
8. Senior Strategy Planner, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, Haifa, Israel 
9. Head of Patent Department, Unipharm Pharmaceuticals, Tel Aviv, Israel 
10. Lawyer from law firms representing the international pharmaceutical industry in 
Israel, Tel Aviv, Israel 
11. Lawyers from law firms representing the national generic industry, Tel Aviv, 
Israel 
12. Professor, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel 
13. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel 
14. Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Ben Ilon University, Tel Aviv, Israel 
15. Business Development Manager, D-Pharm Ltd, Rehovot, Israel 
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